

**CRISE Policy Conference:  
Policies to support peaceful development in West Africa**

**Transcorp Hilton, Abuja - February, 28<sup>th</sup> 2007  
Provisional Conference Programme  
(Notes)**

*Note on conference format:* Each panel discussed a part of the CRISE Policy Briefing Document for West Africa. The panels were introduced by CRISE staff or by local people working with CRISE, and the commentators were academics, politicians and officials, from Nigeria and Ghana.

**Opening Ceremony**

The Chairman, Senator Ike Ekweremadu of the Senate Committee on Federal Character, opened the conference by pointing to the importance of the issues to be discussed, both for Nigeria and other countries in the sub-region.

Prof. Frances Stewart, Director of the Centre for Research on Inequality, Human Security and Ethnicity (CRISE), introduced CRISE and explained that the overall aim of CRISE is to investigate relationships between ethnicity, inequality and conflict in order to identify economic, political, social and cultural policies which promote stable and inclusive multiethnic societies.

This was followed by a keynote address from the Minister of the Federal Capital Territory, represented by Dr. Auwalu Anwar, the FCT Secretary for Agriculture and Rural Development.

Panel I: What are HIs, why do they matter and how do we measure them  
(Sections 1 and 2 of the West Africa Policy Briefing, p. 2-4)

Chair: Senator Ike Ekweremadu, Chairman, Senate Committee on Federal Character.  
Presentation: Prof. Frances Stewart, CRISE Director  
Commentator 1: Temitope W. Oshikoya, African Development Bank  
Commentator 2: Kwesi Jonah, Acting Head, Governance Centre, Institute of Economic Affairs, Accra

The first presentation of the conference was given by Prof. Frances Stewart, CRISE Director, and focused on what Horizontal Inequalities (HIs) are, why they are important, and how to measure them. She also discussed some data and evidence regarding the prevailing HIs in Nigeria, Ghana and Cote d'Ivoire.

She started by explaining that HIs are inequalities between groups, and that this differs from the 'normal' definition of inequality which usually focuses on inequality among individuals. The most politically salient and relevant groups can be based on ethnicity, religion, region, race or some other 'cultural' marker. She further pointed out that HIs are multi-dimensional with political, social, economic and cultural status dimensions.

She continued by saying that countries should not only be concerned about group inequality because it holds back individuals in the relatively disadvantaged groups, but, more importantly, because it increases countries' risk of experiencing socio-political instability, including violent conflict and civil war. While she acknowledged that the measurement of socio-economic HIs is sometimes challenging because of the lack of ethnically segregated data, she suggested that regional or language proxies are often useful alternatives. The measurement of political HIs requires the identification and quantification of group representation in significant political positions and institutions, including the government, parliament, bureaucracy, military, police, etc. Analysis of the prevailing cultural status inequalities requires analysis of the main cultural and symbolic events; media; and education. In addition to attempting to assess a country's 'objective' HIs, she also stressed the importance of determining how people from different groups 'perceived' the prevailing HIs, for example, by means of perceptions surveys and interviews.

In the final part of her presentation, she discussed some data regarding the prevailing HIs in Nigeria, Ghana and Cote d'Ivoire, particularly focusing on the north-south divide. While all three countries were shown to face severe north-south socio-economic inequalities, in the political sphere, the collected data showed that while northerners were excluded from power in Cote d'Ivoire, in Nigeria and Ghana they were included.

The First commentator, **Temitope Oshikoya** of the African Development Bank (ADB) underscored the importance of the work of CRISE and its relevance to West Africa in particular. He noted that the crisis in Cote d'Ivoire which has led to loss of lives and property and the relocation of the headquarters of the ADB to Tunis is evidence of the costs of conflicts. He commended the multidisciplinary and multinational approach that CRISE has adopted for its work. He noted that the findings of CRISE on the existence of vertical inequalities, which ironically has not been emphasised in the CRISE study, raises the need to bring development to the centre of governance and conflict prevention. He also raised issues over what he called the selective use of data in the Policy Briefing Document.

The second Commentator, **Kwesi Jonah**, Acting Head, Governance Centre, Institute of Economic Affairs, Accra, also commended the work of CRISE. He attributed the non-violent outcome in Ghana to the fact that the North ethnic groups who are minorities in demographic terms have historically been overrepresented in the national legislature. He noted that the CRISE findings rightly draw attention to the failure of Ghana to reduce socio-economic inequalities. This he pointed out is a reflection of class interests as the ruling classes have worked out an arrangement that favours them irrespective of their region of origin. He suggested that there is need for policies that are targeted at the majority of the people and not just a few rich individuals. Existing inequalities have, however, been mitigated by migration. Historically, a substantial percentage of the labour force in the cocoa farms in the South have originated from the North. The transfer of resources through migration has helped to mitigate inequalities and prevent any political crisis.

**Mr. Ledum Mittee**, President of the Movement for the Survival of Ogoni People (MOSOP), disagreed with the indices used for measurement. He argued that it was wrong to use territories (geopolitical zones and states) because the differences

between the groups were not in the territories but in the people. The use of geopolitical zones and states conceals more than it reveals. This is especially the case for minorities. In Rivers State for instance, there are about 18 ethnic groups whose peoples have nothing in common. This is unlike the case of the major ethnic groups; in Ogun State, for example, all are Yoruba. When appointments and representation are based on states, minorities such as the Ogoni are swallowed up. The idea of geopolitical zones has created another level of marginalisation.

**Senator Ike Ekweremadu**, the chair, said the situation that Mr. Ledum Mittee referred to was pervasive and not restricted to minorities alone. Even in Ogun State, which Mr. Mittee cited as an example, there are different groups - Ijebu, Egbas etc. The Federal Character Commission (FCC) recognises these differences and the policy has been designed in such a way that all of the interests are represented. What remains is to strengthen the FCC by enacting legislations on sanctions that would be applied to institutions that fail to implement the principle.

Panel II. Ethnic representation and Governance  
(Section 3.1 of the West Africa Policy Briefing, p. 5-10)

Chair: Professor Tekena Tamuno, University of Ibadan

Presentation: Dr. Abdul Raufu Mustapha, Kirk-Greene Fellow & CRISE Senior Researcher

Commentator 1: Richard Asante, Research Fellow, Institute of African Studies, University of Ghana, Accra

Commentator 2: Professor Tekena Tamuno, University of Ibadan (in the place of Senator Udoma Udo Udoma, Senate Chief Whip)

**Dr. Raufu Mustapha**, CRISE Senior Researcher, introduced the discussion.

He said many people feel themselves to be discriminated against, despite policies to correct possible discrimination. The Federal Character Commission (FCC) was a critical aspect of these inclusive policies. It was a very important institution, despite receiving frequent criticism, from the World Bank and DFID among others. However, he said it did have some weaknesses and needed some reforms. One change might be from an arithmetic to a 'trumping' method of allocating jobs.

The worst aspect of HIs in Nigeria was in the social dimension; for example the infant mortality rate was much higher in the North than the South, as was access to maternal clinics. The FCC does not look at these issues. Moreover, discrimination needs to be countered at the level of the private sector and communities as well as government.

A major problem in current policies was the exclusion of minorities: 80% of minority group language had never been used on radio, for example. Policies were needed to create space for minorities.

Economic inequalities were also severe. The data on loans, given in the briefing document, was just a measurable symptom of this. It was not enough to focus on politics alone; social and economic inequalities also need to be addressed.

**Richard Asante** of Ghana University presented the first comment. He noted that there was an interesting comparison between Ghana and Nigeria. Both had had chequered histories, including military coups; and in both cases much of this was due to the high HIs. There was much to learn from the Nigerian Federation and the FCC. In contrast Ghana is a unitary state, which had introduced considerable decentralisation. Nigeria had done pretty well in achieving ethnic balance and avoiding national conflict through its federal system, job quotas and also the new capital, Abuja.

There were critical challenges; the FCC was not working as well as it should be and reforms were needed. He noted that Ethiopia had adopted the principle of Ethnic Federalism and asked whether this might be possible in Nigeria. He would like to know more about the FCC, including its source of funds. It is easy to establish institutions, like the FCC, but it was important to provide enough resources to enable such institutions to carry out their functions. Does the FCC have enough resources? There is also the important point on how the public perceives the FCC. Do they think it is impartial and efficient? Also is the FCC well resourced to carry out its economic mandate?

Ethnic groups have different starting points, some are much more educated than others, for example. A meritocratic system handicapped many groups therefore. He emphasised the importance of access to education, and asked whether education equalised opportunities in Nigeria.

The political elites want political inclusion, but the masses want economic inclusion. The elites had been successful in securing inclusion, but the masses had not succeeded in getting either economic or political power, and were disempowered. How could they be empowered?

The second comment came from **Prof. Tekana Tamuno** of the University of Ibadan.

He said that whereas vertical inequality was quality driven, horizontal inequality was quantity driven. He pointed out that being a Minister of Sport was not the same as being Finance Minister, so merely looking at numbers of ministers could be misleading. Similarly, commanders in the army were not the same as privates.

He felt that 'legitimacy' was critical in representation and governance. This involved participation and performance. In Nigeria, minorities were often excluded from participation. Their votes do not count. He raised the issue of Proportional Representation and asked what sort of PR system would suit Nigeria.

#### Discussion from the floor:

**A. B. Mahmoud** asked whether the FCC should take up a social mandate. Could it do so? Other models of correcting social HIs would be helpful, as he didn't think the FCC could do this. What were the root causes of inequalities; and is the present market-based model of economic reforms capable of dealing with these issues? He asked how these reforms had affected HIs in Ghana.

**Prof. Onigu Otite**, Professor of Sociology, asked about the relationship between VIs and HIs. He said there was a tight interaction between them and they could not be kept apart. Secondly, he said the Federal Character Principle was not enough. He questioned whether arithmetic allocation was enough, and stated that derivation and ownership of resources should be considered before an arithmetic allocation.

**Prof. Frances Stewart** responded to the question about the relationship between HIs and VIs. She said that CRISE emphasised HIs partly because they were generally neglected, but more importantly because they appeared to be related to a higher propensity to conflict, as people mobilised along group lines, but VIs had not, perhaps surprisingly, been found to be so related. Econometric investigation had shown almost no relationship between VI and HI from this perspective. But the distribution of income within a group and comparisons of this between groups was of concern as it altered the incentives for conflict and also the relevant policies. Moreover, HIs contribute to societal household inequality (VI) and to poverty, and in some contexts, it is not possible to reduce poverty significantly without tackling HIs, as in some Latin America countries. She also noted that the issue of how economic reforms affect HIs is important. They appeared to have had unequalising tendencies in Ghana, as the North benefited little from the reform programme.

**Alhaji Mohammed Dewu**, consultant architect, said that CRISE ignored the problem of the elite and their relationship to the deprived. CRISE has ignored the class dimension and the fact that elites manipulate issues to create conflicts. He alleged that there had been a deliberate attempt by some southern elites to stop crude oil being delivered to the North by repeatedly blowing up a pipeline. This was the work of elites as it was too complicated for the masses. This act is capable of causing conflict as it contradicts other forms of integration in which southern elites benefit from economic activities in the North. He cited the case of irrigation schemes in the North where there is a division of labour between northern farmers, southern money lenders and southern buyers of produce. This suggests that there is economic interdependence in the country which those who orchestrate pipeline vandalism fail to take into account.

In response to comments, **Dr. Raufu Mustapha** noted that the FCC could not achieve change on its own. The mandate has to be passed by parliament. The FCC can show the need for change and campaign on it, give leadership. People respect the FCC as shown by their actions (e.g. requesting data, respecting decisions). FCC funding was quite low given the large number of commissioners (37) and heavy travel commitments. In tackling the social mandate, the South African government puts emphasis on extending social services to the masses, as well as including the elite through economic empowerment programmes. He was not suggesting that all economic rationality should be abandoned in order to achieve reduced HIs. A systematic effort should be made to monitor outcomes and transfer resources. The current economic model tends to give more to those who already have. He suggested that Frances Stewart might be in a better position to comment on the implications for economic reform.

**Prof. Frances Stewart** agreed that there was a tendency for economic reform not to consider inequalities and social costs. However in such contexts, special programmes

and investments in infrastructural development can create a trickle-down effect. The Malaysian case shows that this is possible.

### Panel III. Citizenship Rights and Ethnicity

(Section 3.2 of the West Africa Policy Briefing, p. 10-12)

Chair: Dr. Dan Aighewi, Director of Administration, Federal Character Commission (FCC), Abuja

Presentation: Professor Ogoh Alubo, National Institute for Policy and Strategic Studies, Kuru

Commentator 1: Dr. Jibrin Ibrahim, Director, Centre for Democracy and Development (CDD), Abuja

Commentator 2: Dr. Ruth Marshall, Director, French Institute for Research in Africa (IFRA), Ibadan.

The Chairman, **Dr. Dan Aighewi**, Director of Administration and Supplies of the FCC, said this panel was very important because it needed to deal with the question: Who is a Nigerian? This is a question that has generated so much controversy. He hoped the panel would also address the issue of the rights of the Nigerian citizen, the place of ethnicity in definition of citizenship and how all these affects the project of national integration.

**Professor Ogoh Alubo**, who gave the presentation, started by noting that he was no longer the director of research at the National Institute for Policy and Strategic Studies, Kuru, but has since returned to the Department of Sociology, University of Jos.

He noted that according to some estimates there were 374 distinct ethnic groups in Nigeria. His study has focused on North Central Nigeria. The region is important because it contains about 60 per cent of ethnic groups in Nigeria. It has produced many generals and many soldiers. It is also unique in the fact that the ethnic groups in the area believe they have a common enemy: the Hausa-Fulani. The conflicts arise from the perception that the Hausa Fulani are settlers. This perception does not take into account the fact that the Hausa-Fulani have lived in the area for over 200 years. Despite this perception, most of the conflicts he has studied are between the ethnic groups in the region and not between them and the Hausa Fulani. His presentation focused on the conflicts in Plateau State and Nassarawa State.

In one major conflict in Plateau State the conflict was between indigenes and settlers. The Hausa/Fulani were perceived as settlers. The conflict was politically motivated and arose from the objection of the Biroms and other ethnic groups to the appointment of Hausa-Fulani people whom they perceive as settlers to political positions. Although the conflict is basically political, religion and ethnicity also play very important roles. For instance, the city map of Jos has been redrawn along the lines we have in Lebanon, where Christians live in one area while Moslems live in another. There has been mass relocation of individuals and the relocation is facilitated by informal exchanges. There is also an overlap between ethnicity and religion. While the so-called indigenes are Christians, the Hausa-Fulani 'settlers' are Moslems. The conflicts spiralled from Jos to the rural areas with many deaths and much destruction. This has

disrupted the local political economy which was hitherto marked by economic interdependence and led to segmentation of markets.

In Nassarawa State, the conflict is between the Tiv and other 'indigenous' ethnic groups. The conflict also has its origins in politics. Governor Abdulahi Adamu, who was elected in 1999, had much support from the Tiv population in the state. As a result of this he decided to give political appointments to Tiv and also create chiefdoms for Tiv. This infuriated the indigenous ethnic groups. In one case, the 'indigenous' beheaded a Tiv who had been recognised as Chief. This provoked reprisal attacks from the Tiv.

In both cases, he explored the role of gender, and found that women were not involved mostly in the fighting, but in providing food, protecting children and moving to safety.

The issue of citizenship at the state level led to clear discrimination against 'settlers' even if they had been in the state for generations. They suffered from discrimination in jobs, admission to secondary school and scholarships; and only indigenes could stand for elections. Some schools were reserved for indigenes. Women sometimes had a double disadvantage if they married people from another state and were then shut out of both. Thus at a state level Nigerian citizenship meant little.

The Chair, **Dr. Dan Aighewi**, noted that the problem is that a person has to belong to a particular place before they can enjoy citizenship rights.

The first comment came from **Jibrin Ibrahim**, Director of the Centre for Democracy and Development, in Abuja. He pointed out that the constitution of Nigeria does not say that a person must be an indigene to stand for elections, just that one must have at least 6 months residence. It is the mob that enforces the indigene rule. The problem is not one of law but the result of two elements: (i) the very high mobility in Nigeria, so that more than 50% of the population had moved from their place of origin – so the system actually eroded the rights of more than half the population; (ii) the indigenes/settler categories were artificial ones: there was no real way of establishing who were indigenes. Dynamic factors had created the labels. He had participated for 6 years on a Commission on this issue. He believed the right answer was to make rights based on residence only. But the difficulty was in getting this accepted. Basically there was a lack of trust in reciprocity across states.

He noted that despite a legal obligation to submit annual reports to the National Assembly, the FCC had not submitted an annual report to the National Assembly since Obasanjo became President.

**Dr. Ruth Marshall**, Director of the French Institute for Research in Africa (IFRA), gave the second comment. She said there were methodological problems about HIS which arose from the 'taken for granted' nature of groups. The distinction between indigenes and settlers, for example, was a fictitious one. She pointed to the crucial role of the state in creating political identities. She pointed to the fact that aspects of belonging are purely subjective, while censuses etc. harden these identities. This was shown by the paradox of CRISE research showing that 'ethnicity' was not regarded as seriously privately as it was in the public sphere. She noted the fundamental role of

the state in creating the divisive identities in Cote d'Ivoire, even announcing that a person was dangerous if they did not have a village.

Discussion from the floor:

**Prof. Onigu Otite** said the Constitution is clear in theory about whether one should distinguish between indigenes and settlers but practice is very different. Problems of discrimination and access are behind dual citizenship.

**A.B. Mahmoud** said CRISE was supporting discrimination through another means by suggesting a residency requirement. He would prefer a situation where Nigerians every enjoyed rights of citizenship.

**Dr. Raufu Mustapha** said the philosophy of dual citizenship was inherent in federalism. Under a federal system one cannot deny states authority to make laws within their own territory, or one would challenge the federal system. This is why taxation is important.

**Kwesi Jonah** said indigeneity has not been a problem in Ghana because politicians who campaigned on the platform of ethnicity always lost elections. He noted many parliamentarians are representing constituencies that they are not indigenous to and that if the issue were raised many parliamentarians would have to lose their seats. He attributed much of the lesser salience of ethnicity in Ghanaian politics to the boarding school system which brought people from different ethnic groups together, creating the context for strong inter-ethnic friendships at the individual level.

**Prof. Thomas Imobighe** of Ambrose Alli University, Ekpoma, said the problem arose from the abandonment of traditional processes of naturalisation. Each community has a way of admitting settlers into full membership. In Edo State, where he comes from, the practice is for settlers who intend to become indigenes to join the age groups. Such cultural approaches for integration need to be explored in the Nigerian case.

**Prof. Ogoh Alubo** asked why Nigeria was so different from Ghana; it may be because in Nigeria the economy and employment was worsening.

The Chairman, **Dr. Dan Aighewi**, concluded with three points: first, there was a need to review the question of 'sons of soil' and primordial attachment to the land; secondly, he questioned the view that women who marry outside their state cannot continue to call their state of origin, 'home'. He said under the statutes, women retain their natal states even after marriage; and thirdly, he pointed to two types of citizenship, citizenship by birth and by naturalisation. The laws are clear on how naturalisation is done.

Panel IV. Federalism, natural resources and ethnic militia

(Sections 3.3 and 3.4 of the West Africa Policy Briefing, p. 12-14)

Chair: Professor Okwudiba Nnoli, PACREP, Enugu

Presentation 1: Dr. Ukoha Ukiwo, Centre of Advanced Social Science (CASS), Port Harcourt

Presentation 2: Professor Sam Egwu, Kogi State University

Commentator 1: Dr Haruna Wakili, Director, Mambaiyya House, Bayero University, Kano.

The first presentation of this panel was given by **Dr. Ukoha Ukiwo** of the Centre for Advanced Social Science (CASS), Port Harcourt, and focused on the issues of federalism and natural resources.

He noted that federalism was important because political institutions affected the evolution of identities and inter-group relations. Even though Nigerians were dissatisfied with some aspects, the Nigerian federation experience was to be highly commended. After the first Republic, a conscious effort had been made to introduce smaller states such that ethnic groups were divided across states, in order to reduce the power of ethnicity in politics. In addition, the requirement that political parties should have a presence across different states, as well as the layers of government (states and local governments), helped to reduce ethnic politics, and contained the forces of disintegration. The Nigeria Federal system was not perfect but was evolving.

On the issue of fiscal federalism, the CRISE document recommended recognition of the principles of justice, the nationality question, the origin of the resources and inequalities, in determining resource transfers. In the Niger Delta, more needs to be done by companies to ensure good and fair distribution of resources to local peoples.

The document noted that social and economic grievances, alienation, powerlessness and lack of security were factors motivating people (especially young men) to join militias.

In the second presentation, **Prof. Sam Egwu** of Kogi State University, focused on the CRISE research findings relating to ethnic militia, particularly in the Niger Delta. He started by explaining that the Niger Delta situation was the result of the fallout of federalism plus natural resources. The Niger Delta identity was constructed out of a sense of grievance at being allocated little from resources that were located on their soil. The principle of derivation was accepted for agriculture but not for oil. There had also been a centralisation of power. This may have been needed for development, but this was not how it was viewed. There was deep-seated anger in the Niger Delta over lack of employment and infrastructure, much directed at companies rather than the central government. The problems should be linked to problems of governance. Even the elites in Niger Delta were affected and violence has acquired a life of its own. More decentralisation was needed, and there was a need to improve the rule of law.

**Dr. Haruna Wakili**, Director of Mambaiyya House, Bayero University, Kano, gave the first comment. He said there was a need to consider the causes of the crisis. One should not ignore history, including the colonial period and military rule. Governance was critical. It was easy to make recommendations, but these might be perverted in implementation. There was a need to strengthen the state apparatus to attack HIs and poverty, but what was the power base for this?

Discussion from the floor:

**Prof. Nnoli** of PACREP who chaired the panel, asked what was the point of HIs? Where did one stop in defining groups? At the extreme, it would be at the family. There was no automatic relationship between HIs and conflict: what were the intervening variables?

Turning to the FCC he said that if it worked properly, HIs would cease to exist, yet there was little change.

**Prof. Kimse Okoko** of the Ijaw National Congress, said the Federal system has not helped solve problems; there has been an over concentration of powers and resources. The problems of Niger Delta were political as well as economic. The local economy had been destroyed by oil, and environmental issues had arisen. The people of Niger Delta who were challenging the system were freedom fighters, not criminals.

**Prof. L Adele Jinadu**, Director of CASS, said there was a need to take a broader historical view; ethnic revival is a global phenomenon. The state itself has become a problem; it is necessary to consider levels of government and citizenship rights, who owns the state (including gender considerations). More devolution is needed to give people some autonomy. In Nigeria, the issue of ethnic minorities was critical. The Bill of Rights had aimed to protect Nigerians as such. In fact, majority groups had co-opted group rights at the expense of minorities. Once one accepts group rights, as against individual, this was bound to happen. The US had adopted a more pragmatic response to inequalities, via affirmative action, while Nigeria had entrenched groups in the Constitution.

**Prof. Ogoh Alubo** spoke on the Niger Delta issue. He said he was disappointed by the viewpoint prevailing in the Niger Delta that corruption and governance do not matter. He said with the recent revelations from the Human Rights Watch on the extent of corruption in Rivers State, it is clear that governance is critical.

**Dr Bolade Eyinla** of University of Ilorin identified class as the sought-for intervening variable. He said the ruling class deployed the discourse of identity to attain their own objectives. The idea that Federalism wasn't working was the assertion of those who had lost power.

**Prof. Sam Egwu** corrected the impression that he had dismissed the genuine grievance of the people of the Niger Delta. He said he was only pointing to the relevance of governance. He felt that even if more money were given to the Niger Delta and the issue of corruption and governance were not tackled, no development would take place.

**Dr. Ukoha Ukiwo** said CRISE did not posit a mechanical link between HIs and conflicts. All of the studies draw attention to intervening variables. In fact, the focus on federalism and other political institutions is evidence that CRISE is interested in other variables that make HIs likely to lead to conflict. In his own study, intervening variables included the nature of political institutions, that is whether they are inclusive or exclusive, the nature of the state itself, whether it is perceived as partial and in favour of one group against the other, etc. He drew attention of participants to the various studies which give detailed accounts on the interaction of the variables.

Panel V. Lessons from around the world  
(Section 6 of the West Africa Policy Briefing, p. 26-30)

Chair: A.B. Mahmoud, Dikko & Mahmoud Solicitors, Abuja

Presentation: Arnim Langer, CRISE Research Officer in Economics and Politics

Commentator 1: Professor Kimse Okoko, President, Ijaw National Congress (INC)

Commentator 2: Professor Adele Jinadu, Director, CASS, Port-Harcourt.

This was introduced by **Arnim Langer**, Research Officer at CRISE. He reported on the eleven findings noted in the document:

1. In-depth case studies and cross-country as well as within country econometric research shows that the probability of conflict rises where HIs are higher.
2. Conflict is more likely where political and socio-economic HIs are high and in the same direction, or *consistent*.
3. Inclusive (or power-sharing) government tends to reduce the likelihood of conflict.
4. In general it appears that political HIs are particularly important triggers of conflict, because it seems they affect elite motives. Socio-economic deprivation tends to affect the mass of the people, mostly. They thus have grievances but are unlikely to take to violent conflict unless their own group leaders are politically excluded.
5. Citizenship can be an important source of political and economic exclusion, not only at a national but also at regional and local levels.
6. Inequality of cultural recognition among groups is an additional motivation for conflict.
7. Perceptions of inequalities are what make people take action. Though broadly related to observed inequalities, perceptions of inequality can be enhanced or reduced by political leadership, media treatment and education.
8. The presence of natural resources can be a significant cause of separatist conflict, as well as of local conflict.
9. The nature of the state is of enormous importance in determining whether serious conflict erupts and persists.
10. Some HIs are very persistent, lasting centuries even. Where there are persistent HIs, they are particularly important to tackle, and particularly intractable to policy.
11. National and international policies and statistics are too often blind to the issue of HIs.

**Prof. Kimse Okoko**, President Ijaw Congress, made the first comment. He asked whether CRISE investigations included a control variable; whether subnational conflicts were included in the research since in the Southwest of Nigeria there was conflict, even though IMRs were relatively low for Nigeria; he agreed that inclusiveness reduces conflict, including comprehensive citizenship; and he agreed with the points made about the state. He asked what policies were adopted in Europe vis-à-vis ethnic issues.

**Prof. Adele Jinadu**, Director of CASS, Port Harcourt commented that not enough background material had been provided to enable a full assessment of the research. He asked whether CRISE had explored similar societies; was the general purpose of the

research to explain why there are HIs, or to understand conflicts arising from HIs; was the intention of policy to mitigate HIs? He pointed out the importance of defining precisely what was meant, e.g. in relation to what counted as conflict in the study; and what data sources were used; how accurate were they? He asked for more details on some of the policy conclusions, including the role of a Human Rights approach.

**Dr Bolade Eyinla** pointed to the importance of leadership – e.g. of Nkrumah. The Niger Delta represented business as crime and crime as business. He pointed to the importance of conflict entrepreneurs in Nigeria, notably people who benefit from conflict.

**Prof. Thomas Imobighe** said that perhaps resources should not be handled and exploited by foreigners. He asked whether there was a relationship between dependence on a single commodity and higher inequalities. Would it be better if oil were evenly distributed throughout Nigeria?

**Dr. Haruna Wakili** argued that the concept of ‘cultural inequalities’ was not sufficiently interrogated. Quite a number of people appreciate cultural diversity in Nigeria and there is a high degree of intermarriage which should reduce cultural inequalities.

**Fred Onyeoziri**, Director of Research of the People’s Democratic Party (PDP) said inequalities were not a natural outcome, but due to public policy. Even-handedness of the state would reduce the inequalities and also conflict.

**Temitope Oshikoya** asked if all oil revenue went to Niger Delta would this reduce conflict. He said this would not necessarily eliminate HIs. The problem of corruption was important as well as HIs.

The Chairman, **A. B. Mahmood**, asked what was meant in saying that many decision-makers were ‘blind’ to these issues.

**Prof. Frances Stewart** described some experience in Europe in reply to the query of Prof. Kimse Okoko. She noted that the Northern Ireland case was an example, where deep HIs lay behind the conflict, and policies to correct the HIs had been initiated in the 1980s and had been effective in greatly reducing (and sometimes eliminating) the socio-economic inequalities. She argued that this was a major explanation for the peace, though the losing party (Protestants) were not happy with the situation. She also pointed to the examples of Switzerland and Belgium where explicit policies had prevented conflict over the long term, but had been associated with entrenchment of difference.

**Arnim Langer**, CRISE Research Officer, replied to the comments:

- CRISE does not claim that HIs are the only cause of conflict, but that they see an important connection.
- It is necessary to view the connection at the appropriate level, i.e. for conflict within Southeast then it is a matter of inequalities within the region not across the nation.
- He noted that CRISE was talking of *probabilities* of greater HIs being associated with conflict, not of 1:1 causation.

- He agreed the question of the control variable was very important: this had been built into the research, e.g. the Ghana/Cote d'Ivoire comparison, where both countries were similar in many respects, but with different outcomes.
- In response to the query about how a Human Rights approach would contribute, he noted that this would outlaw discrimination of many kinds.
- On the issue of the definition of violence, he noted this varied across research in this area. The definition adopted must fit the local context.
- He agreed that public policy was important in creating HIs (and also geography), but it was also important in reducing them.

The Chair concluded by noting that it was unusual in Nigeria to have discussions among policy-makers, academics and bureaucrats, and thanked CRISE for the initiative.

**Prof. Frances Stewart** thanked the distinguished participants for attending and especially for their fruitful comments, ideas and criticisms which would be of great help in developing CRISE policy recommendations.

**List of participants:**

	<b>Name</b>	<b>Position/Institution</b>
1.	Usman Jimada	Federal Character Commission, Abuja
2.	Senator Ike Ekweremadu	The Chair, Senate Committee on Federal Character, National Assembly
3.	Prof. Ogoh Alubo	Department of Sociology, University of Jos, Plateau State
4.	Prof. L. Adele Jinadu	Centre for Advanced Social Science (CASS)
5.	Prof. Tekena Tamuno	Professor Emeritus, University of Ibadan
6.	Prof. Okwudiba Nnoli	PACREP, Enugu
7.	Prof. Onigu Otite	Executive Director, Kay Tay Consultants
8.	Prof. Thomas Imobighe	Ambrose Alli University, Ekpoma, Edo State
9.	Prof. Sam Egwu	Kogi State University
10.	Dr. Haruna Wakili	Centre for Democratic Research and Training, Mambaiyya House, Bayero University, Kano
11.	Dr Ukoha Ukiwo	CASS
12.	Innocent Chukwuma	Centre for Law Enforcement Education in Nigeria
13.	Dr. Jibrin Ibrahim	Centre for Democracy and Development, (CDD), Abuja
14.	Prof. Kimse Okoko	President, Ijaw National Congress (INC)
15.	Ledum Mitee	President, Movement for the Survival of Ogoni People (MOSOP)
16.	A.B. Mahmoud	Dikko & Mahmoud Solicitors
17.	Fred Onyeoziri	Director of Research, Peoples Democratic Party (PDP), Abuja Headquarters
18.	Adagbo Onoja	The Nation Newspaper

19.	Abiodun Aremu	United Action for Democracy, Abuja
20.	Temitope W. Oshikoya	Director, African Development Bank, Tunis
21.	Beeka Pev Beem Hassana	Member of the Nigeria 2025 Project
22.	Richard Asante	Research Fellow, Institute of African Studies, University of Ghana, Accra, Ghana
23.	Dr. James Zasha	DFID Abuja
24.	Arnim Langer	CRISE Research Officer in Economics and Politics, University of Oxford
25.	Prof. Frances Stewart	Professor of development economics & CRISE Director, University of Oxford
26.	A.B. Ibrahim	Deputy Director, Department of Maintenance, Ministry of Federal Capital Authority, Abuja
27.	Alhaji M. Dewu	Principal Partner, Archimodes Associates
28.	Dr. Ukoha Ukiwo	Centre for Advanced Social Science (CASS)
29.	Dr. Dan Aighewi	Director of Administration, Federal Character Commission (FCC), Abuja
30.	David Angell	High Commissioner, Canadian High Commission, Abuja
31.	Dr. Auwalu Anwar	Secretary for Health, Ministry of Federal Capital Authority, Abuja
32.	Kwesi Jonah	Department of Political Science, University of Ghana & Acting Head, Governance Centre, Institute of Economic Affairs, Accra
33.	Abimbola Akosile	ThisDay Newspapers
34.	Dr. Bolade Eyinla	University of Ilorin
35.	Egbichi Akinsanya	Member of the Nigeria 2025 Project
36.	Umana Rosemary	Director, Education Secretariat, Federal Capital Authority, Abuja
37.	Omeata Winnie	Reporting Officer, Education Secretariat, Federal Capital Authority, Abuja
38.	Odigie Brown	ECOWAS Research Officer

39.	Dr. Ruth Marshall	Director, French Institute for Research in Africa (IFRA), Ibadan.
40.	Dr. Abdul Raufu Mustapha	Kirk-Greene Fellow & CRISE Senior Researcher
41.	Chuks Okoli	Head, Protocol, Federal Character Commission (FCC), Abuja
42.	Enoch Farkeson	Cameraman, Federal Character Commission (FCC), Abuja
43.	Prof. Ayo Dunmoye	Department of Political Science, University of Abuja
44.	Victor Abasiakan-Ekim	Vice-Chairman, National Bar Association (NBA), Abuja
45.	Engr. T.S. Wudil	Chairman, Nigerian Society of Engineers, Bauchi
46.	Dr. Yakubu Mukhtar	Department of History, University of Maiduguri
47.	Danladi Bit	National War College, Abuja
48.	O. Olalusi	Federal Ministry of Education, Abuja
49.	Westerhof	RFI