

RACE, ETHNICITY AND POLITICAL ACTION IN PERU

An analysis of the 2005 CRISE Perceptions Survey in Peru.

- Draft version, do not cite -

David Sulmont

Pontificia Universidad Católica del Perú
Social Sciences Department.
September 2006.

Introduction

The notion of horizontal inequalities (HI) refers to social, economic and political inequalities between groups with shared identities. Those identities may be based on religion, ethnicity, race or other salient factors which bind groups together (Stewart 2005). HIs differ from “vertical inequalities” in the sense that the later are individual inequalities based on different social positions or access to social assets derived of a capitalist society.

The main hypothesis of the HI approach is that when group boundaries are clearly defined, severe HI can lead to conflict. The underlying assumption of this hypothesis is that culture is a powerful mobilizing factor for collective action, especially when it is not easy for people to switch between strongly culturally defined groups. In those cases, group grievances based on HI can lead to violent collective action: “(...) the connection between inequality and social disorder is given by the cultural differences between social groups. If culture is associated with ethnicity, it follows that multi-ethnic societies with pronounced horizontal inequalities would tend to be socially violent.” (Figueroa and Barrón 2005: 5).

Recent research reports based on quantitative data¹ about social inequality in Peru have shown and measured the profound economic, political and social asymmetries between culturally, ethnically or racially defined categories of people. Although there is strong empirical evidence that HIs are correlated with social exclusion, discrimination and social conflict processes in Peruvian

¹ CVR (2003); Ñopo et al. (2004); Drzewieniecki (2004); Figueroa and Barrón (2005); Barrón (2005); Trivelli (2005); Sulmont (2005b); PNUD (2006); INEI (2006).

society, the issue as to the *nature of the relationship* between horizontal inequalities and politics, especially collective action and conflict (violent or not violent), is more debatable. Figueroa and Barrón argue that “(horizontal) inequalities do contribute to social disorder in Peru, but not as directly as HI theory assumes. Ethnic conflict is not the prime mover of social disorder (...) class conflict mobilizes people more than ethnic conflict in Peru” (2005: 26).

The work of the Peruvian Truth and Reconciliation Commission (CVR 2003) is one of the most important recent research projects² to have analyzed the relationship between horizontal inequalities and political process in contemporary Peru. The TRC’s final report stressed the strong link between violence - particularly the *effects* of violence - and ethnicity in the internal armed conflict between 1980 and 2000. The vast majority (75%) of deaths reported and estimated by the TRC occurred among native indigenous language speakers (mostly Quechua) in the central Peruvian highlands. Even though the conflict was not defined as an *ethnic conflict* by the TRC, Figueroa and Barron have pointed out:

(...) the civil war can also be seen as an endogenous outcome of a very unequal society, where horizontal inequalities are a very important contributor to overall inequality (...) the empirical observation that a society with significant horizontal inequalities shows periods of social violence is consistent with the predictions of (...) HI theory (2005: 18).

From their case study of collective action, community and conflict in Huanta-Ayacucho, Ismael Muñoz, Maritza Paredes and Rosemary Thorp (Muñoz et al. 2006) conclude that the level of violence experienced by this region during the internal armed conflict in the 80’s and 90’s, might be explained by a combination of horizontal inequalities with other factors like an oppressive and hierarchical system; an external agent with a political agenda of violence; and racist attitudes of some sectors of the society directly involved in the conflict (like subversive organizations, the army or the police) or watching it from far away (like the inhabitants of middle and upper-class neighborhoods in Lima). In this case, HI are considered as a “facilitating” factor for the existence of violence, but neither at the beginning, nor during it, did the actors involved in the armed conflict on either side frame it in terms of ethnic, racial or even “cultural” categories.

The political discourse of the subversive organizations, Sendero Luminoso and the MRTA,³ was plagued with allusions to the “working class”, “the peasantry” or the “people”. In fact, Sendero

² Although the research done by the TRC was not an academic project, scientific methods from the social and political sciences were extensively and intensively employed during this experience.

³ Sendero Luminoso was a maoist inspired subversive organization, while the MRTA (Movimiento Revolucionario Tupac Amaru) was more inspired by the “classical” Latin American leftist guerrilla movements (Cuba, Central America or the FARC in Colombia).

Luminoso conceived the peasant and indigenous traditional communal institutions as remnants of an archaic semi-feudal system, destined to be wiped out by the communist revolution. The politicians, the army and the police saw the fight against subversion in terms of the need to protect the state and public order. Even the self-defense committees, organized among indigenous peasant communities (autonomously or by the army), framed their involvement in the conflict using categories like “nation” and “peasant”, combined with a willingness to defend their villages and local communities.

Most recently, the 2006 presidential election results in Peru have revealed close links between horizontal inequalities and electoral outcomes. The 2006 electoral map shows a strong correlation between the “indigenous ethnic regions” defined by Figueroa and Barron (2005) and voting percentages favoring Ollanta Humala’s Nationalist Party, the new 2006 outsider of Peruvian politics. Conversely, in “non-indigenous regions” traditional political parties were more successful and received significant more votes. For many social and political analysts, the 2006 presidential election results painted a picture of Peruvian society similar to the one already presented by the Truth and Reconciliation Commission three years before. Both experiences show a correlation between deep social, cultural and geographical divides and political processes in Peru: armed conflict in one case, and political representation in the other.

The 2006 election results have been interpreted as another bell as to the political consequences of inequality and social exclusion (Sulmont 2006a). First, they brought again into public debate the issue of the legitimacy of the State and the democratic system in a country where horizontal inequalities are highly correlated with vertical inequalities; and second, they demonstrated that social grievances derived from such types of social exclusion and discrimination can be politically expressed and exploited by outsiders and become a source of instability. However, despite the relationships between horizontal inequalities and the electoral results, the political discourse of Ollanta Humala’s Nationalist Party is closer to traditional Peruvian and Latin American populism than to “ethnopolitics”. Even if ethnicity was sometimes evoked in the campaign, it was not the most salient dimension of Humala’s political project.

At the beginning of their paper, Muñoz et al. ask themselves how extremely severe horizontal inequalities could have remained unchallenged for so long in Peruvian society (2006: 3). The question does not imply that inequality is not a central issue in Peruvian politics and one of the most important reasons for political mobilization and conflict during most of Peru’s contemporary history. The “problem” is that social inequality *is not politically framed* in terms of horizontal inequalities, especially in the national political arena.

In their case studies, Muñoz et al. have found that in ethnically and socially homogenous environments, group cultural identities enhance solidarity which can facilitate successful collective action when it comes to dealing with some social grievances or problems at a local level (accessing urban services in Lima; controlling social order in Cajamarca; negotiating environmental compensations in Cusco). However, despite some successes, collective action at this local level shows limited results in terms of alleviating poverty or reducing horizontal inequalities. According to the authors, one of the reasons which explain these limitations is the fact that local level collective action has weak connections with intermediate levels that might channel social grievances into the national political debate. This “intermediate level” is a political one, but it cannot perform its connective function because it is controlled by parties that are fragmented or politicians that are corrupt, and prone to personalism and favoritism (Muñoz et al. 2006: 29).

A hypothesis which can explain the difficulty of linking local collective action based on culturally defined groups with intermediate or national politics is the low level of connectedness - beyond the communal or local level - between groups of people in Peruvian society which are categorized or self-identified using cultural, ethnic or racial categories.⁴ This may be one of the reasons behind the fact that horizontal inequalities are not transformed into political projects, ideologies or discourses which could mobilize political action or generate political representation.

Another reason for the weakness of the politically organized dimension of issues of horizontal inequalities in Peru could be related to the social stigma associated with the racial or ethnic categories attributed to the groups or individuals who suffer the worst consequences of inequality and poverty. For many Peruvians, experience has shown that beyond the local level or family ties, “identity” based on such categories is not a useful resource but rather a heavy burden of exclusion and discrimination that holds back individual or collective social mobility.

In this paper we will try to address those hypotheses using data from the 2005 CRISE Perceptions Survey in Peru. First, we will briefly discuss the issue of measuring ethnic and racial categories in Peru, focusing on a quantitative perspective. Then, we will present some of the survey’s results in regard to the respondent’s ethnic and racial self-identification. Finally, we will analyze and outline some conclusions about the relationships that we have found in the survey between variables of ethnic or racial self identification, and political and social alienation, political activism, attitudes toward violence, and perceptions of the efficacy of political action.

⁴ In order to refer to the issues of “identity”, “race” and “ethnicity”, we are borrowing the terms of “categorization”, “self identification” and “connectedness” from Rogers Brubaker (2004).

Problems and methods in the measurement of ethnicity and race in Peru

One of the main problems in the measurement of ethnicity in Peru is the absence of well defined ethnic group categories that can be used by people to talk about themselves. Apart from the case of some native communities in the Amazon region of the country,⁵ for the vast majority of Peruvians the concept of “ethnic group” is a strange notion in everyday vocabulary.

In fact, Rogers Brubaker suggests that the notion of “ethnic group(s)” (as well as the notion of “racial groups”) has more problems than virtues for social analysis, as a result “we tend to take for granted not only the concept of ‘group’, but also ‘groups’ – the putative things-in-the-world to which the concept refers” (2004: 7). For Brubaker, this tendency, which he refers as “groupism”, poses the problem of reifying ethnic or racial social categories, presenting a picture of the world as composed by deeply founded, clearly delimited, self-aware and quasi-natural clusters of people. Instead of *explaining why* people or societies conceive themselves as composed by ethnic or racial groups, social scientists taking a “groupist” approach *describe* such societies using those categories: “Ethnic common sense (...) is a key part of what we want to explain, not what we want to explain things *with*” (Brubaker 2004: 9).⁶

In order to understand social conflict and identity issues in multicultural societies, Brubaker invites us to shift our analytical attention and to change our theoretical tools, focusing on more dynamic processes of social construction of reality:

Ethnicity, race and nation should be conceptualized not as substances or things or entities or organisms or collective individual – as the imagery of discrete, concrete, tangible, bounded, and enduring “groups” encourages us to do – but rather in relational, processual, dynamic, eventful and disaggregated terms. This means thinking of ethnicity, race and nations not in terms of substantial groups or entities but in terms of practical categories, situated actions, cultural idioms, cognitive schemas, discursive frames, organizational routines, institutional forms, political projects and contingent events. It means thinking of ethnicization, racialization, and nationalization as political, social, cultural, and psychological processes (2004: 11).

As we have seen, there are important connections between racial, ethnic or cultural categories and social inequality in Peruvian society. Such issues have been extensively discussed in

⁵ A work published by the International Labor Office (Dandler 1998) reports 65 different ethnic groups in the Peruvian Amazon region. According to the 1993 census, there were nearly 300 thousand natives living in 930 Amazon communities, which represent less than 1.5% of the Peruvian population at that time.

⁶ In Italics from the original.

Peruvian social science but, as Ñopo et al. point out, the research in this field is usually done through case studies “rather than in a systematic approach with some pretension of statistical significance” (2004: 2). One of the difficulties of studying race and ethnicity in Peru from a quantitative systematic approach is the lack of consensus on a proper methodology or set of indicators that could tap into those dimensions in a sample survey.

There are two main approaches for dealing with the measurement of race or ethnicity from a quantitative point of view. The first tends to focus on categorization processes, using “objective” cultural, ethnic or racial markers, such as mother tongue, place of origin or in some cases “skin color” to classify individuals. The second approach uses self-identification, where respondents in a survey or an interview are asked to place themselves in a range of ethnic, racial or cultural categories.

Examining the United States experience in measuring ethnicity and race in national censuses and surveys, Taeku Lee (2004) portrays a shift from categorization to single self-identification and finally to multiple self-identification. Until the 1950s, census reports on race and ethnicity in the U.S. were made using the enumerator’s observation of “skin”, “ethnic background”, or “blood line” of people, conceived as “objective” indicators of race and ethnicity. In the 1960s the major change introduced on these matters was to ask the respondents to self-identify themselves in a range of racial or ethnic categories (African American, Latino, White, etc.), discarding from that point on the enumerator’s observations. The second major change occurred in the 2000 U.S. census where self-identification changed from choosing only one racial or ethnic category to “mark one or more”. This opened the way to 63 possible permutations of “racial or ethnic identifications” and represented a shift towards a “more constructivist view of one’s race” (Lee 2004: 3-4).

In terms of the conceptualization of “identity”, those methodological choices reflect a transition from what might be called a “strong” theoretical concept of identity toward a “weak” or “soft” one. Strong notions of identity are closer to the commonsense idea of the term; they imply that identity is something that all people have or ought to have, even if there are unaware of it. They also imply strong notions of collective boundedness and homogeneity (Brubaker 2004: 37). By contrast, “soft” theoretical understandings of identity, as in constructivist approaches, consciously break with those ideas, trying to grasp the contemporary (modern or postmodern) fragmented experience of the self. The problem with such “soft-identity” theoretical approaches is that they may lead to what Brubaker calls “clichéd constructivism” or conceptions of identity “packaged with standard qualifiers indicating that identity is multiple, unstable, in flux, contingent, fragmented, constructed, negotiated and so on”, which have the risk of “becoming mere placeholders, gestures signaling a stance rather than words conveying a meaning” (2004: 38). As a

result, “identity” as an analytical concept, loses something of the “self-sameness over time” that is part of the core meaning of the term (ibid).⁷

The academic discussion on ethnicity and race in Peru has not been exempt of such issues. The pioneer work of Anibal Quijano (1980) analyzed the new social and cultural identities associated with the urbanization and modernization of Peruvian society in the second half of the 20th century. Quijano argues that in this process a new social group, the “cholos”, emerges from the confluence of Andean and peasant cultural background with the modern experience of the city and the capitalist market. The “cholo” is conceived as a new cultural category or group, based on the social mobility experience of indigenous immigrants in the cities. It distances itself from the “mestizo” category in the sense that the latter is closer to the “biological” meaning of the mix of European (and African) and native populations during the Spanish colonization. The “cholo” category can be theoretically located half way between “strong” and “soft” notions of identity, since for Quijano, this category implies the existence of an “Andean core” of identification and self-understanding, combined with the cultural innovations of the modern experience. In this sense, the “cholo” is a transitional category, the product of a dynamic process of profound social and economic transformations in Peruvian society. In fact Quijano refers to this phenomenon as a “process of cholification”.

If Quijano’s “cholification theory” and later related works⁸ allude to dynamic changes in identity issues related to the experience of modernity in Peruvian society, different studies and analysis have shown an enduring use of racial categories inherited from Spanish colonization in everyday language and discrimination practices.⁹ Many people continue to fuse physical characteristics with social behavior, fixing racial stereotypes in order to categorize individuals. In a recent research carried out among young high school and university students in Lima, Joanna Drzewieniecki found that race “is a category that makes a great deal of sense to Peruvian youth. While culture and socio-economic status matter, young people are aware of skin color and facial features and many perceive an imagined ‘racial hierarchy’ in Peru running approximately from black to white” (2004: 20). In a national survey conducted by David Sulmont in 2004, more than 45% of the respondents said that Peruvian society is “somewhat racist” or “very racist”, and almost 65% thought that Peruvians are “more racist” or “as racists as in the past”.

⁷ In fact, Brubaker’s advice is to get rid of the notion of “identity” as an analytical tool because it carries such contradictory theoretical meanings. He proposes to replace it with concepts like categorization, self-identification, self-understanding and groupness in order to refer to the different dimensions that the problem of “identity” poses to social analysis.

⁸ See Nugent (1992).

⁹ See for example: Callirgos (1993), Portocarrero, Manrique (1999), Santos (2003).

Despite the changes and mutations experienced by Peruvian society through the last century, today, at the beginning of the 21st century, we have a picture of who is in the top and who is in the bottom quite similar to the one we had almost two centuries ago (...) when race or ethnic origin designated the position that an individual could occupy in the society (...) [A] historical continuity persists between what made us unequal in the past and what continues to differentiate us as human beings in the present (Sulmont 2005b: 39).¹⁰

Even though race categories are commonly used in everyday language and interactions, until recently they have been considered too controversial to talk about in academic or political spheres, unless to criticize their use or to denounce racism. We tend to avoid constructing a public discourse of a “racially self-conceived” society. If people can use race to categorize other individuals, these sorts of categories are not the most salient (or politically correct) when it comes to talking about oneself. As Drzewieniecki says: “The fact that the top elite of Peru traditionally have been ‘white’ (sic) or ‘whiter’ than the rest of the population reinforced the taboo on discussion of ‘race’ in the media and elsewhere” (2004: 1).

Instead of “race”, we have tried to use “ethnicity” and “ethnic group” as concepts to describe a Peruvian multicultural society and to refer to indigenous populations, not only from the Amazon region but from the Andes, especially the people who have Quechua or Aymara as their maternal language. However, despite the more “politically correct” aura of “ethnicity” or “ethnic group”, they are notions which lack resonance for the common people (particularly the “indigenous” ones).

The last time an official census measured the distribution of racial categories in Peru was in 1940. After that, official statistics stopped measuring “race” and focused on less controversial and more “objective” cultural and ethnic markers like language. This change was part of a number of state projects to reform and modernize Peruvian society, strengthen national unity and confront social conflict and unrest during the second half of the 20th century. Some of those projects included transforming the cultural and racial categories which have been used to refer to social differences associated with the oligarchic regime of the biggest landlords.

The guerrilla movements of the 1950s and 1960s utilized the agrarian question as a major political challenge to the system. The Revolutionary Government of the Armed Forces, led by General Velasco in 1968, resulted from this political instability. Velasco implemented a massive land reform program during the 1969-1975 period. As part of this program, Velasco also abolished formally the term indígenas (indigenous) and replaced it by campesinos (peasants) to describe the indigenous

¹⁰ Translated from Spanish.

populations (this change in the language has continued up to the present) (Figueroa and Barrón 2005: 17; the underlining is ours).

The metamorphosis of the symbolic categories to talk about and describe Peruvian society has important implications for the issues we are studying. As Brubaker points out, the State is a powerful identifier which can enforce an ethnic or racial classificatory system through official statistics, public records, territory management, administrative procedures or even the public education curriculum. These processes do not necessarily create “identities” or “groups”, but it “makes certain categories readily and legitimately available for the representation of social reality, the framing of political claims, and the organization of political action” (Brubaker 2004: 54).

Perhaps the fact that since 1980 (and even before),¹¹ social grievances related with horizontal inequalities have not been framed in terms of ethnic conflicts in Peru explains why the terminology (or the lack of) used by the State to refer to cultural differences has not been seriously challenged or modified. This does not mean, as we have seen, that racial or ethnic categories have not been related to social differences or conflict in commonsense knowledge, political discourse as well as in academic research.

In recent years we have witnessed renewed efforts to address the problems of measuring ethnic or racial categories from a quantitative perspective; these efforts come both from the academic world and from the State. It is no coincidence that this interest comes in parallel with higher international sensitivity to the situation and problems of indigenous populations in Latin America and Peru. In 1993, the Peruvian Government ratified the ILO Convention N° 169 on Indigenous Peoples, and since 2001 government initiatives have been trying to include indigenous populations in formal structures of the State or to focus on them to implement social programs designed to alleviate, compensate poverty and exclusion or to penalize discrimination.¹²

In table 1, we have summarized some of the methodological approaches to measure ethnicity and race in contemporary quantitative studies, which in some cases have explicitly tried to estimate the size of the indigenous population in Peru:

¹¹ See Figueroa and Barrón (2005: 16-17).

¹² In 2005 a law created the INDEPA, the National Institute for the Development of Indigenous People; since 2002 the electoral law imposes an “indigenous quota” of 15% to the lists for the local or regional government elections where native indigenous populations are significant; also, since 2000 some laws have been passed to impose sanctions specifically on racial discrimination in public offices and private businesses.

Table 1

INDICATORS USED BY RECENT QUANTITATIVE RESEARCH ON ETHNIC IDENTITY IN PERU AND ESTIMATION OF INDIGENOUS POPULATION

Indicator / marker	Type of indicator	Unit of analysis	Estimated size of indigenous population	Dataset	Source
1. Location in "Indigenous / white intensity" scales	Multiple self identification and interviewer's subjective categorization	Individuals	Not possible	Household living standards measurement survey (2000 - 2001)	Ñopo et al. 2004
2. Head of household maternal language	Objective marker	Households	19.2%	ENAH0 2001-IV	Trivelli 2005
3. Head of household self identification with racial and ethnic categories	Single self identification		36.0%		
4. Self identification and maternal language	Mixed		45.2%		
5. Language most frequently used in the household	Objective marker		25.4%		
6. maternal language of head of household parents	Objective marker based on ancestry		47.7%		
7. Self identification with racial categories	Multiple self identification	Individuals	Not possible	Lima's high school and university students survey (2002)	Drzewieniecki 2004
8. Head of household place of birth	Objective marker	Households	74.8%	ENAH0 2002	Figueroa and Barrón 2005
9. Self identification with cultural, geographical or ethnic categories	Multiple self identification	Individuals	Not possible	DEMUS National exclusion and discrimination survey (2004)	Sulmont 2005b
10. Self identification with racial and ethnic categories	Single self identification	Individuals	24.7%	PNUD National opinion survey on democracy perceptions (2005)	PNUD 2006
11. Head of household self identification with racial and ethnic categories	Single self identification	Households	38.4%	ENAH0 2006 first mobile trimester (Jan.-Feb.-Mar.)	INEI 2006

As we can see, those studies have employed a variety of techniques, ranging from categorization using "objective" markers through self-identification (single or multiple) using a set of cultural, ethnic or racial categories, and mixed approaches. We can also differentiate more "constructivist" self-identification approaches (for example: Ñopo et al. 2004; Drzewieniecki 2004; Sulmont 2005b) from ones based on single self-identification. Those different approaches show big variations in the estimation of the size of Peruvian indigenous population: from 75% (Figueroa and Barrón 2004) to 19% (Trivelli 2004). Such differences pose many problems when it comes to focusing or implementing policies like poverty reduction programs or positive discrimination measures (such as the indigenous quota in elections) in regard to those populations.

However, regardless of the methodology or set of indicators used, all these researches have in common that they have found consistent quantitative correlations between the chosen measures of ethnic and racial categories and poverty, social exclusion, discrimination and even attitudes towards politics.

Another common factor is that when a single self-identification methodology is used in a systematic way, we can observe consistent results between different surveys. For example, the

National Household Survey of the 4th semester of 2001 (ENAHO 2001-IV) was the first to include an “Ethnicity – Race” module in official surveys since the 1940 census. Among the questions used to measure ethnicity (which include the maternal language of the respondent and his or her parents) the head of the household was asked to identify himself using a range of ethnic or racial categories,¹³ as a result 36% of the household heads identified themselves as being indigenous (Amazon, Quechua or Aymara; the second category was largely the most common) (Trivelli 2004). Since 2004, the National Statistics Institute (INEI) has been using this question to measure ethnicity in the ENAHO surveys and in the newly National Continuous Survey,¹⁴ the percentages of household heads that identify themselves with an indigenous category vary in a 35%-39% interval. In the first mobile trimester¹⁵ ENAHO 2006 this percentage was 38.4%. Even if such variations are higher than random sample error, the results show some robustness for a variable that has been extensively criticized in a number of academic works.

Most of those critics refer to the fact that in hierarchical societies, where whites constitute the dominant elite, respondents “tend to hide the social stigma of being non white” (Figueroa and Barrón 2004: 9), this causes a high proportion of respondents in some Peruvian surveys to identify themselves as “mestizo”, considered to be a more neutral category (Ñopo et al 2004: 4). If we are trying to seize “true identities” (as in “strong identity notions”), such measurement issues constitute an important problem. However, if we take a more dynamic approach, trying to understand self-identification or categorization processes, the accuracy of those measurement techniques is not a problem but rather an indicator of social practices and symbolic phenomena which are taking place in the society.

One conclusion we can draw from the measurement discussion on ethnicity and race in Peruvian society is that ethnic or racial categories are more “practical” categories than “ontological” entities. People do know and use some of them, especially racial categories, to identify individuals according to social stereotypes. The lack of precision or consensus on the meanings and boundaries of those categories is not a methodological problem but rather a symptom of the social dynamics, where vertical inequalities concur with horizontal inequalities and where self-identification processes have to deal with cultural heritage, the social stigma of a hierarchical society and the social mobility issues of a capitalist society. The imprecision of ethnic and racial self-identifications

¹³ The specific question was: “Considering your ancestry and your customs, do you consider yourself as being: Amazon Indian; from Quechua origins; from Aymara origins; from black, mulato or zambo origins; from white or caucasian origins; from other origins?”

¹⁴ The National Continuous Survey is par of the new methodology of the Continuous Census inaugurated in 2005 by the INEI.

¹⁵ January – February – March. Since 2005, instead of using fixed trimesters, the ENAHO are applied using “mobile” trimesters, which means that the sample is taken in three consecutive months.

or categorizations can also be considered as an indicator of the different degrees of “groupness” of the collectivities defined through such terms.

In fact, both “race” and “ethnic” categories can be analyzed as being part of cognitive schemes or mental structures in which knowledge is represented and processed. Such schemes guide perception and work as a mental recognition device to process information, classify people and events, and influence social interaction (Brubaker 2004: 75) in the everyday experience of social inequality, exclusion, discrimination or social mobility in Peruvian society. Treated in such a manner, ethnicity and race become perspectives *on* the world, rather than things *in* the world. A cognitive approach to study those issues can help social analysis by considering race and ethnicity as:

(...) products of reiterative and cumulative processes of categorizing, coding, framing and interpreting. Instead of asking “what is race?”, “what is an ethnic group” (...), a cognitive approach encourages us to ask how, when, and why people interpret social experience in racial, ethnic or national terms (Brubaker 2004: 87).

The CRISE Perception Survey: the questionnaire and the sample

The 2005 CRISE Perception’s Survey questionnaire was intended to measure perceptions on identity, ethnicity, religion and collective and political action among respondents of samples in the different countries of the regions where the CRISE project is working (Latin America, Africa and Asia). The draft versions of the questionnaire were discussed during the CRISE workshop which took place in Oxford in February 2005. The original English questionnaire was translated to Spanish by David Sulmont to be used as a template in the Latin American countries (Bolivia, Guatemala and Peru). Further modifications were made by the researchers in charge of each country’s survey in order to adapt the questionnaire and the answer’s categories to their specific realities.

In the Peruvian case, the questionnaire was extensively tested and modified in order to accommodate to local terminology and social, ethnic and racial identity issues. A draft version of the questionnaire was first tested on January 2005 in some peasant communities and villages in the region of Cusco, as an input for the Oxford workshop of February. Later, in July 2005, a first version of the post-workshop questionnaire was tested with 40 respondents in some locations of Huanta, Ayacucho. After the final modifications, the survey fieldwork was conducted in late August and September 2005.

Regarding the measurement of ethnic or racial categories, we adopted four types of indicators:

- Respondent's mother tongue.
- "*Ethnic / racial self identification*": Respondent's single self identification with one of the following categories: White, Mestizo, Andean Indigenous; Amazon Indigenous; Cholo; Black / "Zambo"¹⁶; Chinese / Japanese.¹⁷
- "*Ethnic scale self location*": Respondent's self location in a 7 point "chromatic scale", ranging from White (=1), through Indigenous (=7).¹⁸
- *Ancestry*: Respondent's categorization of her or his parents in the "ethnic / racial" categories described above.

We also asked the respondents to identify the two main groups in their communities or neighborhoods using the "ethnic / racial" categories and to locate them in the "7 point ethnic scale".

According to the agreements reached in the CRISE workshop, in order to carry out an exploratory analysis on the relationships between horizontal inequalities and social conflict, the sample design was intended to represent different contexts of cultural identification and categorization, and different levels of social conflict or violence. Considering the resources that could be allocated to the surveys in each country, the average sample size was set around 600 interviews.

In Peru, this sample design led to the definition of three different types of cases, each one represented by a specific location. In order to maximize the possibility of cross examining the cases from different methodological perspectives, these locations were the same as those studied by Ismael Muñoz, Maritza Paredes and Rosemary Thorp during 2004 and 2005 in the context of the CRISE project (Muñoz et al. 2006).

The cases were defined with the aim of testing differences based on region, cultural heterogeneity, urban and rural settings, and areas or people affected by the internal armed conflict in the 1980s and 1990s. In some locations, we made a subdivision intended to represent different levels of social integration and exclusion. It is important to bear in mind that the sample does not represent the whole Peruvian society; therefore, country-level generalizations are not possible. Instead, the sample is intended to represent a variety of social settings where we can observe

¹⁶ "Zambo" is a familiar word which designated someone of black African origins.

¹⁷ The question wording was: "If you have to define which group in this card do you belong to; which one it would be?"

¹⁸ This question was inspired by the methodology used in Ñopo et al. (2004). The question wording was: "Many people think that contemporary Peruvian's identity is mainly the product of the encounter between the Spanish of white race and the native inhabitants of Peruvian territory of indigenous race. Using this scale, where 1 means 'white' and 7 means 'indigenous' in which point would you locate yourself?. Remember that you can choose any point between 1 and 7".

different configurations of horizontal inequalities, perceptions of identity, politics and collective action.

The selected locations were the highland provinces of Bambamarca in Cajamarca and Huanta in Ayacucho, and two neighborhoods in the district of San Juan de Lurigancho (SJL) in the capital city of Lima.¹⁹

San Juan de Lurigancho (SJL) is the most populated district of the city of Lima, and incidentally, the most populated district of the country. According to the 2005 census, it has 812,656 inhabitants; most of them are migrants who came to the city during the mid 80s and the 90s. In this location we selected two neighborhoods: “Huanta I” and “Huanta II”. The inhabitants of those neighborhoods come mostly from the province of Huanta, in the department of Ayacucho. They left their region of origin because of the political violence they experienced during the 80s and 90s. According to the Peruvian Truth and Reconciliation Commission, Huanta in Ayacucho was the most affected province of the country during the internal armed conflict.

The people who founded “Huanta I” in SJL came primarily from the urban areas of their original province; they have higher educational levels and socioeconomic status than their fellow countrymen. In contrast, inhabitants of “Huanta II” came from poorer areas of the province and arrived in the city in the early 90s. “Huanta II” is more heterogeneous than “Huanta I”, since some people came also from other provinces of Peru.

Huanta is the second most important province of the department of Ayacucho, located in the central highlands of the country. The 2005 census found 85,559 inhabitants in this province. During almost 15 years, political violence in Huanta was extremely intense, causing several thousands of deaths.²⁰ In this region we selected two locations to be surveyed: the city of Huanta and the district of Luricocha. The first one is an urban area (population 40 thousand) and the second one is a rural district (population 5.7 thousand). The majority of the inhabitants of the province of Huanta has Quechua as their mother tongue and come from a peasant background.

The district of Bambamarca, capital of the province of Hualcayoc, is located in the department of Cajamarca, in the northern highlands of Perú. In 2005 Bambarcarca had 74,513 inhabitants. It is a rural district; many of its inhabitants are employed in agriculture-related activities, as peasants, artisans or in the commercial sector. The most important organizations in the region are the “rondas campesinas”, a form of rural autonomous police and community justice

¹⁹ For a deeper description of the social context of those locations, see Muñoz et al. (2006).

²⁰ Based on the TRC information and using the Multiple Systems Estimation methodology (CVR 2004: Appendix 3), we figure that 6.5 thousand people died in Huanta during the conflict, almost 8.5% of the overall population of the province enumerated by the 1981 census at the beginning of the conflict.

organization. In terms of cultural characteristics, Bambamarca is more homogeneous than Huanta and SJL.

In each of the locations the respondents were selected using an area-clustered multi-stage random sample design. In order to be selected, respondents had to be between 18 and 70 years old. In total, 615 questionnaires were completed, evenly distributed among the three locations. The fieldwork teams were organized and trained by the staff of the Public Opinion Institute of the Catholic University of Peru, under the supervision of David Sulmont and Vania Martínez.

The distribution of ethnic categories

In table 2, we can see the main characteristics of the respondents in the three surveyed locations. The distributions of the categories in the socioeconomic variables (occupational status, educational level) are consistent with the different social contexts that the cases were supposed to represent. If we had to put the three locations in a socioeconomic scale, creating an index which combines occupation status and education, the order of the three locations will be (from less to more): Bambamarca; Huanta and SJL.

Table 2

CRISE SURVEY: RESPONDENT'S PRINCIPAL CHARACTERISTICS, BY PLACE OF RESIDENCE

Vertical %

Variables	Categories	Total %	Place of residence		
			HUANTA	BAMBAMARCA	SJL - LIMA
Gender	Female	52.7	50.2	50.7	57.2
	Male	47.3	49.8	49.3	42.8
Age group	18 a 24	29.9	32.9	23.4	33.3
	25 a 34	22.1	18.8	26.4	21.4
	35 a 44	24.1	23.0	27.4	21.9
	45 a 54	13.3	13.1	10.4	16.4
	55 a más	10.6	12.2	12.4	7.0
Occupational status	Occupied	46.5	49.2	56.3	54.9
	Peasant	10.6	19.7	11.4	0.0
	Self employed, unqualified	23.1	12.7	34.3	22.9
	Employed in small size enterprises (< 10 empl.)	1.8	0.9	0.5	4.0
	Employed in big / medium size enterprises (> 10 empl.)	4.1	0.9	2.0	9.5
	Public servant	8.8	11.7	8.5	6.0
	Small business owner (< 10 empl.)	5.0	1.9	5.0	8.5
	Self employed, professional	2.9	1.4	5.0	2.5
	Big / medium business owner	0.8	0.0	1.0	1.5
	Not occupied	42.9	50.7	32.4	45.3
	Housewife / housekeeper	23.4	26.8	19.9	23.4
	Student	15.6	22.5	9.0	14.9
	Temporarily unemployed, do not work	2.9	0.5	3.0	5.5
Retired	1.0	0.9	0.5	1.5	
Educational level	None	6.0	2.3	15.4	0.5
	Some secondary or primary school	43.1	47.9	51.8	29.4
	Secondary school	34.2	32.4	18.4	52.3
	Post secondary other than university	7.6	6.1	7.0	10.0
	University degree	8.9	11.3	7.5	8.0
Racial / ethnic self identification	Mestizo	53.7	52.1	72.6	36.3
	Indigenous / andean	18.7	25.3	3.5	26.9
	Cholo	17.6	16.4	7.0	29.4
	White	8.8	6.1	16.4	4.0
	Other / none / DK	1.3	0.0	0.5	3.5
Maternal language	Spanish	70.8	35.2	100.0	79.6
	Indigenous language	29.2	64.8	0.0	20.4
Number of cases		615	213	201	201

We can also appreciate the different distributions of racial and ethnic categories. “Mestizo” is the modal category in all the cases. Although, Bambamarca is a rural district in the northern Andes, very few people identify themselves as being indigenous and almost nobody speaks an indigenous language. A large majority of “Bambamarquinos” consider themselves “mestizos”, making this the most homogeneous location. Whites are also a more common category in Bambamarca than in the other places.

People self-identify as indigenous in SJL almost in the same numbers as in Huanta, which should not be a surprise since most of the people interviewed in SJL were migrants from Huanta. The fact that Quechua speakers are more common in Huanta than “indigenous people” confirms that language is not always a predictor of self-identification (see table 3). “Cholos” are more common in SJL than in the other places, which is consistent with the “cholification process” analyzed by Quijano and described in the previous section of this paper.


Table 3

Respondent's ethnic / racial self-identification, by maternal language
Vertical %

Ethnic / racial categories	Total	Maternal language	
		Spanish	Indigenous language
Mestizo	54.9	59.7	43.5
Cholo	18.0	16.1	22.6
Indigenous	18.0	12.3	31.6
White	9.0	11.8	2.3
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0

In graph 1 and table 4 we can see the distribution and the mean scores of the 7 point white – indigenous self-placement scale. The mean of the whole sample is 4.31, almost in the middle with a slight bias to the “indigenous” side, however it becomes clear that the mean positions of the different places differ from each other, as the ANOVA procedure confirms: Huanta is the most “indigenous” location, while Bambamarca is the “whitest”.

Graph 1



More important, mean scores of the different ethnic categories show significant differences, both across categories and cases. Across cases, with the exception of whites, the other categories are more weighted towards indigenous in Huanta than in the other places.²¹

Table 4

White - indigenous self placement scale mean scores, by place of residence and respondent's racial / ethnic self identification

Racial / ethnic self identification	Mean score	Place of residence		
		Huanta (a)	Bambamarca (b)	SJL (c)
Indigenous	5.28	5.69 (b,c)	4.14	5.02
Cholo	4.34	5.20 (b,c)	3.86	3.95
Mestizo	4.24	4.59 (b,c)	4.03	4.11
White	2.59	2.69	2.42	3.13
Total	4.31	4.85 (b,c)	3.76 (c)	4.27

Small letters represent significant mean differences between the correspondent columns, $p < 0.05$, two tailed

Across categories, an ANOVA test indicates that there are significant differences in the whole sample and in each case. In table 5, we have summarized the LSD tests²² for pairs of categories. In the whole sample, indigenous and white are clearly different from the other categories, but “Cholo”

²¹ In table 3, besides ANOVA, we used Least Significant Differences (LSD) method to test differences across pairs of cases.

²² See supra.

does not differ from “mestizo”, except in Huanta, where “Cholo” is considered in a middle position at a significant distance both from indigenous and mestizos.

Table 5

Mean differences of White - indigenous self placement scale scores across respondent's racial self identification

		Indigenous	Cholo	Mestizo
All sample	Cholo	▼		
	Mestizo	▼	•	
	White	▼	▼	▼
Huanta	Cholo	•		
	Mestizo	▼	▼	
	White	▼	▼	▼
Bambamarca	Cholo	•		
	Mestizo	•	•	
	White	▼	▼	▼
SJL	Cholo	▼		
	Mestizo	▼	•	
	White	▼	•	▼

▼ = Category in row is "less indigenous" than category in column, $p < 0.05$, two tailed

• = No differences between categories

Respondent perception of the ethnicity of their communities differs somehow from the self-identification distribution. Although the question invites a multiple answer, as we can see in table 6, there is a tendency to stress the importance of the “white” category:

Table 6

Two major ethnic / racial groups perceived in the community, by Place of residence


Vertical %, multiple answers do not sum 100%

Ethnic / racial categories	Total	Place of residence		
		HUANTA	BAMBAMARCA	SJL - LIMA
Mestizo	67.3	67.1	89.6	45.3
Indigenous	40.8	60.6	9.5	51.2
White	35.1	18.8	74.6	12.9
Cholo	32.7	32.4	21.4	44.3
Other	3.1	1.4	1.5	6.5
None	0.2	-	-	0.5
DK/DNA	18.5	19.7	3.0	32.8
Number of cases	615	213	201	201

Perhaps this might be explained by the wording of the question. In Spanish we translated “major groups” as “principales grupos”. Like “major”, “principales” does not necessarily represent the “frequency” sense of the word, it can also imply the “most important” meaning of the word.

Nevertheless, analyzing the differences between people's self location and their perception of their communities in the 7 point scale, we have found that the "whiter" somebody conceives himself, the more "indigenous" he is likely to see the others. On the other hand, there are more convergences between one's location and the other's placement in the "indigenous" side of the scale. This could mean that "whiter" self-conceived individuals are aware of their minority position in Peruvian society.

Graph 2



The social salience of race and ethnicity

Beyond the distribution of racial and ethnic categories in the sample, how salient are they for the individuals? Even if the majority of the respondents perceive that race has become a less important issue in Peruvian society (see table 7), there is a significant proportion who think that race is still a burden for social mobility and individual progress. This perception is more acute in SJL (see tables 7 and 8), the reason for this might be the fact that as immigrants from and Andean province, the inhabitants of the SJL surveyed neighborhoods have had to deal with the social prejudice and the difficulties of making a new life, almost from scratch, in the capital. Living in more homogeneous environments, people in Huanta and Bambamarca did not have to confront with those issues at the same level.

Table 7

To have success in this country, do you think that the racial background of a person is more important or less important than some years ago?, by Place of residence

Vertical %

Answers	Total (%)	Place of residence		
		HUANTA	BAMBAMARCA	SJL - LIMA
It is more important	24.7	24.4	22.4	27.4
It has not changed	25.5	21.6	22.4	32.8
It is less important	46.0	52.1	49.3	36.3
DK /NA	3.7	1.9	6.0	3.5
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

As we can see in table 8, the social setting where racial discrimination is still perceived as most important is the labor market, especially in the private sector. This is consistent with the findings of Ñopo et al (2004), who measured the wage gap of Peruvian workers from different ethnic or racial background. Conversely, access to education and public services like running water and electricity, is seen as less affected by race.

Table 8

Racial discrimination: Do you think that someone's racial background affects his/her chances of...?, by Place of residence

% of respondents who answered yes

Alternatives	Total (% yes)	Place of residence		
		HUANTA	BAMBAMARCA	SJL - LIMA
Getting a job in the private sector	59.1	61.1	38.4	76.4
Getting a job in the public sector	55.9	53.6	40.4	73.1
Getting government contracts	49.7	46.4	36.4	66.0
Access to school	29.2	28.9	17.3	40.9
Access to university	27.4	25.1	15.3	41.8
Access to water or electricity	12.0	12.7	6.3	16.8

Despite this, or perhaps because of the social awareness of racial discrimination, this kind of categories are not judged to be the most salient dimensions of one's perception of oneself. Gender, occupation and place of birth are considered the three most important elements that define the way people think about themselves.

Table 9

Which of the following are the three most important elements for the way you think about yourself?, by Place of residence

Vertical %, multiple answers, do not sum 100%

Elements	Total (%)	Place of residence		
		HUANTA	BAMBAMARCA	SJL - LIMA
Gender	69.4	65.7	72.1	70.6
Work or occupation	52.4	38.5	62.7	56.7
Place of birth	39.3	53.5	31.3	32.3
Maternal language	36.1	49.8	26.4	31.3
Religion	32.7	30.5	36.8	30.8
Racial origins	21.3	25.8	15.9	21.9
Place of residence	18.0	18.3	19.9	15.9
Political ideas	13.7	11.3	10.9	18.9
Belonging to an organization	6.3	1.4	10.4	7.5
Other	1.3	-	2.0	2.0
DA / NK	4.6	3.3	4.0	6.5

We should take note that maternal language is considered an important element for a significant percentage of the respondents, especially in Huanta where we can find the largest proportion of Quechua speakers.

In table 1 we shown how place of birth and maternal language have been used as ethnic and cultural markers in several studies on ethnicity in Peru. We can observe in our sample the salience of those characteristics for the respondents. Does this mean the existence of some degree of ethnic consciousness or groupness? In a previous section of this paper, we said that an explanation for the absence of an ethnic framing of social conflicts in Peru could be related to the low level of connectedness - beyond the communal or local level - between groups of people in Peruvian society which are categorized or self-identified using cultural, ethnic or racial categories. Cultural characteristics might enhance social solidarity in a local or communal level, but they have more difficulties to do the same in larger settings. The problem is that some of those characteristics (especially having an indigenous language or being from an Andean province) are associated with racial stereotypes that stigmatize the individuals categorized in such manner.

Outside local or communal settings, racial stigmatization and discrimination is suffered individually rather that collectively, even if large numbers of people share the same problem. The experience of migration and social mobility in Peru has taught people that hiding or distancing themselves from their cultural or social background can facilitate integration and mitigate social exclusion. The “cholification process” described by Quijano, is a transitional process which can also be described as distancing oneself from the indigenous side of the “ethnic / racial scale”, as we can perceive in tables 4 and 5. This can also mean that when we are moving through the “ethnic /

racial scale”, there is always someone that we can consider more indigenous and different from us. A “cholo” in Huanta is less indigenous than an indigenous; and “indigenous” is also less indigenous in SJL than in Huanta (even if they come from the same region!); a “cholo” in SJL is less indigenous than a “cholo” in Huanta; and so on.

The survey’s results show acute social awareness among the respondents of the existence of racial and ethnic discrimination in Peru. They also show that racial categories are not the most salient elements for respondent’s self-perception. To which degree racial or ethnic self identification is associated with the respondent’s experiences of discrimination and social alienation?

In the 2004 National Survey on Social Exclusion and Discrimination, David Sulmont applied a “self experienced discrimination scale” intended to measure the degree of discrimination that the respondents could have encountered sometimes in their everyday experience. He found that 88% of the respondents had personally experienced some discrimination in diverse social settings and that in almost 20% of those cases, respondents attributed this experience to their “race or ethnic origins” (Sulmont 2005b: 20-21).

As an indicator of the social and political alienation that an individual could feel in Peruvian society, in the 2005 CRISE Perceptions Survey we asked the respondents if they considered that “people like them are properly represented” in different social and political institutions. In table 10 we can see the results of the negative answers to this question:

Table 10


Social and political alienation: Respondents who think that people like them ARE NOT properly represented in the following institutions, by Place of residence
% of respondents

Do you think that people like you are properly represented in the...	Total (% No)	Place of residence		
		HUANTA	BAMBAMARCA	SJL - LIMA
Big business	43.3	56.9	22.5	49.2
National government	34.0	40.3	18.8	42.5
Armed forces	32.4	47.8	18.2	29.3
Media	31.3	40.4	14.5	37.7
Police	27.0	41.7	14.4	23.4
Local government	19.9	13.4	12.7	34.0
<i>Social and political alienation index (mean)</i>	1.85	2.40	0.97	2.14

Negative answers range from 56% in Huanta for the “big business” question, to 12.7% in Bambamarca for the “local government” question. Results can be interpreted as a ranking of institutions from the “most alienating” to the least one. We used these results to calculate a “social and political alienation index”: positive (Yes) answers were coded 0 and negative answers (No)

were coded 1; then we added all the answers' codes and we got the total number of institutions that the respondent thinks he or she is not properly represented. As we can see, the index average is higher in Huanta and SJL than in Bambamarca. Almost half of the whole sample has a 0 value for this index.

Graph 3



In order to estimate the relationship between social and political alienation and the respondent's characteristics, especially ethnic and racial ones, we ran several OLS regression models that are presented in table 11:

Table 11

OLS Regression equations for Social and political alienation index

Variables	Unstandardized regression coefficients							
	A ₁	B ₁	A ₂	B ₂	A ₃	B ₃	A ₄	B ₄
Intercept	2.030** (.255)	0.213 (0.369)	1.689** (0.258)	0.243 (0.364)	1.579** (0.254)	0.339 (0.358)	1.349** (0.279)	0.092 (0.375)
Education achievement index	-0.09 (0.056)	-0.08 (0.054)	-0.069 (0.055)	-0.067 (0.054)	-0.175** (0.058)	-0.168** (0.057)	-0.158** (0.058)	-0.150** (0.057)
Gender (1= women)							0.344* (0.174)	0.374* (0.171)
Indigenous self identification (D)	1.000** (0.314)		0.723** (0.228)		0.494* (0.229)		0.482* (0.229)	
Self location 1= White, 7= indigenous		0.456** (0.063)		0.380** (0.064)		0.323** (0.065)		0.329** (0.065)
Mother tongue indigenous (D)			1.083** (0.200)	0.874** (0.199)	0.621* (0.246)	0.544* (0.241)	0.645** (0.246)	0.567* (0.240)
Huanta (D)					1.064** (0.271)	0.841** (0.272)	1.033** (0.271)	0.807** (0.271)
SJL (D)					1.144** (0.242)	1.100** (0.234)	1.102** (0.242)	1.049** (0.234)
R ²	0.037	0.091	0.087	0.124	0.127	0.158	0.133	0.166
Number of valid cases	548	547	547	546	547	546	547	546

Note: Standard errors of the coefficients are in parenthesis.

**p ≤ 0.05; ** p ≤ 0.01; two tailed*


In those models we used two different “self identification” variables for race and ethnicity. The first one (equations A) is a dichotomous variable of indigenous self identification (1= indigenous, 0= not indigenous) which is the product of recoding the “racial and ethnic self identification” variable presented in table 2. The second indicator (equations B) is the respondent’s self location in the white/indigenous 7 point scale. We also used another “objective marker” of ethnicity which consisted of a dichotomous variable of indigenous “mother tongue” (1= indigenous, 0= not indigenous).

As we can see in the different equations, regardless of the “racial and ethnic self identification” variable we used, we find positive and statistically significant regression coefficients. When we introduce the “objective ethnic marker” (equations A₂ and B₂) we note some changes on the “self identification” variables’ coefficients, but those changes are not larger enough to alter statistical significance. This leads to the conclusion that “self identification” and “objective” markers of ethnicity represent two separate dimensions of the phenomena we are studying, even if they may share some multicollinearity.

In equations A₃ and B₃, we add to two dummy variables (Huanta and SJL) to control for place of residence (the control category in this case is Bambamarca). As we have already seen in table 10, the models indicate that social and political alienation becomes more important in Huanta and SJL than in Bambamarca. This could be explained by the more social and cultural homogeneous environment of Bambamarca in comparison with the other places, which can mitigate the individual experience and perception of social and political alienation. Those models also indicate that, controlling for place of residence, the relationship of racial and ethnic identification with social and political alienation remains basically the same.

Another factor that appears in models A₃ and B₃ is the negative relationship between education²³ and social and political exclusion. Higher education levels are related to lower social and political alienation index values. However, as the equations represent, the impact of education on alienation is not the same across places of residence and ethnic or racial perception.

Graph 4



In graph 4 we present a variation²⁴ of the model specified by equation A₃. In this graph we have plotted the unstandardized predicted values for social and political alienation index by the

²³ To measure the impact of education we created an “education achievement index” by assigning numerical values to the different levels of education of the respondents: 1= none; 2= incomplete primary; 3 = complete primary; 4= incomplete secondary; 5= complete secondary; 6 = post secondary technical school; 7 = university degree.

²⁴ The difference between the model presented in graph 4 and the equation A₃ is that the plotted model does not include maternal language in the equation. The R² for the model in graph 4 is 0.117.

education achievement index, signaling the different lines for indigenous self identification and place of residence. Independently from the education level and the place of residence there is always a significant gap in social and political alienation between ethnic or racial categories of people, this gap represents the persistence of horizontal inequalities between those categories.

In equations A₄ and B₄ we have introduced another variable to represent a different source of inequalities between individuals. As we can see, being a woman is also correlated with higher alienation. In this case, the models tell us that gender inequalities remain constant across racial or ethnic categories, place of residence and education achievement.

Political attitudes, race, ethnicity and alienation

Some of the questions of the perception survey were intended to measure the respondents' behavior and attitudes toward politics and their relationship with horizontal inequalities. One of those questions concerns organization membership. As table 12 shows, the majority of respondents in Huanta and SJL do not participate in any organization. When they do so, the main types of organizations are the religious ones, women's organizations (mainly related to survival issues),²⁵ or related to recreation, education and neighborhood issues.

Table 12

Organization's membership by type of organization and place of residence

Vertical %, multiple answers, do not sum 100%

Organization's membership	Total (%)	Place of residence		
		HUANTA	BAMBAMARCA	SJL - LIMA
None	52.5	62.9	30.8	63.2
Religious organizations	16.9	7.5	31.8	11.9
Ronda campesina	11.5	4.2	30.8	-
Women's organizations	10.7	8.5	17.4	6.5
Educational organizations	9.4	7.0	17.9	3.5
Sport or recreational organizations	8.0	7.5	8.5	8.0
Neighborhood organizations	5.7	5.6	4.0	7.5
Unions or federations	4.6	6.6	6.0	1.0
Comunidad campesina	3.7	4.2	5.0	2.0
Other	10.9	13.1	10.4	9.0
DK / DA	0.2	-	-	0.5

In Bambamarca, where we can find the highest rate of organization membership, the main organizations are religious organizations and the "rondas campesinas", a form of rural autonomous police and community justice organization.

²⁵ Like "comedores populares" (popular kitchens) or "comités de vaso de leche" (glass of milk committees), sort of organization related to the distribution of food for children.

In the survey we used three other sets of political behavior and political attitudes variables. The first one is a set of what we might call “political activism”, where we asked the respondent if he has done might do or would never do seven different political actions.

Table 13


Political activism: Have you done, might do or would never do these political actions?, by Place of residence.

Vertical %

Political actions	Total (%)	Place of residence		
		HUANTA	BAMBAMARCA	SJL - LIMA
<i>Sig a petition to the authorities</i>				
Have done	19.3	14.2	33.2	11.1
Migth do	50.7	58.3	48.0	45.5
Would never do	29.9	27.5	18.9	43.4
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
<i>Participate in legal strikes</i>				
Have done	18.9	23.9	19.7	12.7
Migth do	41.9	50.7	39.9	34.5
Would never do	39.1	25.4	40.4	52.8
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
<i>Attend demostrations</i>				
Have done	18.1	20.4	20.1	13.7
Migth do	37.6	41.7	40.2	30.5
Would never do	44.3	37.9	39.7	55.8
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
<i>Go to the media</i>				
Have done	12.7	5.2	25.9	7.5
Migth do	58.2	58.3	52.3	63.8
Would never do	29.2	36.5	21.8	28.6
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
<i>Meet an influent person</i>				
Have done	9.8	4.8	17.3	7.5
Migth do	48.8	43.5	58.9	44.2
Would never do	41.5	51.7	23.9	48.2
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
<i>Block routes or occupy buildings</i>				
Have done	5.1	3.8	9.7	2.0
Migth do	19.7	23.0	30.1	6.0
Would never do	75.2	73.2	60.2	92.0
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
<i>Join boicotts</i>				
Have done	3.7	1.4	6.3	3.6
Migth do	19.1	16.4	27.0	14.3
Would never do	77.3	82.2	66.7	82.1
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Political activism index (mean)	4.50	4.37	5.66	3.54

Whit this questions we calculated a “political activism index” by recoding the answers from 0 to 2 (0= would never do; 1= might do; 2= have done) and adding the numerical values. As we can see in table 13, the political activism index has the highest mean in Bambamarca and the lowest in SJL. In graph 5 we can appreciate the distribution of the values across the whole sample.

Graph 5



The second set of political questions is related to the respondent’s attitudes toward violence. We asked respondents if they agree or disagree with some statements about violence. Results for these questions (% of respondents who agreed with each statement) are shown in table 14.


Table 14

Respondents who agreed with the following statements, by Place of residence
% of respondents

Would you agree or disagree with...?	Total (% agree)	Place of residence		
		HUANTA	BAMBAMARCA	SJL - LIMA
Violence only provokes more violence.	83.9	81.6	78.8	91.5
Sometimes violence is the only way to be heard	50.2	46.9	43.4	60.6
Violence should never be used to revindicate political grievances	49.1	50.7	47.4	49.0
Sometimes violence is necessary to improve the political situation	44.8	54.2	34.8	44.5
Violence has improved the situation of the country in the past.	24.9	29.7	13.8	30.3
Attitudes toward violence index (mean)	1.86	1.99	1.61	1.96

We also calculated an “attitude toward violence index” by coding answers representing “positive attitudes” toward violence with 1 and “negative attitudes” with 0. As we can see in graph 4, almost 80% of the respondents have some degree of favorable or positive attitude toward violence; this favorable attitude is higher in the cases of Huanta and SJL than in Bambamarca.

Graph 6



Finally, the third set of political indicators is what we have called “political effectiveness”, which consists on five questions where we asked the respondents if they agreed that some political actions may improve the quality of life in their communities.

Table 15


Respondents who agreed that the following political actions may improve the quality of life, by Place of residence

% of respondents

Would you agree that the following political actions may improve the quality of life?	Total (% agree)	Place of residence		
		HUANTA	BAMBAMARCA	SJL - LIMA
Having links with an NGO	70.6	66.2	87.8	58.5
Voting in elections	67.6	66.2	70.3	66.5
Joining marches or protests	66.3	69.5	69.8	59.6
Belonging to other types of organisations	63.4	64.9	69.7	55.4
Belonging to a political party	50.3	53.6	49.5	47.4
<i>Political action effectiveness index (mean)</i>	3.19	3.20	3.48	2.90

Applying a similar logic than in the other cases, we calculated a “political action effectiveness index” by adding the codes for the “agree” answers (=1). As we can see in table 15, Bambamarca and Huanta’s respondents are more confident than SJL ones that those political actions may improve quality of life. Also, graph 7 shows that very few respondents are completely skeptical about the effectiveness of such political actions.

Graph 7



In order to analyze the relationship between political variables and ethnic or racial categories, we ran another set of OLS regressions, using the “political activism index” as the dependent variable, table 16 presents the resulting equations. The first two models (C and D) show a negative relationship between indigenous self identification and political activism. In model D we introduced a dummy variable for organization membership,²⁶ which has a positive relationship with political activism. However, when we control for place of residence (as in models E and further), the statistical significance of those variables’ coefficients disappears²⁷, instead we can appreciate that education achievement becomes a significant variable with a positive relationship with political activism.

Model F indicates a negative impact of social and political alienation on political activism. Equations G and H, show a positive relationship between the “attitudes toward violence” and the “political action effectiveness” indexes with political activism. The inclusion of those variables in the regression equations does not alter the statistical significance of the previous variables, making the model more robust.

²⁶ 1 means that the respondent is a member of any organization; 0 means that he or she does not belong to any organization.

²⁷ In the case of the organization membership’s coefficient this is consistent with the fact that it is in Bambamarca where we can find the highest rates of membership.

Table 16

OLS Regression equations for Political Activism

Independent Variables	Unstandardized regression coefficients						
	C	D	E	F	G	H	I
Intercept	4.305** (0.352)	3.863** (0.372)	4.447** (0.378)	5.379** (0.376)	4.717** (0.404)	4.001** (0.505)	3.761** (0.503)
Education achievement index	0.085 (0.077)	0.092 (0.076)	0.261** (0.078)	0.190* (0.081)	0.170* (0.080)	0.182* (0.083)	0.246** (0.084)
Indigenous self identification (D)	-0.850** (0.315)	-0.763* (0.313)	-0.275 (0.312)	-0.103 (0.320)	-0.065 (0.313)	-0.098 (0.319)	-0.271 (0.317)
Indigenous mother tongue (D)							1.357** (0.347)
Huanta (D)			-1.292** (0.313)	-1.415** (0.322)	-1.547** (0.318)	-1.467** (0.325)	-2.289** (0.384)
SJL (D)			-2.255** (0.328)	-2.429** (0.341)	-2.545** (0.335)	-2.458** (0.349)	-2.689** (0.349)
Organization membership (D)		0.850** (0.247)	0.431 (0.247)				
Social and political alienation index				-0.154* (0.061)	-0.170** (0.060)	-0.159** (0.061)	-0.186** (0.061)
Attitudes toward violence index					0.453** (0.085)	0.334** (0.092)	0.333** (0.091)
Political action effectiveness index						0.273** (0.082)	0.282** (0.081)
R ²	0.014	0.034	0.108	0.133	0.184	0.198	0.223
Number of valid cases:	577	577	577	523	504	476	475

Note: Standard errors of the coefficients are in parenthesis.

* $p \leq 0.05$; ** $p \leq 0.01$; two tailed

Finally, in equation I, we introduced the “indigenous mother tongue” dummy variable which has a positive relationship with political activism. As a conclusion of the regression analysis, we think that the empirical results show some consistency with the hypothesis elaborated in the introduction of this paper: social stigma associated with indigenous categories is more a burden than a useful resource for political action, but cultural sameness can enhance solidarity and collective action in local settings.

Preliminary conclusions

Trying to summarize the different ideas and empirical results presented in this paper, we can elaborate the following preliminary conclusions:

Ethnicity and race do constitute important issues in the problem of inequality in Peru. Different researches have shown in a systematic manner profound and enduring horizontal inequalities between culturally, ethnically or racially categorized clusters of Peruvian society.

Racial and ethnic categories are linked not only with “objective horizontal inequalities” but also with “subjective-perceived horizontal inequalities”. People who identify themselves with some ethnic or racial categories are aware of their social and political alienation, especially in social heterogeneous environments. Modernization or social mobility does not alter horizontal inequalities, objective or subjectively perceived ones. As Figueroa has pointed out in his theoretical model of an excluding society (“sigma society”):

Although the distribution of assets is individually based, exclusion mechanisms do not operate on the same basis. Individuals are affiliated to ethnic groups. Exclusion is systematic for some of those groups. The concept of exclusion applies to the whole group and does not pretend to explain individual cases of success (Figueroa: 2003: 217)²⁸.

Ethnic and racial categories do have a practical use for people when it comes to categorize other individuals. Those sorts of categories can also be used into self identification processes, although they are not the most salient ones for individual self-understanding. They take part of racial and ethnic cognitive schemes for social interaction; linking racial or ethnic stereotypes to social positions and social characteristics; and guiding perception about the social realities of exclusion, discrimination and social mobility (or the lack of) in Peruvian society.

In an article published 35 years ago, Fernando Fuenzalida (1971) indicated that the use of racial and ethnic categories to differentiate individuals was part of a traditional social stratification system which created an image of Peruvian society as being composed by three clearly defined castes: Indians, “mestizos” and whites. According to Fuenzalida the function of those categories was to fix socioeconomic and cultural differences between those groups, and to distribute them across a hierarchical pyramid in order to justify the hegemony of the dominant white elite. By doing so, this stratification scheme created the illusion of a stable society, where social inequalities are based on quasi-natural characteristics of the individuals (race or ethnicity).

²⁸ Translated from the Spanish.

When modernization came on, social, economic and political transformations were “absorbed” by these kinds of “traditional cognitive schemes” which were used to make sense of the changes.²⁹ That’s why social mobility can be interpreted in terms of “cholification” processes; vertical inequalities, even among individuals who suffer from exclusion, can be read using racial and ethnic cues: somebody can always be “more indigenous” than oneself.

However, the awareness of horizontal inequalities does not lead to group consciousness or “groupness” enhancement. As we have said, stigmatization and discrimination suffered by people defined with these kinds of racial and ethnic categories can thwart the constitution of solidarity links among individuals classified in such a manner. Because of that, following Brubaker’s advice, instead of “ethnic groups” we prefer to talk about “ethnically or racially categorized” individuals. “Groupness”, based on shared cultural or ethnic characteristics emerges mostly in locally delimited social settings, where racial and ethnic stigmatization is less pronounced, since vertical inequalities are also less prominent. Regional, economical, political and social fragmentation of Peruvian society do not facilitate the spreading of this “groupness” beyond local or community levels.

As we have seen, in the cases we have studied, indigenous self identification is not associated with political activism, at least, not in a positive manner. This is consistent with the hypothesis that political action is not framed in terms of horizontal inequalities. The repertoire of political action includes positive attitudes toward violence, but this violence is not necessarily “ethnically-oriented” and, as Muñoz et al. have pointed out (2005), it has been controlled according to certain socially accepted limits and contained at a local level. The worst episode of unleashed violence in contemporary Peruvian history was not the product of an ethnic or racial framed conflict.

As a final remark, it is important to recall that the specific characteristics of the sample design of the CRISE perception survey do not allow us to directly generalize quantitative findings to the whole Peruvian society. That’s why those findings should be taken as being part of an exploratory research design based on case studies. However, since 2004 National Household Surveys in Peru have been asking questions not only about racial and ethnic self identification, but also about political behavior and attitudes. This can give us the opportunity to test some of the hypothesis discussed in this paper with more representative data of Peruvian society.

²⁹ A similar phenomenon has occurred in the development of political institutions in Peru. Many authors have described how some “modern” political institutions were transformed or adapted to become “functional” to a hierarchical and excluding society during the XIX and XX centuries. See for example the work of Fernando de Trazegnies who uses the term of “traditionalistic modernization” to refer to the adaptation of European modern law-systems to Peru’s landlord “white” dominating elite during the XIX century (1992). Other examples can be found in Deler & Saint Geours (1986), Demelas (1992), Guerra (1992), Sulmont (1996) and Lopez (1997).

References

- BARRÓN, Manuel
2005 *Horizontal inequalities in Latin America: a quantitative comparison of Bolivia, Guatemala and Peru*. Draft paper presented at the CRISE workshop 29-30 June 2005. Oxford: CRISE – QEH, University of Oxford.
- BRUBAKER, Rogers
2004 *Ethnicity without groups*. Harvard: Harvard University Press.
- CALLIRGOS, Juan Carlos
1993 *El racismo: la cuestión del otro (y de uno)*. Lima: DESCO.
- COMISIÓN DE LA VERDAD Y RECONCILIACIÓN (CVR)
2003 *Informe final*. Lima: CVR
- DANDLER, Jorge.
1998 *Pueblos indígenas de la amazonía peruana y desarrollo sostenible*. Lima: OIT.
- DELER, Jean Paul and Yves SAINT-GEOURS (editors)
1986 *Estados y naciones en los Andes, hacia una historia comparativa: Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador y Perú*. Lima: Instituto de Estudios Peruanos – Institut Français d'Etudes Andines.
- DEMELAS, Marie-Danielle
1992 *L'invention politique: Bolivie, Equateur, Pérou au XIXe siècle*. Paris : Editions Recherches sur les Civilisations.
- DRZEWIENIECKI, Joanna.
2004 *Peruvian youth and racism: the category of "race" remains strong*. Paper delivered at the 2004 meeting of the Latin American Studies Association, Las Vegas Nevada, October 7-9.
- FIGUEROA, Adolfo
2003 *La Sociedad Sigma: una teoría del desarrollo económico*. Lima: Pontificia Universidad Católica del Perú y Fondo de Cultura Económica.
- FIGUEROA, Adolfo and Manuel BARRÓN.
2005 *Inequality, ethnicity and social disorder in Peru*. CRISE Working Paper N° 8. Oxford: CRISE – QEH, University of Oxford.
- FUENZALIDA, Fernando
1971 "Poder, etnia y estratificación social en el Perú actual". In: Matos Mar, José et al. *Perú: Hoy*. 2nd Edition. Mexico DF: Siglo XXI.
- GOYDER, John
2003 "Measuring social identities: problems and progress". In: *International Journal of Public Opinion Research*. Vol 15. N° 2. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

- GUERRA, François - Xavier
 1992 “Les avatars de la représentation au XIXe siècle”. In: Couffignal, Georges (editor). *Réinventer la démocratie: Le défi latino-américain*. Paris: Presses de la Fondation Nationale de Sciences Politiques.
- INEI – INSTITUTO NACIONAL DE ESTADÍSTICA E INFORMÁTICA
 2006 *Encuesta Nacional de Hogares 2006, primer trimestre móvil (enero, febrero, marzo)*. Bases de datos. Lima: INEI.
- LEE, Taeku
 2004 *Social construction, self identification and the survey measure of race*. Paper prepared for the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association. Chicago Illinois.
- MANRIQUE, Nelson
 1999 *La piel y la pluma. Escritos sobre literatura, etnicidad y racismo*. Lima: SUR – CIDIAG.
- MUÑOZ, Ismael, PAREDES, Maritza and Rosemary THORP
 2006 *Acción colectiva, violencia política y etnicidad en el Perú*. Documento de trabajo N° 1. Lima: CISEPA – PUCP.
- ÑOPO, Hugo, SAAVEDRA, Jaime and Máximo TORERO.
 2004 *Ethnicity and earnings in urban Peru*. Discussion Paper Series N° 980. Bonn: Forschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit. <http://ssrn.com/abstract=491625> (page last visited on May the 6th, 2006).
- NUGENT, José Guillermo
 1992 *El laberinto de la choledad*. Lima: Fundación Friedrich Ebert.
- PNUD PROGRAMA DE LAS NACIONES UNIDAS PARA EL DESARROLLO
 2006 *La democracia en el Perú: El mensaje de las cifras*. Lima: PNUD.
- PORTOCARRERO, Gonzalo
 1993 *Racismo y mestizaje*. Lima: SUR.
- QUIJANO, Aníbal
 1980 *Dominación y cultura: lo cholo y el conflicto cultural en el Perú*. Lima: Mosca Azul.
- SANTOS, Martín
 2003 “La ‘cuestión racial’: un ajuste de cuentas en tiempos de globalización y modernidad”. In: *Debates en Sociología*. N° 27. Lima: PUCP. (133-171).
- STEWART, Frances.
 2005 *Policies towards horizontal inequalities in post conflict reconstruction*. CRISE Working Paper N° 7. Oxford: CRISE – QEH, University of Oxford.

SULMONT, David.

- 2006a “Elecciones 2006: el reto de representar a los peruanos”. In: *Coyuntura: Análisis Económico y Social de Actualidad*. Year 2, N°. 7. Lima: CISEPA-PUCP: May – June.
- 2006b “¿Cómo buscamos representarnos los peruanos?: Los resultados de la primera vuelta del 2006, cambios y continuidades en la representación electoral”. In: *Palestra – Portal de Asuntos Públicos de la Pontificia Universidad Católica del Perú*. <http://palestra.pucp.edu.pe/portal/especial_02/analisis/04_01.htm> (page last visited on August the 28th, 2006)
- 2005a “Una sociedad con hambre de ciudadanía”. In: *Cuestión de Estado*, N° 36. Lima: IDS.
- 2005b *Encuesta nacional sobre exclusión y discriminación social*. Lima: DEMUS. <http://www.pucp.edu.pe/invest/ridei/b_virtual/archivos/Encuesta_discriminacion.pdf> (page last visited on May the 6th, 2006)
- 1996 *Entre la Communauté et la Nation : Citoyenneté et stratégies sociales dans la société péruvienne*. Mémoire de DEA en Sociologie. Paris : Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales.

TRIVELLI, Carolina

- 2005 *Los hogares indígenas y la pobreza en el Perú: Una mirada a partir de la información cuantitativa*. Documento de trabajo N° 141. Lima: Instituto de Estudios Peruanos.