

Ethnic identity in Peru: Perceptions, prejudices and fluidities¹

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(Still in review, please don't refer to and don't circulate)

Introduction

This paper analyzes the salient ethnic identities collected through the CRISE survey applied in August of 2005, with follow up interviews in June of 2006. It shows the persistence of prejudice against indigenous population in the country and explores the various consequences of ethnicity. Finally, it attempts to contribute some insights to explain the relative lack of engagement in political action in the country, whether ethnically driven or not.

Ethnicity is complicated to analyze because it never comes "clean". Both the survey and the interviews lead us to the need to confront its subjective and context-specific nature. The various approaches in the literature on ethnicity do not on their own give us the framework we need. An exclusive emphasis of some writers on the immutability of inherited ethnic and racial identities --in which conflict appears as unavoidable-- does not seem suitable to understand emergent categories such as *cholo* or *mestizo*. Nor does the understanding of ethnicity in terms of individual strategies based on common interests, where conflict appears as the result of differences, which leaders capitalize on, seems able to explain by itself the absence of ethnic mobilization given the existence of deep and enduring horizontal inequalities in the country². Finally, an exclusive emphasis on the role of historical and institutional processes contributes very little to the understanding of the relative absence of the mobilisation occurring in Bolivia and Ecuador, or the absence of ethnic consciousness compared to Guatemala, given that Peru shared with these other countries similar historical processes.³

¹ We acknowledge the significant comments and suggestions received from Rosemary Thorp and Courinne Caumartin from the CRISE Latin America team and the valuable collaboration of Jazmin Angeles and Maria Teresa Gonzales from the Universidad Catolica with the interviews.

² Stewart (2000) has introduced the term 'horizontal inequalities' to understand ethnic groups, and especially cultural inequalities in access to political and economic resources. A recent case study of these horizontal inequalities in Peru has been made by Barron and Figueroa (2004)

³For Primordialist theories see Eller & Coughlab 1993, Grosby 1994 and Van den Berghe 1995. For instrumentalist approaches see Bates 1983, Hardin 1992, 1995 and Waters 1990 and for those theories emphasizing power of external (generally historic) processes, such as modernization, decolonization, the construction of the nationhood and others, see Vail 1989, Comaroff & Comaroff 1992, Ignatief 1994 and Wilmer 1997.

We think that the use of prejudice as a window on ethnic identity in Peru provides us with a more comprehensive framework to battle with these problems than is available from this separate literature. The study of prejudice allows us to explore the different levels (or expressed forms) of identification (or negation) with a specific ethnic category, the possible values attached to one's own group or to the others' groups, and the perception of how one's group is seen by the others (Hogg and Abrams, 1988). It also permits us to take into account, to some extent, the possible strategies that individuals choose to obtain gains (education, progress) while facing possible ethnic prejudice. Finally, the historical and institutional processes have to be kept in mind when attempting to understand the circumstances in which prejudices develop over time and under what conditions prejudices become most evident⁴.

Prejudices take a long time to change. Although Peru is not the inflexible ethnically or racial divided society that it used to be, and beliefs in a natural hierarchy of races and cultures, that justified prejudices in the past, tend to lose importance in the consciousness of certain groups giving place to new more democratic and open discourses, prejudice can be recreated and can emerge in new forms. People's reactions to being the subject of prejudice are diverse and may vary from person to person and according to the context in which they live. For sure, it is not possible for us to answer these questions without additional research, but our material allows us to provide some insights for further hypotheses.

Before embarking on the analysis, we would like to present the methodology. The perception survey has been applied by interviewing 615 people in three localities: Bambamarca in Cajamarca in the North Highlands, Huanta in Ayacucho in the Central Highlands and San Juan de Lurigancho in the capital city (see map in the annex). In addition, 30 interviews, 10 in each of these localities, were carried out after one year of the survey and applied to a randomly selected sub-sample of the survey's original population⁵. The three cases were chosen to contribute to the broader research agenda of CRISE, aiming to explore the role of ethnicity in prevailing horizontal inequalities and its association with political conflict, in violent or non-violent form. Huanta in Ayacucho was the case where conflict

⁴ There is a vast literature on ethnicity that seeks to understand the cultural context in which group differences are perceived, important part of these literature have been based on a cognitive approach to the process of categorizing, interpreting and framing ethnic categories. What this approach adds to discussion of categorization of race, ethnic groups and nations is further interrogations such as how, when and why people interpret social experience in racial ethnic or national terms. Probably the two most important elements brought for this literature has been from on one side, the self-classification and the classification of (and by) others; and on the other side, the levels (individual, interactional and institutional) and the context in which categorization occurs (See: Barth 1969, Tajfel & Turner 1986, Jenkins 1997, Brubaker 2004 and others)

⁵ The survey was conducted by the Universidad Catolica del Peru, Facultad de Ciencias Sociales in close coordination with Latin American Team of the Centre for Research on Inequality Issues, Human Security and Ethnicity - CRISE.

took place, with a high level of Sendero (Communist Party of Peru Shining Path⁶) penetration; Bambamarca in Cajamarca represented the case where almost no conflict was registered with hardly any sign of Sendero presence. In both cases, urban and rural areas were considered in order to capture variation in degree of heterogeneity. In addition, a third case was selected in the capital city in order to sample something of the greater heterogeneity of the country in ethnic and class terms. The case comprises two migrant communities in San Juan de Lurigancho, Huanta Uno and Huanta Dos.⁷

Our cases were strongly affected by the dramatic process of migration in Peru. Between the 1950s and the 1990s, migrants looking for employment, better living conditions and refuge⁸ went principally from the provinces of the Sierra to Lima. At the beginning most of the provincial migrants were fairly homogeneous members of local elites and relatively well-off sectors of provincial urban capitals, but later on, there was a marked growth in the social and cultural diversity of migrants coming from villages. As a result, Lima has today 30% of all Peruvian residents (7,829, 436 from 26,152,265) and the change in distribution from rural to urban has been profound. The urban population rose from 47% in 1961 to an estimated 70% in 1990.⁹ The experience of violence during the internal conflict in the 80s has made the circumstances of migration very different in our two provincial cases and the two settlements in San Juan de Lurigancho in Lima. Unlike migrants from Bambamarca, families from Huanta had to escape from severe experiences of violence. The better off in Huanta—owning houses and land—were able to sell and fund a better establishment in Lima, the poorer—manly small holders and villagers—fleeing from even more traumatic experiences, left their homes with family members dead or missing, livestock destroyed and land abandoned. In Lima, Huanta migrants naturally formed two settlements (our third case). Huanta Uno, which comprises the former and relatively better off in the valley, and Huanta Dos formed mainly by highlanders and peasants who fled from severe experiences of violence to sanctuary (Munoz, Paredes and Thorp 2005).

In addition, these two provinces vary in the degree of ethnic strength. In Bambamarca, ethnic characteristics such as language and form of organization have to a large extent disappeared and

⁶ Shining path was the maoist-inspired party that initiated the internal conflict in early 80s. Their actions were largely controlled since the capture of its leader, Abimael Guzman, in September 1992.

⁷ Both towns are the capitals of their provinces, Hualgayoc and Huanta, with 75,806 inhabitants and 64,503 inhabitants each one. More than 60% of the population of these provinces is rural and the principal economic activity is agriculture and livestock. In the case of the Lima case, the settlement of Huanta Uno has 2,450 inhabitants and Huanta Dos 1,750 inhabitants. Both belong to the district of San Juan de Lurigancho, the largest district in Lima with in terms of population with 1 million inhabitants.

⁸ Since the outbreak of the internal conflict, over 30,000 persons have been dislocated from towns and villages in the Ayacucho and Huancavelica highlands, most of them gravitating to Lima.

⁹ Other coastal cities, such as Piura, Chiclayo and Trujillo have attracted people from their regions in considerable numbers, as well and significant growth has occurred in some Southern highlands cities such as Arequipa, Cusco and Juliaca in Puno, but Lima is still 14 percent larger than the next 24 cities combined, and 58 percent of all urban dwellers live in Lima (Institute of National Statistics of Peru, INEI).

people with lighter skin predominates as a consequence of an earlier process of intermarriage with European migrants in the region. In Huanta some ethnic characteristics have remained, such as language and social organization, mainly among highlanders. Our case in Lima is more heterogeneous in terms of ethnic backgrounds as result of the process of migration described before. However, the survey was far from sampling the full heterogeneity of Peru in terms of ethnicity and class. It does not cover people living in ‘core Lima’ where most of the *white* and *rich* live¹⁰, or rural areas at high altitudes where quechua and *indigenous* communities predominate.

Even if significant information has been gathered through these tools, we are aware that for Peruvians, ethnicity and race issues are considered taboo and a matter of contempt. As we conducted the interviews, we realized that people tend to react with distrust to the person asking questions about these topics. Therefore, we must be alert to the limitations of our instruments. The discussion with our colleagues about the interpretation of the interviews has also made us realize the difficulties of exploring the perceptions of people without allowing interference from our own subjectivity. Invented names are provided to secure the real identity of our sources and numbers are provided for their identification.¹¹

The paper has been organized in four sections. First, it analyzes the salient ethnic identities revealed, and second shows the persistence of prejudice against the indigenous population in the country. In the third section, the paper explores the various consequences of ethnic identity and ends with an attempt to contribute some insights on the issue of the relatively lack of engagement in the political life of the country.

1. Salient Identities in the Survey

We asked rather carefully in the survey about identity in terms of ethnic origin, paraphrasing ethnicity as racial or cultural origin¹². The result of such self-identification was 18% (N=108) *indigenous*

¹⁰ The probability of finding *white* people with the low levels of education and income is drastically higher in Cajamarca than in any other place in the country.

¹¹ All interviews have been conducted in Spanish and registered in form of notes. Only few interviewers allowed us to record their testimonies. In order to report the interviews in the paper, we use double quotation when we translate and reproduce the testimonies. Single quotation is used for paraphrasing and emphasizing ideas.

¹² As in Peruvian society the concepts of ethnicity and race have been and are very much suppressed, a card containing options was used. The question was paraphrased in the following form: A lot of people think that the racial or cultural groups living in Peru are the following: (1) indigenous/andean, (2) amazonic, (3) black or Zambos, (4) whites, (5) cholos, (6) mestizos, (7) Chinese or Japanese and (8) others. Using this list, if you had to define which of these groups you belong to, which it would be?

andean, 9% *white* (N=54), 18% *cholo* (N=108), and 54% *mestizo* (N=330).¹³ We are not including in the analysis the tiny per cent of *black*, *chinese/japanese* and *amazonico* people (N=15). These proportions are only applicable for our own sample and cannot be extrapolated to the country because the survey was not designed to represent the entire population. As people's identity is always multiple, the questionnaire also sought to identify which aspects of people's identity were perceived as the most significant. Ethnic elements, such as language and race, were only mentioned by 36% and 21% of the people, while gender and occupation were mentioned by 70% and 52% of the respondents respectively. Differences among the four groups are not large, with two exceptions. First, *indigenous* and *cholos* mentioned race as an important aspect of identity than in the rest of the sample. Second, *indigenous* were less likely to mention occupation compared with the rest of the group.

The findings of the 30 interviews help us to clarify the content of these categories.

Indigenous/andean, as the option was presented in the questionnaire, represents the most complicated situation, as *indigenous* may refer to the inheritance of a culture or race from pre-Columbian groups; and *andean* to a regional or geographic background, the Andes and Sierra. Among the *indigenous*, a significant group self-defines as *indigenous* because they come from the Sierra. Some of them think that *serrano* and *cholo* are the same because they have the same origin; others make a difference suggesting some superiority of the *serrano* over the *cholos*¹⁴. One case neither identifies with *cholo*, nor completely with *Serrano*. Alberto Ticlla, a peasant from Huanta, told us that *indigenous* is for him 'a kind of race', different from *serrano* and *cholo*, but he thinks people tend to identify it with terrorism [14]. Most of the *cholos* interviewed shared the feeling of being *serranos*, except Agustin who prefers to say that 'being *cholo* is the same as *mestizo*' [29]. The *cholos* all share in some extent a strong consciousness of being subjects of disdain because of their *cholo* traits, but have overcome with a degree of pride these circumstances, in one form or another. In contrast, almost all *mestizos* have explained their self-definition by referring to the nature of their skin (mixed or moreno) and have not mentioned their *serrano* origin, with the exception of one, Beatriz from Huanta [13]. Yet, among *Mestizos*, women had serious trouble understanding the concept of identity. *Whites* have explained their ethnic self-definition referring to the lighter colour of their skin, although a few also mentioned their *serrano* origin. The interviews show us how the category of *indigenous/andean* strongly overlaps with the *cholo* category: both emphasise their common place of origin, the Sierra, but it is among *indigenous* that we have identified the need of differentiation from the *cholos*. There is also

¹³ In the course of the analysis we will call these four groups *white*, *mestizo*, *cholo* and *indigenous/Andean* in italics for simplification of writing.

¹⁴ Gloria Varillas from Lima self-identifies as indigenous and described the *cholo* as a person more from the city. While she does not express any negative feeling against *cholos*, she said that her parents would [24]. Hildebrando Vargas says that being *cholo* is more common because all Peruvians are *cholo*, but being *serrano* is more specific. He adds that being *cholo* is 'worse than' *serrano*, *cholo* is more 'criollo' [30]. 'Criollo' is a term frequently used to name those persons who know how to avoid the rules.

evidence of the importance of skin colour for some groups, particularly *whites* and *mestizos*, whether it is an important marker for them or the most easily element to be aware of when struggling with the understanding of identity.

Table 1 shows the most important characteristics of the four ethnic categories. As the survey was carried on in small provinces of the Sierra and among migrant population in Lima, it is not surprising that from the 600, excluding the *amazonico*, *asian* and *black*, 85% were born in the Sierra, 4.5% were born in the Coast or Rain Forest and 10.5% were born in Lima. People born in Lima have an average age of 25 years old and live in a migrant neighbourhood; we can presume that they have migrant parents. From the 530 who have provided more detailed information about their place of birth, 85% were born in small cities or towns, 5% in a main city or capital of a region and 10% in Lima. Among those born outside Lima, 29% have migrated to the capital city. About half of the sample knows how to speak quechua, 30% learned as a maternal language and 17% as additional language within the family. People who have never learned quechua either live in Bambamarca (only 1 quechua speaker) or were born in Lima (only 4 quechua speakers). Partly because there are no rich people in our surveys, differences in socioeconomic and educational indicators are not as large as in the overall analysis of the country (Barron and Figueroa, 2004). Differences in the survey are basically associated with whether a person lives in an urban or in a rural area. Almost 60% of the surveyed with no formal education or only primary education live in the rural areas of Huanta or Bambamarca; and 95% of the people without flush toilet and 93% without refrigerator live in the same rural areas.

Table 1
Characteristics of the Salient Ethnic Groups (Percentages)

	White	Mestizo	Cholo	Indigenous	TOTAL
Place of Residence					
<i>Lima-SJL</i>	14.81	22.12	54.63	46.30	31.67
<i>Bambamarca urbano</i>	25.93	19.70	12.04	3.70	16.00
<i>Bambamarca rural</i>	35.19	24.55	0.93	2.78	17.33
<i>Huanta urbano</i>	12.96	19.70	17.59	22.22	19.17
<i>Huanta rural</i>	11.11	13.94	14.81	25.00	15.80
Total (100%)	54	330	108	108	600
Region of birth					
<i>Sierra</i>	90.74	85.45	77.78	89.81	85.33
<i>Coast or Rain Forest</i>	9.26	10.61	12.96	7.41	10.33
<i>Lima</i>	0	3.94	9.26	2.78	4.33

Total (100%)	54	330	108	108	600
Place of birth					
<i>In Metropolitan Lima</i>	9.62	10.13	11.11	5.49	9.43
<i>In a main city of a region</i>	0.00	5.23	11.11	4.40	5.47
<i>In a small town</i>	90.38	84.64	77.78	90.11	85.09
Total (100%)	54	330	108	108	600
Migration(*)					
Migrated to Lima	12.96	20.19	48.98	43.81	28.75
Migrated internally	5.56	16.09	10.20	15.24	13.94
Didn't migrate or returned	81.48	63.72	40.82	40.95	57.32
Total (100%)	54	330	108	108	574
Knowledge of Quechua					
<i>As tongue language</i>	7.41	23.33	37.04	51.85	29.50
<i>As other language</i>	20.37	14.85	16.67	23.15	17.17
<i>Don't speak</i>	72.22	61.82	46.30	25.00	53.33
Total (100%)	54	330	108	108	600
Education					
<i>No formal</i>	12.96	7.27	0.93	3.70	6.00
<i>Primary completed</i>	29.63	30.61	19.44	24.07	27.33
<i>Secondary completed</i>	27.78	37.58	48.15	44.44	39.83
<i>Post secondary qualifications</i>	29.63	24.55	31.48	27.78	26.83
Total (100%)	54	330	108	108	600
Family Ethnicity <i>(Percentages do not total to 100%)</i>					
<i>Same ethnicity than mother</i>	75.00	90.48	83.65	91.35	88.00
<i>Same ethnicity as father</i>	77.36	85.71	82.86	93.33	85.81
<i>Parents with same identity</i>	66.67	85.26	87.13	92.16	85.16
<i>Spouse with same identity</i>	52.78	71.04	63.77	68.57	67.68
Socio-economic status <i>(Percentages do not total to 100%)</i>					
<i>Has radio or tv (communication)</i>	100.00	99.39	99.07	97.22	99.00
<i>Has secure roof (protection)</i>	74.07	73.03	68.52	75.93	72.83
<i>Has Flush toilet (sanitation)</i>	38.89	46.06	46.30	55.56	47.17
<i>Has Refrigerator (electricity)</i>	14.81	25.45	45.37	36.11	30.00
<i>Had private secondary education</i>	7.41	3.64	2.78	0.93	3.33

Notes: (*) all born out of Lima. Source: CRISE Survey-Peru. Universidad Catolica del Peru. All differences are tested (ch2) and significant at a minimum of 95% of confidence.

Flexible ethnic categories

We have learned from the survey and interviews that ethnicity is subjective and context specific. For instance, *mestizos* are aware that they may appear as like *cholos* or *serranos* in other *mestizos'* eyes. *Cholos* or *indigenous* in Lima may pass as *mestizos* in Ayacucho, but in Lima being *mestizo* may be a more restricted category in the eyes of other groups. What we would like to show in the following section is how the place where a person lives changes his or her awareness of specific traits, particularly when living in a largely differentiated society such as Lima. We analyze place of origin, language and skin colour.

Place of birth or origin has been to be a strong ethnic marker in Peru, particularly when the distinction is made between those born in the periphery (small towns) and those born in Lima or a regional capital city (Barron and Figueroa, 2004). In our sample, being born in a small town is strongly correlated with having a peasant father (95% of those born in small towns).¹⁵ Using this variable, the results across localities are revealing. Among those born in the periphery, people now living in Lima are more likely to perceive themselves as *cholos* or *indigenous* (63%) than those living today in Ayacucho (43%). In contrast, almost none of those in Cajamarca perceive themselves in the same way (only 9%). Even Cajamarquinos born in a peripheral town and with a peasant father prefer to self-identify today as *whites* or *mestizos*.

Almost half of the sample speaks quechua and 30% has learned it as their first language. In average, *whites* have the lowest percentage of quechua speakers (28%); followed by *mestizos* (38%), *cholos* (53%) and *indigenous* (76%) with an overwhelming percentage of quechua speakers. People with knowledge of quechua living today in Lima are more likely to report themselves as *cholos* or *indigenous* rather than *mestizo* or *white*, comparing with those quechua speakers living today in Huanta (71 vs. 41%)¹⁶. This difference is quite considerable and it slightly increases if we narrow the analysis to those who reported quechua as their first language (80 vs 46%). The knowledge of quechua may become an ethnic trait in Lima, inducing them to feel *indigenous* or *cholo*, while not in Ayacucho. Speaking quechua in Ayacucho does not necessarily determine one's ethnic identity. As, in the South and Central highlands of the country (Enaho 2001), the knowledge of quechua is

¹⁵ According with Quijano (1980), being cholo and being mestizo have been defined in opposition to agricultural labour dependence, but as ethnicity and race are mainly subjective constructions, we see that having a peasant father may play a role in the self-definition of people, especially in urban settings such as Lima.

¹⁶ When analyzing language only cases from Lima and Ayacucho have being kept as people from Cajamarca do not speak any indigenous language.

extended in Ayacucho, even among *mestizos* or *whites*¹⁷. Further more, only 35 years ago, the use of both languages was an important source of power for *mestizos*.¹⁸

A question about the self-perception of skin colour was introduced in the Peruvian questionnaire using a scale from 1 to 7, where 1 is *indigenous* colour and 7 is *white*. On average, *whites* see themselves *lighter* compared with *mestizos* (5.4 vs. 3.7). *Cholos* feel almost identical to *mestizos* with respect to their skin colour (3.65); but they feel whiter than the way *indigenous* see themselves (2.64). Perceptions about skin colour vary among ethnic groups according to where people live today or have been born. *Whites* living in Lima are likely to feel darker than *whites* living in Bambamarca and Huanta. In contrast, *indigenous* and *cholos* are likely to feel darker if they live today in Huanta than *indigenous* and *cholos* in Lima. The exceptions are the *cholos* and *indigenous* in Bambamarca. *Mestizos* do not reveal differences; they feel in the middle of the skin colour scale in the three places (See table No 2). In the same way, *whites* are likely to feel darker if they have born in Lima or in a main city rather than in a small town. In opposition, *indigenous* and *cholos* feel darker if they have born in a small town rather than in Lima or a main city. *Mestizos* do not reveal differences; they feel in the middle of the skin colour scale in both circumstances.

Lima, where most *white* people live, may present a higher degree of “whiteness” for people living in Bambamarca and Huanta. During the interviews skin colour was an important ethnic marker for some *mestizos* and *whites*. Monica, a woman in Bambamarca, who has worked in Trujillo (a principal city on the Coast) observed that in Trujillo there were more differences in skin colour, white, *morenos* (brown) or even, *gringo* (blond hair and blue eyes)[3]. Florencia, a women who considers herself a *white* living in a neighbourhood mostly *cholo* in Lima, but works in the well-off residential district of San Isidro, observed differences between her whiteness and her colleagues’ in San Isidro. When talking about her place of work, she called herself “*clara*” instead of “white” and her colleagues “whites”, she underlines her boss characteristics. “Tall, white and with fair hair” [28].

¹⁷ In our survey 100% of *whites* and 95% of *mestizos* in Ayacucho speaks quechua.

¹⁸ Until the agrarian reform of 1968 speaking quechua was still an essential element of power for *mestizos* and *whites* in the Sierra, as *indigenous* population did not speak spanish. The use of both languages enabled them to become the intermediaries between the vast *indigenous* population and the central authority and to uphold their power over the *indians* (See De la Cadena 2000, Borricoud 1970, and Cotlear 1970).

Table 2

Self- Perception of skin colour across ethnic groups and localities (means on scale 1 to 7)

Perceived ethnic identity	Huanta (Ayacucho)	Bambamarca (Cajamarca)	San Juan de Lurigancho (Lima)
White	5.31	5.58	4.88
Mestizo	3.41	3.97	3.89
Cholo	2.80	4.14	4.05
Indigenous/Andean	2.16	3.86	2.98
TOTAL	210	200	190

Source: CRISE Survey-Peru. Universidad Catolica del Peru.

What the similar results of the analysis of these three variables (place of birth, language and skin colour) lead us to elucidate is how ethnicity in Peru is largely subjective and context specific when evaluating its different elements. Migration and living in Lima can raise the self-awareness of some specific ethnic traits such being born in a small town, having a peasant father, coming from the sierra, knowing quechua, speaking with an accent, being coloured, having *indian* features or any other visible trait, such as clothing or culture. (Horowitz 1985, Olzak 1992). In a largely differentiated society where most of the *whites* (the rich and more educated) live, the deeper the contrast, the stronger the awareness of people of their ethnic traits and the way they are seen by the others. The distinctions which were important in the province, like the type of quechua spoken (harder from the *indigenous*, softer from the *mestizos*), or being urban settler are not necessarily recognized far away from home. For the “cosmopolitan Peruvian”¹⁹ new and recreated markers and traits emerge. Simon, a 35 years old man from Bambamarca who sees himself as *cholo*, told us that he never felt himself a *cholo* when he was young. When he first arrived at Lima at 15 years old to San Juan de Lurigancho, he heard people calling him *cholo* or *Serrano*. He also learned from observing in the public buses, how people rejected a woman in her typical dress, calling her “serrana” and “chola” and “complaining about her llama odour” [8].

2. The prejudice against cholos and indigenous

The theory of self-categorization underlines the importance of the perception of others in the construction of the *in-group* identity and, most importantly, how the relation that an individual can

¹⁹ The word cosmopolitan generally describes an environment where many cultures from around the world coexist; or a person whose culture and identity baggage comes from many different cultures. Its sense overlaps to some extent with citizen of the world, implying identification with a world community rather than with a particular nation or people. We call cosmopolitan Peruvian to the one who identifies with different spaces and cultures in Peru. She or he have travelled to other regions for work, including Lima; has shared with people from other regions, have moving from his or her little provinces to largest cities, or has returned to them.

establish to the outside world is determined in part by the individual's assessment of how "the others" see him or her according to some salient ethnic traits. Many of the case studies looking at the phenomenon of ethnic identity in Latin America and Peru have arrived at the same conclusion²⁰. For those reasons, we believe it is particularly important to study ethnic prejudice in Peru.

Prejudice is defined as a hostile attitude toward groups predicated on false, simplistic, over-generalized, or unconscious beliefs. It may be felt or expressed, may be directed toward a group as a whole or toward an individual because he or she is a member of that group (Allport 1954). According to this definition, prejudice has two essential ingredients. First, there must be an attitude (of favour or disfavour) respect to the characteristics of a group. Second, prejudice must be related to an over-generalized belief about the group itself. A good illustration of these two concepts is shown in some of the survey's results. The 45% of people who would neither accept their daughter or sister marrying a cholo or indigenous, or vote for a cholo or indigenous running for the Congress, are illustrating the attitudinal factor of a prejudice. The 48% that placed cholo and indigenous groups in the lowest levels of a violent (1)/pacifist (7) scale are expressing the belief factor.

Commonly we tend to make overgeneralizations or misconceptions in our everyday life, but not all these simplifications turn into prejudices. For instance, we avoid birds or insects that are unfamiliar to us, but after proper indications, we are capable of distinguishing which are still dangerous. Prejudices, however, are conceived when we are not capable of rectifying our judgment under the light of new information and our beliefs acquire a strong resistance to all evidence that would overthrow them (Allport 1954) and have the power to organize our affects and sentiments (Balibar 1988)²¹. Florencia told us that her mother is against her relationship with a man she considers *cholo*: her mother tells her that "*cholos* are bad men, they abuse women, and they are drunk". The young woman, who has painfully maintained her relationship for about four years, has introduced her boyfriend to her mother so "she can see that he is not a *cholo*, he is a good person and wants the best for me", she says, "but my mother does not change her opinion about him, she just does not like him"[28].

In the subsequent parts of this section, we will analyze prejudice against *cholos* and *indigenos* from both the survey and the interviews. First, we will present the results of the survey and second, we will

²⁰ The imposition or pressure from outside in the self-definition or self-categorization of social identity has been largely study in social psychological, as we have said previously. See: extensive work of Hogg M. particularly with MC Garty (1990) and with D Abrams (1988). These studies rarely have interacted with macro political explanations of ethnicity. Efforts in this direction have been made by Green & Seher (2003) and Brubaker, Loveman & Stavamov (2004). In Peru Portocarrero (1993), De la Cadena (2000) and Mendez M (1996) have interesting work in this direction.

²¹ Prejudices are understood as cognitive structures that contain knowledge, beliefs, and expectations about social groups that are deeply rooted in an ordinary cognitive process of the individuals and the groups. Therefore their content is highly variable across cultural settings, over time, and across groups. For an overview of social psychological literature on stereotypes see Hamilton & Sherman (1994).

turn to the interviews to explain how people become aware of being the subject of prejudice, particularly in Lima; how strong the prejudice against highlanders and indigenous peasants appears in Huanta and Bambamarca and how prejudice against the Serrano people have been reproduced over time in the country.

Evidence of prejudice from the survey

The results of the survey are interesting in terms of attitudes toward *cholo* and *indigenous* people. When we asked about whether they would agree to their daughter or sister marrying a *cholo* or *indigenous* or vote for a *cholo* or *indigenous* running for Congress, *white* (54%) and *mestizos* (52%) tend to be more prejudiced than *cholos* (39%) and *indigenous* (30%). But among *cholos* and *indigenous*, the latter tend to be more prejudiced about the first than viceversa (30% vs. 22%). *Indigenous* and *cholos* express prejudice against their own group in identical proportion (17%). The proportion of people with an overall prejudice against *mestizos* and *whites* is much less (25%). Yet, we need to be careful with our interpretations of previous figures. We are not capable of distinguishing between those who would not agree their daughter or sister marrying a *cholo* or *mestizo* because of prejudice or because they believe they will get on better if they marry “up”. When we analyze the proportion of people that characterize *indigenous* and *cholos* as violent, the proportions follow the same trend, *white* (62%) and *mestizos* (53%) tend to be more prejudiced than *cholos* (38%) and *indigenous* (37%). Table 2 shows the profile of those expressing significant prejudice. They will disagree with a marriage between their daughter or sister and a *cholo* or *indigenous*, will never vote for a *cholo* or *indigenous* running for Congress, in addition they will qualify *cholos* and *indigenous* as violent compared with those not expressing prejudice in any of the aspects²².

Table 3
Characteristics of those with and without prejudice against *indigenous* and *cholos* (Percentages)

Characteristics	Without	With
TOTAL (N=337)	185	152
Locality		
<i>Huanta (Ayacucho)</i>	30.57	34.42
<i>Bambamarca (Cajamarca)</i>	24.87	47.40
<i>San Juan de Lurigancho (Lima)</i>	44.56	18.18

²² Those that only express prejudice in only one or two of the mentioned aspects have been excluded of the table.

Age		
18-25	39.38	24.03
26-40	34.72	36.36
40-70	25.91	39.61
Education		
No formal	6.22	9.74
Primary completed	20.21	35.06
Secondary completed	46.11	30.52
Post secondary qualifications	27.46	24.68
Migration		
Migrated to Lima	33.13	13.99
Migrated to Huanta or Bambamarca	12.88	13.99
Didn't migrated or returned	53.99	72.03
Skin colour (mean)	3.49	4.02

Source: CRISE Survey-Peru. Universidad Catolica del Peru.

Being the subject of prejudice

We carefully asked in the interviews about why people would not agree to their daughter or sister marrying a *cholo* or *indigenous*, and why they would not vote for somebody belonging to any of these groups. People did not seem comfortable addressing these types of questions. Only Elvira Macedo, a 27 year old mestiza women, who told us that her grandfather had advised her never to allow anybody to put her down because she is a *mestiza* and that she should eat ‘red meat’ to make her cheeks rosier, was willing to explain. She is married to a *cholo* who is ‘a good man’; but she would like somebody ‘better’ for her daughter, a “limeño”, she said. We asked for the difference between a limeño and a *cholo*, and she explained to us that a *limeño* is a mix between skin colour and place of origin [23].

While we cannot address these questions directly from our interviews, we can see that our respondents seem to be very aware of negative beliefs associated with the categories *cholo* and *Serrano*. It is clear from their narration that this awareness comes from negative experiences, whether they have directly experienced it (they have been snubbed as *cholo* or *Serrano* with an offensive intention) or witnessed it.²³ On other occasions, they have realized they have been excluded from certain circles. Marco from Bambamarca, who has travelled to Lima to study, told us: “the children *de bien* never joined the groups of provincials, *serranos* or *cholos*... there was a hidden behaviour going on ... people from the sierra look more aggressive, but it is because they are defensive, they do not remain silent. I think it is because they feel rejected. They do not say it, but a *serrano* feels it” [1].

²³ See Interviews with Marco Balbín, Bambamarca [1], Pablo Cavero, Bambamarca [5], Simon Barreto, Bambamarca [8], Jorge Pajuelo, Bambamarca [10], with Beatriz Calderon, Huanta [13], Eliana Cabrera, Huanta [16], Soledad Tello, Huanta [18], Jacinta Cáceres, Huanta [19], Julio Aguilar, SJL [21], Agustin Carrasco, SJL [29] and Hildebrando Vargas, SJL [30].

Harold from Huanta and studying in Lima said: “there is in the Conservatory a group of friends that are always together, they are from Lima and the majority are *white* and fair-haired, they have studied together in school... they do not join the rest and are given preferment treatment in the Conservatory... my friends are mostly from provinces” [17]. Finally, we can identify an awareness of ‘being seen’. Julio, a 48 *cholo* living in Lima, told us that when he walks in the street in residential places such as Miraflores or San Isidro he feels that people look at him. We asked how? and he replied ‘as a *cholo*’ [21]. Soledad, a 38 years old teacher from Huanta, told us that she went to work to Lima for one year as a maid when she was 17 years old. She received good treatment from the family, but she felt that people looked at her as *serrana* with contempt or disdain [18]. Elvira told us her experiences in residential areas in Lima where she was working as maid. When she arrived in La Molina she “felt fear, embarrassed, different, observed, and intimidated”. She never could talk with calm, even when it was necessary to explain her non-attendance to work to keep her job. Her silence was followed by the anger of her woman boss who pulled her hair and fired her without pay. On another occasions, she tried to sell some goods in the streets of Miraflores and felt the same; “embarrassed, observed, without words”. Now, she prefers to take her daughter for entertainment to other places, such as the Park of Huachipa and the *Parque de las Leyendas* (Zoo) [23], places packed with migrants during the weekends. Whether the rejection is intended in ethnic terms or not, the way in which, people receive it has a strong ethnic component.

Not all interviewed feel the same. There are those who are completely unaware of any type of second thoughts about them. This group has two characteristics. First, they are mainly cajamarquino women (in a lesser extent from Huanta) with little experience of travelling to the coast cities or Lima. When they did travel, they visited their families and were not looking for jobs. Second, they are the type of cajamarquino with lighter skin, which probably minimizes the visible traits that tend to serve as the “condensing rod” for prejudice.²⁴ Lilian, a thirty five year old woman from Bambamarca, describes herself as “fairly *white*, fair and with brown eyes”. Two years ago she had visited her cousin in Lima for the second time. In her memory, he used to live in a small house with straw-mat walls, but now both the house and neighbourhood were prettier. She had been treated with affection in Lima, but she had not left the house very often, only with her cousin to the centre of Lima or to Huachipa (his brother had advised her to avoid going out alone because she might lose her way). She had felt comfortable in Lima and, if Lima would offer jobs, she would like to move with her family there [2]. Another example is Judith, a *mestizo* women who said that her father is a little bit darker but her

²⁴ Allport (1954) underlines that a genuine physical difference comes to be regarded as a total (categorical) difference in *kind*. Whether real, such as skin colour, or imaginary, as generally are other “sensory” qualities like odor, they become a central symbol, a “condensing rod”, which enables us to think about another group as a solid unit and attach specific qualities to them. In different cultures or historical times, women are not only thought of as different in appearance, but also in biological nature, less intelligent, and less rational and --in some cultures—without a soul.

mother is *white* with red hair. She told us she had visited not only Lima, but also cities such as Cajamarca and Trujillo (always visiting relatives). In all the places, she had felt very well and had not felt any discrimination. She would not like to move to Lima because there are too many cars and the life is different, although her children study there and she misses them [6]. A third example of this group is Gladys, a *white* woman from Bambamarca, who told us that she is “in love with Lima”. She travels with her husband and daughter every year for vacation and remains for months in the house of her sister in Chorrillos. She goes out with people there, loves “the green places and the parks”. Gladys thinks that people in Lima are calm; however, she underlines that she only walks in the central areas (Surco and San Borja); she does not like the suburbs [9].

The prejudice about the indians²⁵

While soft in Bambamarca and very strong in Huanta, people from the three cases report prejudice against *indians* or *chutos* (as they are called in Huanta). Unfortunately, the survey missed this population, the sample included surrounding rural towns, but upper communities were not reached²⁶. Harold, an *indigenous* 23 year old student, explained to us what a *chuto* is “the word ‘chuto’ is used to identify a peasant or an *indian* offensively”. For him, *Cholo* is different. It is the same as *indigenous*. “In Lima everybody is a *cholo*, he emphasises [17]. Jacinta, a 23 year old *indigenous* woman in Huanta, who considers herself *blanca* (to express she is fairly *white*) expressed it with more clarity: “there is not much difference between *indigenous* and *cholos*, we both speak quechua; but *chutos* or *indians* are different. They are those who live in the highlands, in the mountains” [19]. For Margarita, a 55 years old woman in Huanta, being *chola* means being *serrana*, “all Peruvians, we are *cholos*” The *chutos* are different, she affirms. “They are from the ‘sleet highlands’, don’t talk spanish, don’t know how to read and write, and have an especial character: they are stubborn” [20].

Bertha, a young teacher in primary school told us that the children coming from the highlands are called *chutos* or “the stinking ones”, because they do not know how to speak spanish very well, have an accent, or because of their different appearance or odour. She has listened to her colleagues, especially ‘those coming from the city’, calling them ‘those of the highlands’, ‘the *chutos*’. She adds that “It is easy to identify them because they wear their *hojotas* (traditional sandals)”, she said [13]. Marco tells us that in Bambamarca people from the city treat the peasant in a similar way: “often they insult them, call them ignorant ones, dirty ones”. He mainly witnesses these situations in the buses to Cajamarca, since there are no special buses: “people avoid sitting with them, touching them, and peasants realize” [1].

²⁵ Although the word “indio” is not commonly use any more in public and academic literature, it is still used and with a very well defined content among the people we have interviewed.

²⁶ In order to reach these communities especial transportation is needed. Infrastructure is extremely limited and inadequate.

What Harold and Jacinta have made clear for us is that being *indigenous* or *cholo* is not the same as being *Indian*. *Indians*, *chutos* or peasants (in the case of Bambamarca) can be seen for the *serrano* people as a specific category different from them, in which the ethnic elements are not lacking. Eliana, a young *white* teacher from Huanta, told us that *chutito* (little *chuto*) is the one who comes from the highlands, with *cobrizo* (copper) or darker skin, trousers of bayeta (a cloth material), socks of sheep wool and hojotas (typical sandals). She added, that these children only speak quechua and they do not understand spanish very well. The other children, who do not want to learn quechua, laugh at them and complain to her: “teacher, they do not understand”, “they are donkeys”[19]. Beatriz, a *mestizo* teacher in Huanta, described for us the situation of a girl of 6 years old insulting an *indian* boy calling him *chuto* and foolish (*bruto*), and making him cry. She said to us that this type of situations always happens.

We heard clear how *indian* children are discriminated in the schools because their particular ethnic treats. The process of “becoming educated” has not been an easy one, and still is not today. Soledad, a 38 year old *cholo* teacher in Huanta, experienced this discrimination herself. The first year she had attended school, she couldn’t speak spanish very well, and once, she couldn’t do the homework because she hadn’t understood the professor’s instructions. She did not have the strength to explain the cause of her fault and the teacher beat her against the blackboard. The rest of the class laughed and she did not come back to school until the following year. She remembers that her first years at the school were not pleasant. The students insulted her because of her language and parents’ occupation (peasants). Only at the end of the 2nd year she remembers feeling more comfortable with spanish, and better in overall terms. Today, she has forgotten some of her quechua and speaks it mixed with spanish. However, she is teaching it to her daughter because new job opportunities exist in Huanta for people with knowledge of quechua, in the government and NGOs, she explained [18].

We do not know how these so called *indians* will self-define themselves. Probably they will not use the word *indian*, and they will consider themselves *cholos*, *mestizos*, or even, *whites*. However, for the *serrano* people living in the towns, or closer to them, this group does exist, as an imaginary solid category with specific visible traits. They can be easily identified and a series of negative oversimplified characteristics are associated with them. This serves to justify practices (insults, rejection, intolerance, humiliation and shame) and discourses (ignorant, dirty, with bad smell). These practices and discourses around the stereotype of *indianess* not only organize the feelings and emotions of the ones who have the prejudice, but also of those who are its victims (Balibar 1991, Kaufman 2001). Beatriz underlines “people come to hate quechua and make their children feel shamed of their language when they love it” [13]. Marco from Bambamarca agrees with her. He said that “when people discriminate against peasants and laugh about their traditions, the result is loss of

self-esteem, of their own culture. The young feel shame and start looking for other accepted forms, alienated ones” [1].

While we cannot say exactly how people feel or process these situations, or to what degree it happens, we find significant evidence here of the existence of prejudice, the discriminatory mechanisms and the degree of acceptability in Peruvian society. In order to avoid being laughed at schools, it is necessary not to speak quechua anymore. Poor peasant parents, who know the suffering produced by the stigma, will not hazard their children’s learning of Spanish. Consequently, they oppose bilingual education.²⁷ Traditional clothing and traditions are visible traits of the stigma. It does not matter that the clothing is clean, or that students are not allowed to wear it in the school; what matters, is that the other children laugh at them. A level of rupture with one’s own community²⁸ and a desire to leave behind the despised ethnic traits (as far as possible) becomes unavoidable.

Prejudice about the serrano

In Lima the prejudiced eyes turn to the *cholo* and *serrano*. Eliana complained “in Lima they call the *serrano* people *cholos* because they are from the sierra and in Lima they see the sierra as backward, but it is not like that. *Cholo* is a negative expression and the *serrano* says, yes, I am *cholo*, just to shut their mouths [16].

Whether a migrant is a “so called *indian*” or not, they will try to speak spanish and dress in an urban way, if they don’t, without a doubt, another person could appear rapidly – very likely another *serrano*— ready to call them “*cholo*” or “*serrano*”. This is in order to remain them that they are exposing those markers nobody want to be identified with (Nugent 1988). While some of these traits can be removed, others cannot. Unfortunately, we did not ask about how a *serrano* can be recognized in Lima (which are the visible traits?). In the community, however, it is enough to know the neighbours’ place of origin. Julio, a 48 years old *cholo*, living in SJL, told us that he does not like to be called *Serrano* or *cholo* because in the neighborhood most come from the sierra “why do people only call some of them *cholos*?” He told us that during parties there are fights and people, when drunk; insult each other as “*cholo de mierda*” and “*serrano*”²⁹. He was specific that the norteros

²⁷ Eliana [19] and Beatriz [13], both teachers in Huanta explained to us that bilingual education is not working well in their jurisdiction. On one side, parents oppose bilingual education because they want their children learn Spanish and on the other side, professor do not have the adequate training. Eliana says that *Indian* children speak a different quechua, ‘a hard one’ and teacher’s quechua, is less pure, is more mixed with Spanish. They find difficulties in understanding and speaking with *indian* children. They also told us that bilingual education is given only in the rural area, but not in the principal schools, where parents want to send their children.

²⁸ The teachers in Huanta told us about peasant parents paying rooms for their small children to attend the primary and secondary school.

²⁹ This is recurrent testimony. For example see interviews in Lima: Julio [21], Elvira [23] and Carlos [27].

(from the north coast) are not insulted as *cholos*. The young do not like to be called *cholo*. On the contrary, they want to be seen as *limeños*[21].

Outside the migrant community, in the traditional or residential areas of Lima, the contrast can become deeper, and other traits emerge. We do not have information from our data to describe those traits, interviews with people living in more residential areas would be needed. Our hypothesis, however, is that traits, such as accent, colour of skin and features become more important. However, these can be downplayed with the opportunities brought by improving one's appearance, obtaining education or possessing some level of wealth. These characteristics all together enable the world to distinguish between a new poor migrant from the sierra and a successful assimilated *mestizo*³⁰. Why is such differentiation important? Eliana gave us a clue "they think the sierra is backwardness".

The idea that 'the sierra is backwardness' is old rooted in the history of Peru and has persisted through the discourse of a *mestizo* society. However, it is precisely inside the discourse of *mestizaje* –based on the greatness of our melted blood and our Inca and Spanish heritage—that the prejudice has survived. In a much divided society³¹ a stereotyped picture of both, the indio and the landlord (the gamonal, the misti from the Sierra) was recreated and lasted in Lima and the most important cities of the coast until the first half of the 20th century. Not only the *indians*, about whom we have already learned a lot from our interviews, but also the masters (among them, *whites* and *mestizos*) were associated with the traditional, the archaic, the past, the resistance to modernity³². The projects to bring these subjects from the past were multiple³³. New policies based on the assessment of the "deterioration of the *indian* race" were promoted by the Civilist Party at the beginning of the 20th century, first; and the *indigenista* movement, later. The focus was on education and hygiene. After the failure of these policies, the gamonales (landlords from the Sierra) were accused of being responsible for boycotting *indian* integration (Contreras 1996). Later, the agrarian reform put the emphasis on the unjust structural base of society and the division was made clear: on the one side there were the "landlords",

³⁰ Another hypothesis to explore in a future study is how "rapid changes" are seen. Becoming and acceptable assimilated *mestizo* takes time. Those migrants coming back from Miami and Paterson, holding the appearance "card", such as modern cloth and some relative wealth, become another different group, which is not necessarily well accepted.

³¹ Important literature explains the dualism of Peruvian society. On one side, a modern sector concentrated in the coast generated 67 percent of the gross domestic product but employed only 35% of the population; and on the other side, a traditional sector concentrated in the Sierra with small scale units of low productivity. This resulted in a highly unequal distribution of income and assets. In contrast with the Coast, the Sierra presented severe problems of transport and of poorly –yielding land, about half of the population lived in the Sierra in a subsistence economy nurtured by this dualism (Thorp & Bertram 1978, Webb 1977 and others).

³² De la Cadena (2000, 2001), Mendez (1996) and Nugent (1992). The latter calls this view "countermodernity". He maintains that this view attributes an archaic identity to social actors and support the continuity and reproduction of the discourse that indians are backward and violent.

³³ These attempts followed the disillusion after the failure of immigration policies that aimed to bring into the country more "invigorated races from Europe" to "adjust the biological disequilibrium of our society" because the predominance of the *indian* race. For a discussion of this period and ideas, see: David (1973) Mendez (1996), Manrique (2006), and Larson (2004).

the abusers; and on the other side there were the “peasants”, the victims. Ethnic relations associated with these structures were not acknowledged, but rather ignored and removed by decree. *Indians* were not to be called *Indians* anymore, but peasants (Davies 1973). While the discourse made landlords the villains, the category of *mestizo* was exalted. The *mestizo* was the new race embracing all Peruvians; through it, *indians* would find their dignity.³⁴

While we are not dealing with a discourse based on the superiority of biological heredities of certain groups over others, the symbols of backwardness and archaism served to transmit beliefs about the incompatibility of life styles and traditions if there was not a “transformation”, if a way of becoming “*mestizo*” was not found. There is nothing against the sierra or the *serrano* or *cholo* people “in their nature”, but it is required that they overcome the “backwardness” “the irrational”, “the authoritarian” aspects of their culture to become compatible with the modern Peru, with the culture of progress. The “culture criteria” replaces the “nature criteria” (Balibar 1988) to justify the emergence of a new set of prejudices and stereotypes against *serranos* and *cholos* and physical features are still important because they are visible traits to make these identifications.³⁵

How people react to this prejudice is a much more complex question. People’s reaction may vary according to the different context and circumstances in which they live. However, our interviews allow us to offer some insights that can be useful for further research. The emotion of shame, with its consequences for people feeling it, is important in our cases. For instance, as the school teachers Beatriz and Marco pointed out, the humiliation of *indian* children in the schools may result in the loss of self-esteem, embarrassment at their own culture, and drop outs of school [1] [13].

Prejudice is not only present in Lima; it is also highly present in Huanta and Bambamarca against the indigenous peasants. Urban-based *indigenous* call them ‘the indians, the chutos’ and consider them ‘ignorant’, ‘dirty’, ‘pigs’ ‘stubborn’. The tragedy in Lima is that those differences between ‘chutos’ and the rest of *serrano* people, very present in the province, are not clearly identifiable anymore. All *serranos* may fall into the same disdained category. In these circumstances the denial of group membership to avoid the shame may be the response. They desire to suppress their identity when they arrive in Lima and discover that those awful characteristics, which belong to the peasants or ‘chutos’ in their words, tend to be attached to all *serranos*. As Elvira [23] and Julio[21] illustrate ‘I am *cholo*, but I don’t want to be called *cholo*’. Another important response is to make clear the differences

³⁴ See De la Cadena (2000) for an explanation of how *mestizos* also maintained relation of power over the *Indians* and for a discussion on the constructing of the *mestizo* society see Mallon (1992).

³⁵ The recent elections in the country have open again all these stereotypes and prejudices in the highlands, and the highest authorities in the country have felt free of making prejudiced comments. The first ministry told the press that it is the lack of oxygen what prevent people from the sierra of having good and rational decision eluding the high support that the candidate Ollanta Humala had in these areas. Cited for Degregori C. ‘Inclusión vs. Racismo’ in Peru 21 (July 16, 2006).

between these ‘indians’ and themselves: here education turns into a central strategy. Agustin Carrasco, a 52 years old mechanic in Volkswagen Lima, told us that ‘the *raza cobriza* (copper race) is the race with capacities’. He added that if you are professional, it is difficult for others to treat you badly: “they speak to you with more respect, nobody can *cholear* you (call you *cholo* offensively)”. For him the act of ‘cholear’ is the same as to ‘humiliate’ [29]. However, facing the pressure of colleagues, he felt the need to distinguish himself, an educated *cholo*, from those ‘*indians*’, ‘non-educated’, ‘still dressed in their traditional clothes’. He described to us how a couple of *serranos* went to the Volkswagen store to buy a car and his colleagues mocked at him saying “you go and help your *paisanos* (those from your same place of origin)”. He made clear to us that this couple were a different type of *cholo* from him: “they were dressed with their typical clothing and a sac in the hand”. In order to demonstrate this to his colleagues, he sold the car to the couple for a much higher price. ‘I bought a car with the commission’, he told us proudly [29].

In contrast to these previous types of responses, there is the attitude of Soledad [18] and Marco [1] and others, who self-define as *cholos* and refuse to feel shame. For this group, the awareness of being the subject of prejudice has led them to a new appreciation of their own identity. Soledad was driven to hide her language, but now she is teaching quechua to her daughter, taking advantage of the new opportunities that are appearing in the Huanta labour market ‘the State and NGOs are hiring people with knowledge of quechua’ [18]. Marco, a teacher from Bambamarca, is proud of being the son of a peasant. He told us he still goes to work with his father using “the *yunta*”, an agricultural tool inherited from pre-spanish cultures. He argues that his trips to Lima and new experiences have helped him to accept his identity, while when he was young, he used to feel shame. An important group of our cases, mainly self-defined as *cholos*, acknowledge that the word ‘*cholo*’ is used to humiliate and insult by the wider world, but their response does not come with shame, it comes with pride, as a deliberate affirmation against the insult the others are offering to them: ‘I am *cholo*, and so what’. In the survey *cholos* are a special group. They are above average education, concentrated in Lima, and sharing honesty/hardwork views of indigenous more than of *mestizos*. We cannot say from our research what factors have been crucial in their effort to overcome prejudice, but probably education, together with a wider experience of the world, coming from migration and travelling, has played an important role.

3. Perceptions on the consequences of ethnic identity

The survey aimed to collect information about whether people feel ethnicity affects their lives or not. Questions asked specifically about the effects of ethnicity on people’s chances of getting employment, education and public services; and more broadly about group domination in ethnic terms and

government favouritism and discrimination. These are the types of perceptions we are addressing in this section.

We have learnt in the previous sections that we need to be very careful when analyzing ethnic categories in Peru. They do not mean the same in different contexts and in the eyes of different people. In Lima all *serranos* increase their awareness of their own ethnic traits and their effects, and all who know big cities see that there is discrimination against *serranos*. While being *serrano* or *cholo* is not a problem in Huanta or Bambamarca, in Lima it can become a negative ethnic trait with negative connotations for the entire group. Those who consider themselves *whites* and *mestizos* in Huanta can become *serranos* or *cholos* in Lima. For instance, Eliana [15], who feels white, and Beatriz [13], who feels *mestiza*, are quite clear that in Lima they can be humiliated as *serrana*, or *chola*. Therefore, we should be very cautious when interpreting the information provided by the survey, contextualize the answers always by the locations—if we are referring to our respondents in the provinces or to the ones in the capital city, and finally, use the interviews to frame the survey results in more contextualized realities.


Before entering on the analysis of perceptions about the specific consequences of ethnicity, it is important to notice that we are analyzing a group largely alert to the impact of ethnicity in the country today. Half the group has said that the importance of racial and cultural characteristics has not changed or has become even more important with time in the country in order to access opportunities for success (52%). There are not significant differences of opinion on this across different ethnic groups, but across localities (47% in Huanta, 47% in Bambamarca and 62% in Lima) and, particularly among those who have migrated to Lima. Among the 85% of the sample born out of Lima (N=518), 63% of those who migrated to the capital city believe that ethnicity is still or has become more important. The percentages for those who have migrated internally in the Sierra (only to Huanta and Bambamarca) or never have migrated are much smaller (39% and 40% respectively).

The effects of ethnicity in employment

The survey asked for people's opinion about the effects of ethnicity on opportunities of employment in the government and private sector. The results are revealing. At least half of all respondents perceive that ethnic background affects one's chance of obtaining jobs, whether in the government or in the private sector (53% and 56% respectively). The impact of ethnicity on getting access to contracts with the state is slightly smaller (47%). Differences across ethnic groups are less clear and they are difficult to interpret. *Cholos* and *indigenous* perceive the effects of ethnicity some what more than *whites* and *mestizos* (Figure 1), but the two latter groups do express it as well. The question does not permit us to distinguish if respondents are reflecting in their own ethnic traits and chances of employment, the ethnic traits and chances of employment of others, or just the way the system seems to work.

Figure 1

Do you believe racial and cultural characteristics affect one's chances of getting access to...?




Total = 600; White= 54; Mestizos=330; Cholo=108 and indigenous/Andean=108. Source: CRISE Survey-Peru. Universidad Catolica del Peru.

We have learnt from the interviews that *serrano* people migrating to Lima are likely to feel more discrimination than those who have not migrated. The results of the survey seem to capture this. Among those born outside Lima, there are strong differences of perceptions between those who have migrated to Lima and those who have not (See figure 2). This result supports our hypothesis that it is in Lima where people become more aware of their ethnic traits and of the prejudices associated with them. As being *serrano* can become an ethnic trait too, *white* and *mestizos* may also find that ethnicity becomes an important element in Lima when considering employment. Differences among more and less educated exist but they are not large (55% vs 45%). No significant differences across ethnic groups or localities were found.

Figure 2

Do you believe racial and cultural characteristics affect one's chances of getting access to...?



Total = 538; migrated to Lima= 132; migrated to Huanta/Bambamarca=81; never migrated or returned=125. Source: CRISE Survey-Peru. Universidad Catolica del Peru.

The interviews allow us to deepen our understanding of the form and manner in which this discrimination is experienced. From the interviews ‘preparation’ and ‘qualifications’ are important, but ‘*buena presencia*’ seems to be the heart.³⁶ Eliana from Huanta told us “yes, there is discrimination when looking for jobs. They request people with good presence. It does not mean that you have a nice dress or you know how to express yourself, but a person who is good looking, pretty; but if you are unattractive, darker, they say, *ay no!*”[19]. The *white* are particularly aware of this mechanism. Florencia, living in Lima, added that in companies in Lima the first thing they look at is if girls are thin, tall, have a good manner and pretty face. “The colour is also a criterion”, she added. Florencia had a friend who told her that a supermarket chain was hiring. When they went there, a man separated her friend from the queue, despite her friend the same qualifications as hers. She believes it happened because her friend was darker [28].

The perception of discrimination based on “physical appearance”, whether it is purely aesthetical or ethnic, is more widely perceived in the search for jobs in the private sector than in the government. Discrimination of this type is perceived in the government as well, but more because of party membership and contacts. Gertudris from Bambamarca said that personal interviews are convenient because they not only evaluate your oral performance, but “your *pinta*” (if you are good looking); however, for finding a job in the government, ‘qualifications are not important, but whether you are or not affiliated to the party in power’ [9]. Soledad from Huanta said that Regional Government of Ayacucho only offers jobs to the people affiliated to its party: ‘relationships with the ruling party are needed in order to access job in the government’, she affirms. [18]. While interviews downplay ethnicity in preference to party affiliation, this is the insight that comes from an open question, compared with the questionnaire's closed question. The emphasis on party affiliation doesn't mean an ethnic element is not there.

Effect of ethnic background in educational opportunities

The results of the survey on the perceptions of effects of ethnicity in education opportunities are very moderate. Only 27% percent think that ethnicity has an impact on access to pre-university education and 28% on university education. Differences across ethnic groups are not significant and percentages are slightly higher in Lima than in the rest of localities. These results denote a significant difference with the results on employment.

The interviews, however, allow us to deepen this finding. Education plays a hugely important role to overcome prejudice against being *indian*, *cholo* or *serrano* and when the moment of looking for employment arrives, ethnic characteristics may matter, but education and preparation is what matter

³⁶ Interviews with Marco, Bambamarca [1], Pablo, Bambamarca [5], Simon, Bambamarca [8], Soledad, Huanta [18], Karen, SJL [22] and Karla, SJL [26].

the most. There is no formal barrier to access education. But in regard to true freedom to acquire capabilities, there is a huge ethnic difference in terms of the access and the quality. The sacrifices people are willing to make to accessing education are extraordinary. The poorest indigenous highlanders make the largest effort to access education. Poor and highlander children either walk hours to reach schools, especially when looking for secondary schools or avoiding “multiyear” primary schools, or they live alone in rented rooms in the town. Eva Salazar, living in the community of Occana in Lauricocha, 15 minutes from Huanta by car, told us that she couldn’t finish secondary school: ‘I couldn’t do it anymore’ she said. She used to wake up at 3.00 in the morning to cook and at 6.00 a.m. begin to walk. The walk was about an hour under the sun and her face was frequently burnt [12]. Sonia, a professor from Huanta teaching 11 year old children, told us that indigenous from the highlands rent rooms in Huanta so their children can attend the school there “they are far way from their homes, are disorganized in their appearance and dirty. The other children insult them and they get depressed because their houses are far away and their parents are poor”. [18] While the physical separation from the community and the family is unavoidable at such a young age, parents still aspire to give the children a more comfortable living. Aberto Ticlla, a rural *indigenous* from the community of Pampay in Luricocha, told us that his hope is to buy a “lote” in Huanta for their children studying there: ‘today they live in a tiny rented room’, he said.

While the poor rural and highlanders are looking for strategies to overcome the problem of distance, the urban-based indigenous still need to deal with the different qualities of education. They are quite clear that the quality of education is not the same everywhere. The closer you are from the centre or the capital, the better the education you can receive. Pedro, a *cholo* from Bambamarca, told us that the racial aspects do not prevent people from finding a job, but preparation and education. Lamentably, he said, ‘preparation is not equal for all’. He added ‘my son was the first student in Bambamarca but what did he learn? it did not do him any good in Lima’. Again, success depends on the enormous effort of parents to send their children to the closest town and/or the extraordinary sacrifice of the child. Neptali Tipto, almost finishing secondary, walks and takes a car to go to school in Huanta instead of just attending the school in Luricocha (closer to his town). He is proud of attending school in Huanta: “I am the only one in Llanza”, he said [11]. Juana from Bambamarca has sent three of her four children to Lima. Two are attending the secondary school and one is working (only the smallest one, still in primary school, has stayed with her). She said “it was hard for them the first year, but then they got used to it”. She has mixed feelings about her children liking their new life in Lima. She misses them a lot, but cannot get used to Lima: “too many cars, another life”, she said. She has visited them four times (18 hours at least by bus) and is working hard to afford her children’s education. In addition to farming, she makes hats “to afford all the things that the school asks for”.

Class and ethnicity are fundamentally embedded in the mechanisms and the cost of those mechanisms to overcome access and quality of education. Indigenous highlanders are the ones who bear the highest cost, but all in the provinces, if looking for better quality of education, need to face the burden. Physical separation from the community and the family when still very young is quite an impact on the formation of identity of a child, especially when the school is an institution offering a different culture and community of language. Whatever the cost, it is clear that people are struggling to bear it. How each person, each child may appropriate this experience is something that we cannot explain with our material, but we think it is a key subject for further research, as education has been shown to be such a precious institution to overcome discrimination and ethnic humiliation.


Effects of ethnicity in political power

Another set of questions in the questionnaire aimed to explore perceptions about power. The survey asked specifically for ethnic power in four institutions in the state (local government, central government, high personal of the police and the army) and two in the private sector (big private firms and media). It also asked more openly about favouritism or discrimination of the government towards specific groups, whether they are ethnic or not. In the interviews, we tested perceptions about power with an open question; “Who has power in your locality or in your country?” The results from both sources are complementary and provide significant insights about the complexities we face when talking about power in Peru.

The identification of power in the hands of *whites* is significant across the different institutions for most of the respondents, with the exception of local government, where *mestizos* are perceived have more power (Figure 3). In the case of central government, the percentage of people who believe *mestizos* have the power gets closer to the percentage affirming that the *white* do, but is still significantly different. An important percentage of people, though still small, think *cholos* hold the power in the central government. This is the only institution in which *cholos* are perceived to have power. This is certainly associated with the presidency of Alejandro Toledo, who has repeatedly pointed out his indigenous and/or cholo origin. However, it could be argued that the percentage is still very small considering that Peru has had a *cholo* president. The proportion of people affirming that *whites* have power in the private sector and the media is far the greatest.

Figure 3

Which ethnic groups do you believe have power in ...?




Total: local gov =572; central gov=557; police=559; army=556, private sector= 559 and media=554. Source: CRISE Survey-Peru. Universidad Catolica del Peru.

Exploring further across localities, we found the power of *mestizos* in local government is mainly perceived in Huanta and Bambamarca (46% and 43% respectively), but not in San Juan de Lurigancho (SJL). In SJL most of people believe the *whites* hold power in local government (44%) (Table 4). The opinion about ethnic power in the central government is not homogenous across locations. In SJL the percentage who believes that *whites* have the power in the central government is the largest and close to 50%; in Huanta, in contrast, the opinion is divided between those who believe *mestizos* hold power and those who think *whites* do (35% and 37% respectively), and finally, in Bambamarca opinion is more heterogeneous (Figure 4).

Figure 4

Which ethnic groups do you believe have power in the central government?




Total =546; Huanta= 191, Bambamarca=175 and SJL=180.. Source: CRISE Survey-Peru. Universidad Catolica del Peru.

When asking about dominating groups in the high commands of the police and the army, a higher percentage of people both in Huanta and SJL consider *whites* the dominant group. For the police the percentages are 46% and 53% respectively and for the army 47% and 55% respectively. The next group mentioned in both localities and institutions was *mestizo* (Table 4). In Bambamarca the largest percentage for these two institutions was the option “no particular ethnic group”, with 43% for the police and 40% for the arm).

In the case of the big private firms and the media, results are definitely more clear-cut across all localities (Figure 5). However, differences between Huanta and SJL taken together, and Bambamarca are significant. In SJL and Huanta, 71% and 61% percent, respectively, think that the power in big private firms is in the hands of *whites*. In Bambamarca, in contrast, the percentage that believes the same is smaller, and almost equal to the percentage that answered “no particular ethnic group”. The results for media are similar to the answers for big private firms. See Table 4 for a detailed report across localities.

Figure 5

Which ethnic groups do you believe have power in the big private firms?



Total =546; Huanta= 191,Bambamarca=175 and SJL=180.. Source: CRISE Survey-Peru. Universidad Catolica del Peru

Table 4

Which ethnic groups do you believe have power in.....?(By localities)

Groups holding Power	Huanta (Aya)	Bambamarca (Caj)	SJL (Lim)	Total
Local Government				
White	10.68	12.02	44.77	21.57
Mestizo	45.63	43.17	26.74	39.04
Cholo	14.08	8.74	9.88	11.05
indigenous/Andean	20.39	3.83	4.07	9.98
No particular	5.34	14.75	4.65	8.20
Others	3.88	17.49	9.88	10.16
Total	191	175	180	546

Central Government				
White	35.08	19.43	46.67	33.88
Mestizo	37.70	26.86	16.11	27.11
Cholo	15.18	16.00	19.44	16.85
indigenous/Andean	3.66	1.71	2.78	2.75
No particular ethnic group	6.28	19.43	7.22	10.81
Others	2.09	16.57	7.78	8.61
Total	191	175	180	546
Police				
White	45.69	16.18	52.57	38.53
Mestizo	27.92	23.70	21.14	24.40
Cholo	4.57	3.47	7.43	5.14
indigenous/Andean	2.03	0.58	2.29	1.65
No particular ethnic group	18.27	42.77	9.14	23.12
Others	1.52	13.29	7.43	7.16
Total	197	173	175	545
Army				
White	47.18	20.59	54.80	41.33
Mestizo	20.51	22.35	18.64	20.48
Cholo	5.64	1.18	9.60	5.54
indigenous/Andean	1.54	1.76	2.26	1.85
No particular ethnic group	24.10	40.00	7.34	23.62
Others	1.03	14.12	7.34	7.20
Total	195	170	177	542
Big private firms				
White	60.51	34.12	70.56	55.60
Mestizo	17.44	20.00	6.11	14.50
Cholo	3.08	3.53	5.00	3.85
indigenous/Andean	1.54	0.00	0.56	0.73
No particular ethnic group	17.44	30.00	12.22	19.63
Others	0.00	12.35	5.56	5.69
Total	195	170	180	545
Media				
White	53.33	28.57	63.48	48.98
Mestizo	31.28	28.57	18.54	26.25
Cholo	3.59	2.38	5.06	3.70
indigenous/Andean	2.56	1.19	1.69	1.85
No particular ethnic group	7.69	24.40	5.62	12.20
Others	1.54	14.88	5.62	7.02
Total	195	168	178	541

Source: CRISE Survey-Peru. Universidad Catolica del Peru


Across ethnic groups, *whites* and *mestizos* see local government mostly in the hands of their groups, particularly the *mestizos*. Thirty one percent of *whites* think that *mestizos* hold power in local government vs. 16% of *mestizos* that think *whites* hold power. Forty nine percent of *mestizos* believe that they hold power in local government. As we have seen in the case of SJL, the largest percentage believes *whites* hold power in local government; we could consider that it is particularly the *mestizos* in the provinces who feel confident of their power in the local government. *Cholos* and *indigenous* see something rather different. While still the largest group the power in local government in the hands of *white* and *mestizo*, *cholos* 33% and 22% respectively, and *indigenous* 23% and 27% respectively, a

third opinion appears. There are 18% of *cholos* and 28% of *indigenous* that see the power of local government residing in their own groups.

In the eyes of the majority of all groups, with the exception of the *mestizos*, the power in the central government is in the hands of *whites*. However, there is an important fraction in each group who thinks that *cholos* are the ones holding power in the central government (the largest percentage is among *cholos*). When we check back the results for localities, the proportion who thinks the same is very similar in all the localities. Again this is certainly related to the presidency of the *cholo* Toledo, as he was called by the popular media.

Figure 6

Which ethnic groups do you believe have power in the central government?



Total =546; white= 49; mestizo=297; cholo=100 and indigenous/andean=100. Source: CRISE Survey-Peru. Universidad Catolica del Peru

Regarding the high commands in the police and army, the perception among ethnic groups is more diverse. The percentage of *cholos* and *indigenous* who believe power is in the hands of *white* is strong, 43% and 59% for the police and 45% and 60% for the army. However, the percentage of *whites* and *mestizos* who think similarly is smaller. An important percentage in each group thinks that “no particular ethnic group” predominates in the police (26% and 29%) and in the army (30% and 31%). The percentage of *cholos* who says the same has increased as well (18% and 19% respectively) but not in the same proportion. Big firms are largely perceived in the hands of *whites* across the groups and for the first time *mestizos* do not believe in its majority that they hold the power. Half of *mestizos* (53%) believe that *whites* have the power in big private firms and a quarter thinks that “no particular ethnic group” have the power. In the case of media, no interesting differences occur across ethnic categories. All groups mention *whites* in first place, followed by *mestizo*.

The interviews lead us to deepen our understanding of how power is perceived. In contrast with the survey, the question in the interviews was open. The responses report that power is certainly

perceived both as political and economic and only one has mentioned race or ethnic characteristics. The absence of responses addressing the question from an ethnic approach is notable when the question is put in an open form. Political power was directly associated with the President, for the country, and the Mayor, for the locality. The emphasis on the president is very strong in the testimonies, especially in Bambamarca. For instance, for Liliam power is first 'in god' and then 'in the president' [2] and for Fatima "the president has the power in the country as parents do in their home" [4]. In Huanta, the president and political power is very important as well, but it generally becomes subordinated to economic power. Beatriz from Huanta said that it is the United States which has power over Peru in the economy, while within Peru the power belongs to the 'private firms' [13]. Luis Enrique expressed that the rich and the government hold the power; but the government works for "the rich" not for the "people" [15] and finally Pedro affirmed that big private firms hold the power and buy the politicians and the media. He told us that that some years ago, the people from Bambamarca organized a strike to protest against Yanacocha (a gold mining company particular working in the area). According to him the strike lasted for a whole week in the middle of demonstration and protest, but the media, corrupted by the firm, did not give any publicity [5].

Few have expressed power in terms of ethnic identity and each has put it in different way. Karina was the only one who mentioned ethnic and racial characteristics. For her power belongs to the big businessmen and she describes them as 'white, fair-haired and dressed in a suit'. These groups are more powerful than others, in her opinion, "white people are more involved in politics because they have more relations, relatives that help, access to education, and more opportunities" [26]. Others such as Hildebrando in SJL [30] and Pedro in Bambamarca [5] think that political power can be achieved by *cholos* but the consequences are disappointing. For Hildebrando when people 'such as he' reach the power, 'they forget about their people' and do not do anything for them. Pedro was very happy with Toledo as a new President because he is "a serrano, cholo" and would help the peasants, the poor, but was disillusioned when he learnt Toledo's salary and the president 'fell from his pedestal', he said [5].

Government favouritism and discrimination

Fifty seven percent of people believe the government discriminates. Discrimination has been mostly expressed in class rather than ethnic terms. No significant differences among localities and ethnic groups have been found. The identification of the specific groups subject to this discrimination is more dispersed, but in the open question it is heavily reported in class terms. Among those who believe that there is government discrimination, the group most mentioned was the poor (54%), followed by the indigenous (16%) and political opponents (15%). Favouritism from the government is more perceived (61%) and largely felt in political terms. 67% of those who perceived government's favouritism mentioned as the most important favoured group, politician's colleagues and relatives.

This perception is equally mentioned across localities and ethnic groups. The second group most mentioned were the rich (19%). Favouritism in ethnic terms was only expressed for a tiny fraction, less than 5%.

4. Political mobilization and lack of political engagement

Our previous findings make the question of political mobilization much more pressing. Why has conflict, violent or non violent, not arisen with a strong ethnic base? The internal conflict in the 80s, which raged with approximately 69,000 victims in the country, in vast majority indigenous, was mainly expressed in class terms³⁷. It is clear that the answer to this question is out of the scope of our analysis, but we believe the information from the survey and interviews allow us to illuminate, in some extent, the road that takes us to the answer. The survey has collected information about political engagement and mobilization, as well as, about perceptions on the significance of organization (whether it is political or not) and the use of violence.


In an overall evaluation, the most striking result is that people have not reported participation in any type of organization. With the exception of the 30% of bambamarquinos who belong to the “ronda campesina”; the percentages of people that belongs to an organization or association is extremely small.³⁸ More than 50% do not feel close to any political party (57%), 17% feel close to Fujimori’s party and 10% to the APRA party. The percentages of people that have taken part in different forms of political actions are less devastating, but still very small. Figure 6 shows the results for the complete sample. Twenty percent has signed a petition, 20% has participated in an official strike and 18% has attended a demonstration. Most people, of course, said they might do some of the mentioned forms of political actions with the exception of joining boycotts and, in less extent, attending demonstrations. The latter two forms of actions have shown the larger percentages of rejections, together with going to an influential person. Figure 7a shows the result for “uncontroversial” forms of actions and Figure 7b for “controversial” ones.

³⁷ Truth Commission of Peru (2005).

³⁸ We have asked for participation in organizations of the following types: religious, educational, trade union/farmers organization, neighbourhood associations, women, environmental, professional or business, pro-democracy or human rights, political, sport or recreational, ethnic, credit, other.

Figure 7a


Engagement in different forms of “uncontroversial” forms of political action



Total =600. Source: CRISE Survey-Peru. Universidad Catolica del Peru

Figure 7b

Engagement in different forms of “controversial” forms of political action



Total =600. Source: CRISE Survey-Peru. Universidad Catolica del Peru

When there is not too much engagement in organization or political action, most people still perceive organization as useful. Having links with NGOs is considered useful (68%), followed closely by joining marches or protest (66%) and belonging to an organization (63%). Fifty percent thinks that belonging to a political party is useful. Finally, there is 19% that agrees that nothings serves and it is practically impossible to improve the quality of live. It was surprising for us that half of the 111 people that agreed with this statement live in Lima and three quarters of them belong to the group of the most educated. Finally, an overwhelming 83% agree that violence only provokes more violence, but 44% agrees that violence is sometimes necessary and a similar percentage agrees that sometimes it is the only way to be heard.

Regarding political engagement and action, there are strong regional differences. Around 53% of people from Bambamarca have participated in at least one of the forms of political action, in contrast with 38% in Huanta and 34% in Lima. This is by far the largest percentage we would find in engagement of any form in a group. When analyzing specifically which forms they have used, a larger percentage of people in Bambamarca have taken part in at least one “uncontroversial” form of action. Among those who have engaged in “controversial” forms of actions there are no significant differences across localities (Huanta=31%, Bambamarca=28% and Lima 23%). There are not many differences about the perception of the significances of organizations across localities, most of them think they are useful, but people in Bambamarca see the utility of having links with NGOs in larger degree (83%, vs 64% in Huanta and 57% in Lima).

These results are very consistent with the way people from Bambamarca see their world and their community: ‘very organized’. Organization plays an important role to alleviate the community needs, such as water and electric light. Lilian said that it is possible to obtain ‘obras’ (infrastructure and public services) for the community. For example they are receiving now the water they have been demanding for six months: “at the end we got it”, she said. She added that the electric light took more time (two years) but in the end it also happened. In Bambamarca organization can happen spontaneously because people see their neighbours as close and collaborative. Monica’s neighbours discovered that some young men had rented a room in the community and were stealing vegetables and guinea pigs. The neighbours got together and made the bandits run away, she told us very proudly. For Monica, strikes are useful for achieving things that on an individual basis we cannot: ‘it is in being united we are strong’”, she said. However Maria immediately made clear to us that she does not like violent forms, she likes peaceful actions “with order”. But violence is not necessary in Bambamarca: “the organization, the ronda has always been heard”, said a young man. [10].

Bambamarquinos see the role of the rondas as very important, 30% of them are involved. However today they are not convinced about the future of the rondas. The experience of getting close to political elections and trying to get power in the municipality has gone wrong. Pablo said that rondas today are weak because ‘all have been politicized’ ‘there are too many fights among political parties and too many divisions’ [5]. Marco thinks that the ronda has been very important for the community and regrets that the ronderos could not reach high positions in the municipality: ‘the parties use and divide them’ [1]. Finally, Jorge, son of a rondero, believes that winning the elections for the municipality is crucial but he thinks that urban people believe that the ronderos will fill their pockets with money from the municipality ‘because they are peasants’ [10].

The perception in Huanta is very different. People see organization as useless. In the rural areas, people told us their communities are in permanent conflict; even when they accomplish some things, they do it with too many problems. In addition it is too costly because people do not collaborate, Eva told us: ‘they are pessimists’ [12]. Farmers have sometimes participated in marches and demonstrations but without any specific result. Alberto has participated with the Federación Agraria of Huanta but he thinks it is worthless [14]. Leadership is lost in a corrupt system. When people from the community reach power, they forget the community: ‘it is pure opportunism’, added Eva [12]. In urban neighborhoods, things are even more difficult. People see their neighbors as distant and strange. Beatriz said that in her neighborhood they do not organize because they do not know each other. They have come from different places and at different points in time; some are just renting [13]. Teachers and farmers have participated in demonstrations and strikes but nothing was achieved [11] [14]. For Eliana demonstrations achieve little, “but at least they make authorities pause to think”. She complains that actions are very badly organized: “people cannot strike all the time, they live from their work” [19]. Lucio thinks that organizations do not work as they did in the past. He does not know what has gone wrong, but now he does not trust people, his grandfather taught him this and the time of terrorism has reinforced it. Several of them made clear to us that they are against any type of violence and have only participated in peaceful demonstrations. Only one, Soledad, said that sometimes violence is needed, “if not they ignore you”. [18]

In San Juan the Lurigancho people ‘get on with own lives’, said Julio from Huanta Dos [21]. With the exception of the richer area, where most of people have come from urban Huanta in Ayacucho and families knew each other since before, the rest of the areas of these two settlements are not organized. They do not support or trust each other. Most of them come from different regions and feel prejudice towards each other. Karen said that there are no major changes in her neighborhood because people are not united, ‘they are bad people’ and her family do not relate to them: “Their houses are in a bad condition, their children are badly dressed”. In addition, “they are violent with their children, stubborn and they drink and fight a lot” [22]. This area is on a hill and they do not have street illumination yet. In the night they have to walk up in darkness, but division prevents them from organization: ‘we do not achieve to do anything together’, said Elvira. When leadership emerges, the system becomes too complicated, too many doors to knock on without success. The dream of Hildebrando in Huanta Dos has been to help his community, but he finds institutions impossible to access when there are no ‘contacts’³⁹. The politicians do not help, they come for the electoral campaigns but then “they forget”. He has enjoyed being a leader at the cost of his work. Unfortunately there are not too many willing to do it, he said. Now he is disillusioned.

³⁹ The overwhelming difference that ‘contacts’ and ‘managing the system’ make for successful and less costly collective action in Lima has been pointed out by Munoz, Paredes and Thorp (2005).

5. Conclusions

Our initial hypothesis was that a strong prejudice against *cholos* and *indigenous* people, mainly in Lima, and against *indians* in the Sierra, was a significant explanation of the fluidity or weakness of identity in Peru. It was presumed that people would try to run away from the negative stereotype and hide the traits that allow the others to associate them with it. What the data and the interviews reveal, however, is rather different. We find evidence of strong sense of ethnic identity in the three cases, mostly among those who self-identify as *cholos*. We find that being subject to ethnic prejudice has not only resulted in passivity, denial of the group or alienation, but also, in other instances, in a new appreciation of ones' own identity. However, it is clear that coming from a very prejudiced environment against indigenous peasants, 'the indians' 'the chutos' in the Sierra, serrano people feel disgusted when they arrive in Lima and discover they are being put in the same group they themselves consider so low. In this context we can understand better the need for denial or suppression of identity, or the creation of clear differences between uneducated *cholos* and *indigenas* (the indios, the chutos), and educated serranos. The imperative of this differentiation can include harm to one's own group.

Our cases also bring insights as to the different effects and consequences of salient ethnic identities. Most people are aware of the effects of racial and cultural traits on people's chances to get access to jobs. While much has been accomplished for them or their parents through the process of migration and education, still the most desirable jobs in the private sector seem to run into the devastating excluding power of appearance, whether this is purely aesthetical or ethnic. In the government, access to opportunities run into problems of connections and corruption. This can probably explain why so much sacrifice results only, in the best of the cases, in moderate achievements. Power is seen as in the hands of whites and mestizos. In the provinces, mestizos are aware of their power locally, but in Lima all agree the power is with the *whites* in most institutions of the government, and more so, in the private sector. People are less aware of the impact on education and they considered education an accomplishment that relies on their own efforts. However, the effects of ethnicity are this time embedded in the mechanisms of education supply. It is not only limited for the poorest, the indigenous in the highlands, but its quality is tremendously poor for those living in urban settings. What becomes clear is the overwhelming importance of the "structural arrangement", the necessary loss of in-group ties (language, clothing, history) when looking for education and employment, and the still deep division among the Sierra and the Coast that foster longstanding ethnic stereotypes.

Organization is weak, with the exception of Cajamarca, where the rondas have done much and people see their community as more harmonic and collaborative. In Huanta and in Lima division, distrust and

prejudice predominates, with the exception of the better-off community formed by the urban “huantero” families. Severe ethnic insults appear where the barriers of moral conventions are weaker, such as when people are drunk at parties. In these circumstances organization is almost impossible. Leadership appears with much voluntarism, but rapidly, falls into disillusion. The system is too complicated: too important contacts are essential and politicians do not care, ‘they forget’. When community organization is so difficult, the goal of overcoming prejudice against *cholos* and *indigenous* seems even more complicated, more difficult to achieve. It not only requires a personal huge effort, such as that made by some of our *cholo* respondents, to overcome the prejudice themselves and challenge the myth that individual dedication to reach progress and education will save them from the humiliation of being “choleados”, in addition it is necessary to bring the topic of prejudice out from the private to the public sphere. That is when the reality of the terrain is too overwhelming: too many people from different places to trust, too many different and complex steps to manage the system and too much risk in the informal economy and insecure jobs. The result is the frustration of leadership and the belief that any political effort will run into the sand of a corrupted system.

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