

**MOBILISATION FOR POLITICAL VIOLENCE: WHAT DO WE KNOW?  
A CRISE WORKSHOP**

**Harris Manchester College, Oxford  
17 – 18 March, 2009**

**SESSION NOTES**

**Panel I: The Dynamics of Armed Groups**

**1. Rebelling Against Rebellion: comparing insurgent and counterinsurgent recruitment**

Stathis Kalyvas (Yale University) and Ana Arjona (Yale University)

*Abstract*

Rebellion – its causes, dynamics, and effects – has received considerable attention across several social science disciplines. Rebel recruitment, in particular, has attracted substantial effort. However, the question of why people “rebel against rebellion” has seldom been asked systematically: why is it that individuals join armed groups located outside the formal boundaries of the state to fight against the rebels? We use existing theoretical conjectures to derive hypotheses about how joiners in these two types of groups differ and test them using novel survey data from the ongoing Colombian civil war. We find that, compared to their rebel counterparts, individuals who join counterinsurgent organisations are equally poor, yet more motivated by materialistic concerns; though less rural, they are equally likely to have lived in areas of low state capacity and equally likely to have lived in areas ruled by the group they eventually joined. The importance of territorial control revealed by our data points to the crucial role of “endogenous” dynamics in civil war.

**2. The Dilemmas of Recruitment: the Colombian case**

Francisco Gutiérrez (University of Colombia)

*Abstract*

It is normally taken for granted that guerrillas and paramilitary structures prefer to recruit more people than less. This hidden assumption does not hold. Every strategy of recruitment must face the fact that on the one hand it involves the quest for objectives that are not always compatible, and on the other there are objective constraints to growth. Strategies successful in terms of numbers have the potential of disrupting alliances and links with the group’s social base, and of creating deep internal fractures. Specific choices have a decisive influence over the organisational quality of the group, which in turn is a key variable for explaining survival (non-state armed groups generally have to overcome a very, very steep technical asymmetry with their adversaries). The paper discusses the dilemmas faced by the leaderships of non-state

armed groups in the Colombian conflict, and proposes some conclusions about their organisational dynamics.

### **3. New Tigers, Black Eagles and the Dynamics of Violence in Sri Lanka and Colombia**

Flortje Toll (University of Utrecht) and Ariel Sanchez (University of Utrecht)

#### *Abstract*

In March 2004, a man known as Colonel Karuna Amman announced his decision to distance himself from the LTTE (Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam), an armed group for which he had fought for over two decades seeking the formation of an independent Tamil state in north eastern Sri Lanka. Six months later Karuna launched a new political party – TMVP – with a new set of goals, entering politics while still engaged in a military confrontation, mainly against his former partners of the LTTE. Soon, this breakaway faction turned out to have tensions of its own and started an internal armed confrontation. Meanwhile, that same year (2004) in Colombia, the paramilitary AUC (United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia) started a process of demobilisation and disarmament after negotiations with the Uribe government. This demobilisation process gave birth to an amalgam of new armed actors in areas formerly under paramilitary control. The Uribe government is intent on treating these groups as drug related-criminal gangs (*Bandas Criminales*, BACRIM) and thus as a matter of law enforcement. However, there are links and similarities with the former AUC and some of these new groups trying to seek legitimacy and a political platform. One of the more visible of these groups is the so-called Black Eagles (*Águilas Negras*). Sri Lanka and Colombia have thus recently experienced a peace process which in both cases produced the emergence of new armed actors, transforming the conflicts' dynamics. They equally – albeit in their own way – portray complex interactions between politics and violence in which simultaneously continuities of violence and the paradoxical presence of post-conflict processes are manifested. Moreover, some general features of the two countries and their conflicts reveal the possibilities and relevance of comparing these phenomena happening on opposite sides of the globe. For example, they are two of the longest ongoing armed conflicts in the world; they are (and were at the time the conflict started) formal democracies and they have both sustained relative economic development. It is the combination of these shared features, with the radically different contexts of conflict, that makes looking at the emergence of these new armed actors in a comparative perspective the more attractive. Our objective in this paper is threefold: given the fact that BACRIM and TMVP are recent phenomena and that very little and scattered information is available, we hope to provide a systematic account of the emergence of these new actors in their particular contexts. In addition, we aim to explore in a comparative perspective the implications of these processes for the understanding of the linkage between transformations of conflict and continuities of violence. Finally, in tracking the emergence and comparing the processes of these new armed actors, we have encountered crucial challenges to the established perceptions of conflict dynamics, forcing us to reconsider some common current labels, assumptions and dichotomies, particularly regarding the nexus between the sustainability and reinvention of armed actors, the fluidity of political and economic alliances, the mobilisation strategies and their legitimising discourses.

#### 4. Categories of Rebellions in Practice: the “Mouvement des Nigériens pour la Justice” in Northern Niger

Yvan Guichaoua (University of Oxford)

##### *Abstract*

On 9 February 2007, a military post of Iferouane, a Northern locality of Niger, was attacked by a handful of armed men on board five pick-ups. That was the start of a rebellion that continues today, in which probably more than a thousand combatants have enlisted, claiming more justice for the – mostly Tuareg – Northern Niger residents. The paper aims at categorizing the current rebellion – the Mouvement des Nigériens pour la Justice (MNJ) – using existing academic typologies. It argues that the MNJ hardly fits any of the types commonly depicted in the literature: it is rather, a fragile *bricolage* built progressively under external and internal pressures and highly vulnerable to factionalisation. Instead of viewing rebellions as the outcome of once-for-all established logics, our case study suggests that irregular armed groups should be seen as the results of an array of forces constantly shaping their nature and their trajectory.

##### Comments and Questions

**Frances Stewart** to **Stathis Kalyvas** and **Ana Arjona**: What is the difference between counterinsurgents and the army? Is there a difference, or are they the same group of people?

**Stathis Kalyvas**: Generally speaking, these counterinsurgent groups are not part of the army. Membership and participation in these groups is usually on a part-time basis and draws primarily on the local (peasant) population to staff the ranks. These groups possess more contact with local communities and there is a greater degree of continuity from villages all the way up to the counterinsurgent/militant group. The counterinsurgent groups have an irregular structure, which replicates the organisation of rebel groups, and function as something between a police force and an army.

**Frances Stewart**: We don't generally find it puzzling that individuals join the police and the army, but it appears that we do in this case. Why?

**Stathis Kalyvas**: There are always a variety of reasons for joining particular groups. This research delves into those motivations. For example, joining the Viet Cong was a matter of moral obligation.

**Valpy FitzGerald**: there is a distinction between the recruitment process and profile of those individuals joining during peace and those joining during war time.

**Francisco Gutiérrez** commented on the limits and requirements imposed on recruitment by noting the technical/skill requirement that leads to a structural difference between the army and counterinsurgency groups. To join the FARC, for example, an individual must not only commit to life-long membership but possess a specific and useful skill set as well.

**Maritza Paredes** to **Stathis Kalyvas**: Are there differences between the mechanisms of recruitment for different groups?

**Stathis Kalyvas**: This component is yet to be fully examined. However, it appears to be a case of supply and profiles. Recruitment and membership of particular groups correlates with the dominant organisations in place in a given location.

**Frederic Deycard to Yvan Guichaoua:** You emphasise the difference between a political and rebel cell. How does the political self and the fighter self affect the “fight” on the ground?

**Yvan Guichaoua:** Only material from the French side (i.e. the diaspora) is readily available. These are closed groups that are tightly organised and hold closed meetings. Documents are sent via and to particular contacts in Niger. The question is: how convincing is this? How does the discourse used affect the case? And how do the rebels themselves react to the discourse used by the political cell? Attempts to repress the ambition of fighters to fight have led to the emergence of new groups. Combatants are professionals and may be relatively resistant to discourse.

## **Session II: The Motivations of Individual Combatants: Who Joins and Why**

### **1. Why Do We fight? Perspectives of young combatants in western Cote d’Ivoire**

Magali Chelphi-den Hamer (University of Amsterdam)

#### *Abstract*

Who joins armed groups? Why do civilians follow certain leaders into war? Why do soldiers join a rebellion? The “loose molecule” hypothesis, which argues that the base of a militia/rebellion mostly consists of jobless, uneducated, and desocialised youths, is quite anchored in the popular sociology, and still rather popular amongst donors and humanitarian practitioners. Yet, it has become increasingly questioned recently, as academics have found that low-ranking recruits could have other characteristics. Another popular theory to explain individual motives for enlistment is the “feeling deprived” hypothesis, which argues that when local populations feel that they are not getting a fair share of resources, they may enter violent groups to claim what they consider theirs. Grievance-based theories of conflict have often been put forward to explain the reasons that motivate people to join violent groups, especially when the base shows a certain ethnic homogeneity. Less put forward but nonetheless worth looking at, are the role and charisma of individual leaders in explaining recruits’ engagement, why some recruits cease to be active a few months after they join whereas others continue to claim their belonging to the group several years after the peak of the conflict, and what degree of agency recruits exercise when they enlist. Who joins armed groups and why remain empirical questions, and answers vary considerably across contexts. In this paper, I explore the profiles and motives that made young Ivorians follow their respective chiefs. The data is based on 200 semi-structured interviews of low-ranking youths who joined governmental militias and rebel groups at the start of the Ivorian conflict. Interviews took place in Guiglo and Man, in western Côte d’Ivoire, in areas severely affected by the Ivorian conflict.

### **2. A Divided Hope: remembering guerrilla mobilisation in Guatemala**

Corinne Caumartin (University of Oxford)

### 3. Les Raisons de l'Enrôlement des Jeunes Combattants de la Rébellion du Nord de la Côte d'Ivoire

Moussa Fofona (Université de Bouaké)

#### *Abstract*

Le conflit armé éclaté en Côte d'Ivoire à partir du 19 septembre 2002 a conduit à la partition du pays entre le Nord et le Sud. La rébellion des Forces Nouvelles qui contrôle la moitié nord du pays a justifié son action par la dénonciation de l'exclusion et des injustices sociales dont les « nordistes » seraient les victimes. Ce mouvement armé a été rejoint par la suite par de nombreux jeunes originaires du Nord. Cette étude basée sur les études de cas et biographies de 22 jeunes combattants de la rébellion et des entretiens avec leurs leaders montre les raisons justifiant leur engagement. Elle questionne leurs perceptions du conflit et analyse les rhétoriques de la justification. Il ressort que dans l'ensemble des cas, l'engagement a pour but la reconnaissance de leur citoyenneté qui passe par l'acquisition de cartes d'identités. Le sentiment victimaire né de l'exercice de la violence légale par les forces de l'ordre, la vengeance, le besoin de sécurité ou encore l'attrait pour le métier des armes nourrissent les motivations qui conduisent à l'enrôlement des jeunes. L'étude montre aussi l'existence d'un environnement s'appuyant sur la parenté, un discours culturel et la mobilisation de la mémoire ancestrale collective qui a favorisé l'adhésion du jeune au mouvement rebelle. Ces jeunes restés mobilisés pendant plusieurs années, loin de vouloir participer à une scission de l'Etat, vivent l'enrôlement et l'exercice de la violence politique comme une réponse ultime face à la frustration d'une demande d'inclusion dans l'Etat. Au-delà des expériences individuelles, l'étude découvre, non une armée ethnique mais plus une organisation à base identitaire engagée dans la renégociation violente de son appartenance nationale.

#### Comments and Questions

**Jason Hart** to **Magali Chelpi-den Hamer** on Côte d'Ivoire: In terms of methodology, was asking combatants to reflect on their original motivations after the conflict a challenge? Did the study account for possible bias in retrospectively rationalising involvement? What definition of youth does the study use?

**Ana Arjona** to **Corinne Caumartin** on Guatemala: Was conversion to Catholicism a prerequisite for joining the rebel movement?

**Rosemary Thorp** to **Corinne Caumartin** on Guatemala: Is it possible that the emphasis in the testimonies on the role of the Catholic Action network in incorporation is the result of issues of religion being more politically correct than other topics? How do you differentiate between honesty and political correctness?

**Gnangadjomon Koné** to **Magali Chelpi-den Hamer** on Côte d'Ivoire: Why did the leaders initiate the pro-government militias? Why were the pro-government militias concentrated in the south west of the country?

**Yvan Guichaoua** to **Magali Chelpi-den Hamer** on Côte d'Ivoire: To what extent were rebels recruited locally as opposed to from Abidjan, the capital?

**Stathis Kalyvas** to **Magali Chelpi-den Hamer** and **Moussa Fofana** on Côte d'Ivoire: Fofana's study noted gaining citizenship as a motivation for joining the fighting but Hamer's did not

emphasise this. Is this divergence a result of differences between the regions in which the studies took place?

## **Responses from presenters**

### ***Magali Chelpi-den Hamer***

The sampling did not emphasise combatants from Abidjan. In fact, only three or four respondents were from Abidjan. However, at the start of the conflict in September 2002 the Ministry of Justice in Abidjan issued a call to recruit new soldiers for the army to fight the rebellion. This call netted approximately 4,000 recruits. Some of the study's respondents had replied to this call from the Ministry of Justice and gone through the recruitment process but were not taken by the army. These respondents then responded when they heard that pro-government militias were recruiting elsewhere. For the most part, however, respondents were recruited locally.

The pro-government militia was located in the southwest rather than the north because that was the location of the frontline and the violence but the study did not provide information on the reasons the pro-government militia leaders formed them. Issues of citizenship came up infrequently in research. However, the different region of study from Fofana explains the difference in the importance of citizenship. In general, the study defined youth as individuals between 18 and 35. However, local definitions of youth were very confusing and blurred. In some cases, youth association leaders might be 42 years old. The concept is not necessarily linked to assets. Sometimes people with families and jobs are labeled as youth.

The study relied on life histories. Respondents described their life pre-war and their post-war perspectives. The interviews were not necessarily chronological but did attempt to triangulate results.

***Moussa Fofana:*** The problem is complex because the armed group FN is made up of three rebel organisations. Each rebel organisation has different motivations and is composed of different ethnic groups. Also, the government militias were not always formed to oppose the rebellion but based on other claims related to the land such as the exploitation of the forests.

***Corinne Caumartin:*** Liberation theology in the Guatemalan context is not at all politically correct because of the extreme stigmatisation following the mass repression. The politically correct thing is to not admit to being part of the network and deny incorporation. People might talk about activism but not incorporation. In addition, many of the people who gave testimony were Protestant. Catholicism did not apply across the board.

## **Panel III: The Motivations of Individual Combatants – A Gender Perspective**

### **1. A Divided Hope: remembering guerilla mobilisation in Guatemala – a gender perspective**

Corinne Caumartin (University of Oxford)

### **2. Gendered Patterns of Mobilisation and Recruitment for Political Violence: lessons learned from three Latin American countries**

Luisa Dietrich (University of Vienna)

#### *Abstract*

The present proposal for a CRISE conference paper is framed within a broader PhD thesis project at the Political Science Department at the University of Vienna, Austria, aiming to explore the consequences of stigmatisation, discrimination and trivialisation of female ex-combatants in peace-building settings. Female ex-combatants are understood to constitute an untapped potential and reconciliation, thus a key component to successful reintegration. Researchers have raised concerns that macro level approaches to violent political mobilisation can lead to generalised, inaccurate explanations that often can not capture contradicting effects. (Viterna, 2006). In comparison, micro-level analyses have allowed to highlight gendered aspects of mobilisation, the heterogeneity within armed opposition groups (AOG) (urban-rural divides, class, ethnicity, educational background), and as well as different roles played and levels of command achieved by women. In her study on women's mobilisation into the Salvadoran Guerrilla Army, Viterna analyses multiple paths that women followed to the guerrilla camps and suggests how these new insights may have important implications for macro-level processes such as democratisation and broader transformations in gendered rights and relations. (Viterna 2006) Taking her analysis to another broad process, namely top-down Transitional Justice (TJ), especially Truth Commissions, this paper takes on the challenge to explore connections between types of mobilisation of women (as well as socialisation) into AOG and their subsequent dispositions to collaborate in truth commissions. The initial hypothesis is that politically and ideologically motivated women, who have been socialised in a closed, collective group identity are more likely to participate substantially in TJ initiatives than economically motivated, abducted and forcefully recruited women. Using a comparative analysis of discourses of female ex-combatants in Colombia and Peru this conference paper aims to explore the possible connection points between (1) gendered recruitment policies, (2) women's differential motives to enroll in AOG, (3) women's conflict experiences, as well as the (4) factors of identity creation and female subjectivity during collective group socialisation as micro-level factors impacting upon dispositions to participate in top-down TJ-processes. Traditional Disarmament Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR) programs tend to focus on economic variables to successful integration and continue to understand DDR processes focused on ex-combatants as different from and opposing TJ-process, with a preferential option for victims. General calls for "community oriented DDR programmes" and "reconciliation and cleansing activities" obscure the micro-level patterns, which might allow a more substantive involvement in transitional justice mechanisms. The roles and responsibilities of ex-combatants in truth-seeking, reparation and reconciliation processes have consistently been overlooked by academics and practitioners, often because both processes were separated in time. The Colombian case study constitutes an interesting exception in the sense that DDR programmes and the National Commission for Reparation and Reconciliation (CNRR) are operating in a parallel manner, offering opportunities to theorise on a new field of participation of female ex-

combatants beyond party politics (as seen in Central America). Further, the fact that status-quo defending (right-wing) ex-combatants are reintegrating alongside left-wing militants provides additional inputs. The Peruvian Truth and Reconciliation Commission, created an unprecedented amount of information due to statement-taking activities with female militants in prisons, allowing insight into motivations to participate of politically mobilised female ex-combatants.

### **3. Engendering Armed Militancy in Kashmir: women as perpetrators of violence**

Seema Shekhawat (University of Mumbai)

#### *Abstract*

Generally, women's experiences of armed conflict are multiple - vulnerable victims, survivors, peace-builders and combatants though with varying degrees. Since World War II, there is an unprecedented increase in their visibility as actors in the hostilities. Violent conflicts have witnessed women frequently joining the armed conflicts, voluntarily or involuntarily, performing both direct and indirect roles.

Women in Kashmir have played a significant role in militant activities. They have contributed to the conflict in both material and ideological ways. They have been at the forefront in the initial period of militancy when there was a mass uprising against the Indian State. It is widely perceived that the movement could not have sustained without the participation of women. In numerous demonstrations in Kashmir they were often seen at the forefront. They actively joined hands with male counterparts in enforcing the civil curfew, helping armed separatists to escape during crackdowns by blocking the ways of security forces, etc. Besides carrying out tasks such as feeding combatants and providing shelters women in Kashmir have acted as couriers carrying not only the messages but also arms and ammunition under their veils. They also came forward to openly testify rape and other forms of sexual violence to "contribute" to the struggle. The women extremist groups in Kashmir such as Dukhtaran-i-Millat have played a crucial role in indoctrinating women into playing an active role in the movement. In the recent times, there are also reports that unlike earlier there are cases of women's direct complicity, for instance planting bombs, in the violent activities. At the same time, it is also a fact that since the mid-1990s most women have started distancing themselves from the movement.

The proposed paper would aim at analysing the lesser-known gender dimension of the much highlighted Kashmir conflict in terms of women's role in the violent conflict. The paper would be primarily based on the data collected by the author during her extensive surveys in Jammu and Kashmir during the last seven years. In course of analysis, the paper would endeavour to address the following questions. Which factors motivated women in Kashmir to join the separatist movement? What are the ways through which women contributed to the movement? What roles do the radical women organisations play in inculcating violent spirit in women? What are the factors that motivated significant number of women in distancing from the movement in the later stage? What can be done in terms of policies and practices to bring these women into the mainstream of public life?

#### **Comments and Questions**

**Patricia Justino** to **Corinne Caumartin**: You talk about women joining against traditional roles. How does this affect the local society from which they come? Is there a shift toward egalitarianism?

**Rachael Diprose** to panel: Has there been any research done on the use of amnesty and women combatants? Women are complicit in the support of violence (food, shelter, etc) and as combatants. When it comes to amnesty, there is ambiguity as to who should and should not receive amnesty.

**Francisco Gutiérrez** to **Corinne Caumartin** and panel: What is the impact of female combat involvement on the wider society? The Israeli army has 15% female involvement; what is the change in the tradition of war as women break this tradition?

**Magali Chelpi-den Hamer** to panel: What are the ways to circumvent presenting gender as a separate category of analysis?

**Sonia Andolz** to panel: During peace-building there are usually different components when women are involved and when not. Is the kind of violence different from when there are women present, or not? Are the women as violent?

### **Responses**

To **Sonia Andolz**: In the LTTE women are part of the militants and suicide bombers. Another nearby organisation has no female participation. In Sri Lanka, women carry arms, but don't appear to be heavily involved in fighting otherwise. It is very difficult to draw any generalisations in this way.

**Luisa Dietrich** on amnesty: Works on Colombian DDR program and transitional justice. The female combatants fall through all nets. They do not appear as traditional victims. They are viewed as minority actors within the groups. Perception is that they are generally incapable of violence (that they are there for a variety of other reasons: coercion, rape, grievance, etc). One must look at specific cases to figure out whether there are patterns to women's acts. There are cases where women have mobilised both for and against amnesty. Also, our preconceived notions prevent us from really viewing women as perpetrators – their crimes are often left unaddressed.

**Corinne Caumartin** on the gender aspect of the demobilisation process in Guatemala: There are group and individual programs. Those that settle in communities tend to be okay. The changed social structure is generally maintained. This is NOT the case when women are demobilised individually. The traditional communities are unable to adjust to the new arrivals. Women are forced back into traditional roles. They also face problems with finding jobs, etc. What about the snowball effect? The communities of the demobilised are very isolated. So there is no broader change in the social fabric as might be hoped.

**Rajesh Venugopal**: To what extent is it useful to talk about mobilisation as an abstraction without looking at the ideological structure and the way that the movements end? Some movements have an explicit agenda for breaking down gender divides. To what extent is participation useful in itself without looking at the underlying philosophy of the struggle?

**Corinne Caumartin** to **Rajesh Venugopal**: there are tremendous shifts in the structure. The Guatemalan case does not mention gender until 1990 – it takes all that time to fill in the discursive gap. The rhetoric and ideology use prior to that was about liberation in general, which could manifest itself in a variety of ways.

**Seema Shekhawat** on the Kashmir context: Women are either combatants or they are in the support role. But they are never in the leadership role. They are good followers, but not good

leaders. Even in a post-conflict scenario it is difficult to return to local communities, because they have to resume their traditional roles.

**Luisa Dietrich** on the sectional division of labour: Cooking classes for females and workshops for boys. Benefits given to females were lower than for men. In terms of microfinance: agricultural projects are generally allotted and supported in favour of men while women receive lower levels of financial support to pursue smaller projects geared towards crafts. We should focus on beneficiaries: look at needs, not capabilities. Women were responsible for upholding justice within groups (against mass looting and rape). Militant groups like having women for their loyalty and their political allegiance.

### **Further questions**

Can you also consider what the dynamics are for men returning to the community? What lessons can we draw from the cases of women bearing arms and apply them to men?

**Adam Higazi** to panel: Are there any examples of women whose status has actually increased by their involvement in the movement?

**Ana Arjona** to panel: After demobilisation, have you thought about how the socialisation of males has changed their disposition?

**Frances Stewart** to panel: To what extent are we gendering the issues? We do gender it (loose molecule hypothesis) – it is our role in life.

**Maritza Paredes** to panel: Do you have any idea about how society responds to the changes in roles? For example, in Peru young girls become very violent militants of the party because the media has glorified this image. By selling this icon to the public, the media romanticised the militants' cause and increased their capacity for recruitment.

### **Responses**

**Luisa Dietrich** on masculinity: From our stereotyped point of view, we assert our conception of men as violent, while women break this conception. They are spoilers. We see young men as the primary recipients in DDR programs. The society punishes women for transgressing their gender role. Disabled women are left by husbands, while injured men are glorified by their home communities (double standard). Women who return are losing their job and are unable to find one, while men who return strip women in their home communities of their work roles. We have addressed these problems through methodology and how one frames the question. We can thus address issues of rape, violence, etc. War has never been a solely male activity (e.g. Amazons), we just don't see [the women]. They remain invisible to most analysis. There have been some state responses, such as in Peru, where policies have been dramatic. The result of this poor handling has resulted in innumerable cases of rape of female prisoners by soldiers.

**Corinne Caumartin** on machismo: In Guatemala there is a notion that actors are moving outside of their society by getting involved. But this is not the case. Men tend not to want to go back or they are unable to return. Thus, society does not change all that much. Gender needs to be integrated into the approach to conflict studies and analysis.

**Seema Shekhawat**: Women were mobilised in Kashmir as part of the acting community. This is the same in Sri Lanka. Women are not independent actors. There is an ideology of being a part of the community (mother, sister, etc.) and an attack on one member is an attack on the entire group. If a state causes grievance, it becomes a motivator and women will want to take

revenge. But revenge is limited to the particular source of grievance and thus limited in scope. If a woman is raped and then approached by militants, then they are likely to join the group to achieve retribution. For example, the Sri Lankan Prime Minister (as the responsible individual) was killed by women because a member was raped by security forces. This was community revenge because the act of rape constituted communal dishonour.

## Session IV: Understanding Youth Mobilisation

### 1. Analysing the “Jeunes Patriotes” Through the Biographies of their Leaders

Gnangadjomon Koné (Université de Bouaké)

#### *Abstract*

La guerre civile éclatée en Côte d’Ivoire depuis la nuit du 18 au 19 septembre 2002 a révélé un phénomène social nouveau caractérisé par de gigantesques manifestations de jeunes. Connus sous le vocable «Jeunes Patriotes », ces activistes du régime au pouvoir justifient leur engagement politique par l’idéal de défense de l’Etat et de ses Institutions. L’objectif visé à travers cet article est de comprendre l’émergence de ce phénomène de mobilisation politique de la jeunesse ivoirienne à partir d’une analyse des profils sociopolitiques, des expériences de vie et professionnelles de ses principaux leaders. Notre démarche est fondée sur la conviction que les parcours et expériences antérieures des acteurs – en tant que somme d’apprentissages – constituent des éléments de structuration des manières d’être, d’analyser et d’investir des situations nouvelles. L’étude repose en outre sur l’interprétation des registres de justification de l’entrée desdits leaders en scène politique. Les travaux du politologue Richard Banégas et du philosophe Yacouba Konaté sur la question étudiée manquent de données empiriques et microsociologiques susceptibles de rendre suffisamment compte des processus individuels de socialisation ayant conduit à l’avènement du mouvement “Jeunes Patriotes”. Conduite selon les exigences de l’approche phénoménologique, la présente recherche fonde sa spécificité sur sa démarche et ses instruments de recueil des données. L’analyse du corpus de données collectées révèle que l’élan de mobilisation générale amorcé par la jeunesse ivoirienne au lendemain de la tentative de renversement manqué du pouvoir n’est pas un fait spontané. Il est le résultat des talents d’une génération d’étudiants syndicalistes forgés au cours d’un long processus de socialisation dans les sillages du parti au pouvoir. Le mouvement “Jeunes Patriotes” se présente *in fine* non pas comme un mouvement de *défense de la patrie en danger* mais bien plutôt comme un instrument de pression de la jeunesse pour négocier sa participation politique.

### 2. Profiteers, Religious Warriors, or Homeland Defenders? Understanding conflict mobilisation processes through the case of Central Sulawesi, Indonesia

Rachael Diprose (University of Oxford)

#### *Abstract*

This paper seeks to understand conflict escalation and mobilisation processes in the communal conflict in Poso, Central Sulawesi, Indonesia which took place primarily between 1998 and 2003, although tensions and some violence continued up until early 2008. The paper begins by comparing conflict onset and escalation factors in Poso with neighbouring and demographically similar Donggala at the time of national transition in Indonesia, to see how small clashes between youths in Poso turned into a district civil war but similar clashes in Donggala did not. Both places are ethnically fragmented (at least four larger ethnic groups) and religiously

polarised (Muslim-Christian). The paper finds that horizontal inequalities between religious groups existed in both places in terms of household asset wealth, but more so between the elites of each group in Poso. It also finds that while political discourse during the transition of marginalisation and domination of the state played out around ethnic cleavages in Donggala, in Poso this played out around religion. This was despite the efforts of elites in Donggala in some cases to mobilise around religion. In Donggala, ethnic politics, while contentious, are less likely to escalate into district-wide violence due to ethnic fragmentation and religious identity which cross cuts ethnic identity. In contrast, in Poso, district political discourse quickly took on religious overtones in the competition for leadership positions in government, mapping on to a degree of geographic segregation between groups and grassroots grievances concerning political and economic access. Decentralisation and district splitting in the months following the first outbreak of violence saw the only ethnic group which cross cut both religions in Poso 'shifted' into a new district. As the conflict played out, the motivations to engage in violence were many and varied, ranging from fear and the need to protect the village (or homeland) to payment for razing villages and murder. Violence only worsened as jihad and other ideologically motivated religious groups descended on Poso from other parts of the island and the archipelago.

### **3. Clientelism, the Multiparty System and Peasant Mobilisations in Rwanda (1991-1994)**

Emmanuel Viret (Sciences-Po, Paris)

#### *Abstract*

This contribution aims at understanding better the mobilisation of the Rwandan peasantry during the genocide by focusing on the changes brought about by the implementation of a multiparty system. The peasants' "moral economy" (Thompson, 1988) was fading away at the end of the '80s, under pressures from both the bureaucratisation of social relations and the rise of an accumulation-oriented behaviour stemming from the expansion of salaried work on the hills. I will argue that the weight of "the logics of situation" as a determinant of action (as opposed to carrier-paths and trajectories, and defined as the general circumstances in which a collective action is taking place) has been reinforced by the collapse of the coherence of a moral economy. This can explain how most of the Rwandan gangs were formed, on a non-regular basis, in public places such as *cabarets*, crossroads, junctions etc. Those logics of situations are not, however, free from any pressure from their constitutive elements. I will describe how the context of multiparty-system competition shaped collective action, by creating a double consensus:

- First, a political consensus aimed at the building of an order (the "Hutu Power" consensus) following severe fragmentation of networks and clientelistic relations.
- Second, a social consensus: in the early 90s, social class division faded away. Typically, gangs during the multiparty violence and the genocide were made up of "brokers" at the core, a social status anyone can attain, beyond social-class references.

I will argue that behind the situations produced lies a logic of "hypocritical cooperation" (Heckathorn 1989, Linares 2004) where a free rider's behaviour tends to disappear, making way for "zealots" and "hypocrits" "who give encouragement to individuals directly implicated in the collective action but do not directly participate themselves" (Linares, 2004: 458), which in turn reduces the costs of taking action. The contribution will be based on data collected during 18 months of fieldwork in two Rwandan rural communes: Bicumbi (around 15,000 victims killed in April 1994) and Nyakabanda (around 1,000 victims in May and June 1994).

#### **4. Displaced Children's Participation in Political Violence: towards greater understanding of mobilisation**

Jason Hart (University of Oxford)

##### *Abstract*

Within the burgeoning literature on recruitment, children's participation in political violence is overwhelmingly considered in terms of coercion. Displacement camps are seen as locations in which the young are particularly vulnerable to the predations of recruiters due to the characteristics of camps *per se* combined with the incapacity of children. My presentation questions assumptions of incompetence that underwrite much of the discourse on child recruitment. As I argue, the experience of growing up in situations where profoundly asymmetrical power relations give rise to systematic oppression may lead to the early development of "political" understanding. I also seek to challenge a currently dominant approach to displacement camps as places of inherent vulnerability, ignoring the historical experience of the population that came to inhabit them or the processes of meaning making that therein occur. Three specific dimensions of displaced children's experience that may account for their engagement in political violence are discussed: life in the socio-historical space of a displacement camp; frustrated transition to adult status; and the embeddedness of "politics" within everyday life. Discussion draws particularly on my fieldwork amongst young Palestinian refugees. In conclusion I argue that curtailing children's involvement in political violence may require consideration of this phenomenon far less through the lens of humanitarian policy, as is the tendency at present, and far more in relation to the political-economic processes that shape and constrain the lives of young displacees.

##### **Questions and Responses**

**Corinne Caumartin:** Her question centred on the role and influence of the leaders of movements, and what exactly they were hoping to achieve through the mobilisation that they were encouraging. Perhaps we need to focus on the motives of the leaders/creators of the discourse? She also made a comment about how questions remain as to how we define what is a child, pointing out that some states even send out kids to fight as young as 14.

**Rachael Diprose** said that in her presentation she did not focus much on why people joined groups in the first place because of time constraints, and focused on trying to link discourses around grievance. But in fact people were not participating just because they were told to; rather, there were many motivations, and you could see these developing through the phases of the conflict. It began with a major state of uncertainty as a result of the economic and political crisis that Indonesia was undergoing at the time, leading to the breakout of violence in many places. There was an atmosphere of fear because the previous regime had built its legitimacy on providing stability but that stability was unravelling, as were institutions; moreover, standards of living were falling as unemployment rose. Then there was the first instance of collective violence that broke out in the particular site she was examining, where a couple of kids got into a fight at a time when the religious festivals of both Christmas and Eid were being celebrated within two days of each other. Alcohol was said to be involved but then there were stories of how kids were being paid to wreak havoc. Fear and uncertainty began rising among the grassroots. Soon, religious symbols and slurs were bandied about and rumours of plotted assassinations started circulating, irrevocably heightening the sense of fear and insecurity, now along sharply religious lines.

**Jason Hart** highlighted that state legitimacy is partly predicated on the fact that you do NOT recruit children. This does not mean that we can say that it has not ever happened but the key fact is that norms are changing, particularly with the United Nations Convention of the Rights of the Child. He gave the example of Sri Lanka, which always used to use children but is now publicly and loudly condemning the rebel movement, the LTTE, for doing the same.

**Thomas McKenna** asked **Rachael Diprose** if there was any difference in state-sponsored immigration in the two Indonesian localities that she looked at. In addition, he wanted to know what particularly led Laskar Jihad to go to one locality rather than the other? To **Jason Hart** he said that he wanted to support his findings with his own research, whereby he spoke with men in their 20s who had fought in their early teens in southern Philippines but who had then gone back to high school after the first ceasefire and become well-adjusted young men.

**Rachael Diprose** said that she did not find a difference in state immigration policies. Regarding the entrance of Laskar Jihad, she pointed to the series of events and emotions she had just laid out (see above) and explained that their coming in to the area was as a result of the compounding escalation, particularly once racially charged graffiti started appearing, thereby giving the situation decidedly religious-conflictual dimensions.

**Ukoha Ukiwo** asked **Gnangadjomon Koné** what the ethnic background of the Young Patriots' membership is. Why did they choose that particular name? And finally, given the fact that Young Patriots are supportive of a regime that disowns a sizeable part of the population, what really is their conception of what the Ivorian nation is?

**Gnangadjomon Koné:** if one just looks at the leaders of the movement, it is very difficult to say that any particular ethnicity is characteristic of the group – some are from the northern part of the country while others are from the centre etc. He said that this was because of the way that the movement originated, whereby Gbagbo, alone in his opposition to President Boigny, tried to build as strong a support base as possible by appealing to all young men rather than those of a specific ethnic group. However, he suggested that now, with the emergence of other political parties, it was possible to see perhaps the development of the salience of ethnicity, especially if one looked at socio-political discourse. Regarding the name of the group, he said that this particular group of Gbagbo supporters wanted to distinguish themselves from his other supporters and emphasise themselves as young people fighting for him. Finally, the question of what it means to be Ivorian is a debated one. He spoke about the nationalist sentiment in the country, with conceptions of Ivorian-ness generally centring on ancestry i.e. to be considered Ivorian, your father and your father's father needed to be born in Cote d'Ivoire.

**Magali Chelpi-den Hamer** to **Jason Hart:** would you treat underage combatants as a separate category in the analysis?

**Jason Hart:** yes and no. While it is important to engage with academic and/or internationally accepted understandings of what a child is, in terms of a real inquiry into how dispositions are formed, hanging on to rigid categorisations may not be helpful. We must pull apart the simple dichotomies and really think about the question of who is a youth; for example, do we define someone as a youth until they get married? But what if there are important context-created restrictions and they can't?

**Philip Verwimp** wanted to know how political divisions played out during the actual genocide in Rwanda.

**Emmanuel Viret** explained that during the genocide, each party was in control of a certain sector and members of another party could not enter that sector i.e. there was a total breakdown of cooperation between the MDR and FPR members.

**Maritza Paredes** asked **Jason Hart** about his presentation of a testimonial by a young Palestinian, Qusay, living in a refugee camp in Jordan. Having shown how Qusay went from considering himself Jordanian to feeling more Palestinian, from initially thinking about more material things like food and school to then eventually connecting that with a larger understanding of identity and history, she wanted to know if he could say more about how this transformation happened. Specifically, was it just a result of the process of growing up and gaining maturity or is it the specific situation of conflict that makes a young person develop this disposition faster?

**Jason Hart** explained how, in the time between the first interview (when Qusay saw himself as Jordanian) and the second (when he considered himself Palestinian), Qusay's father, who worked in a Jordanian government institution, lost his job. This was clearly seen as discrimination and probably had a major role in formulating Qusay's new way of thinking. The question of alienation is complicated: he looked at school registers and saw a clear pattern of boys dropping out of school at age 13; among those who did drop out, he found a sense of "no matter how hard I try, I'm not going to get anywhere". It is important to remember that these are refugee camp kids and are thus growing up within a very specific physical and emotional context. If and when they are mobilised, and if and when this translates into violence, depends on the larger picture and on opportunity; for example, these youths in the camps know that they cannot attack Israel and so they attack the Jordanian police instead. He concluded by emphasising that in order to understand youth mobilisation, it is vital that we understand the youth mindset – from the ages of 13 to 16, you think about how you are going to become an adult, and there is an awareness of and engagement with the environment you live in.

**David Anderson** began by praising the papers presented, highlighting their rich research. He posed a question to all presenters, centring on the material aspect of understanding youth mobilisation: are kids being paid (to be fighters)? What role is payment playing, with payment being understood not just in terms of money but other things such as food, property, security etc. He noted that he thought situations are in fact much more dangerous when people are *not* being paid.

**Jason Hart** said the situation is complicated and depends on context i.e. payment is more important in some places than others. He agreed that materiality can be used in a whole host of different ways. He also pointed out that all too often, there is only blanket condemnation of the situation with no serious engagement with the real issues e.g. if these youth were not in the military or movement, what would they be doing? They have no access to schooling, and may in fact be benefitting from joining armed movements e.g. in terms of getting food etc.

**David Anderson** agreed, noting that when he worked in Ethiopia, he found that more than half the youth's greatest wish was for a Kalashnikov, and in fact a lot of them did have one – it was an aspiration that they could actually achieve.

**Gnangadjomon Koné** explained that the Young Patriots received money from the president, and the strategy thus becomes to prove to him that you are organised and mobilised i.e. payment is an incentive. Furthermore, the Young Patriots becomes a space for the distribution of administrative positions by the group's leaders and there is thus inter-member competition for these too.

**Rachael Diprose** agreed that the issue is difficult to discuss because as soon as you mention payment, it all seems so sinister i.e. people are only in it for gain. In the sites of conflict in her own research, she found that people would admit to accepting money for burning down houses, general rioting and engaging in frontal warfare with other groups, but would never admit to individual murders. The level of payment varies, and could be not only in monetary form but also in the form of jobs, the provision of food by women etc. She also highlighted the importance of culture in understanding the issue of payment, pointing out that it is common and not considered a big deal in Indonesia to be paid to run amok during an election.

## Session V: Nationalism, Religion, Ethnicity and Political Violence

### 1. The Perversities of Political Mobilisation and Violence in Peru

Maritza Paredes (University of Oxford) and Rosemary Thorp (University of Oxford)

#### *Abstract*

This paper documents and analyses political mobilisation in Peru – mobilization both for violence and non-violence – from the 1970s. It will explore how – perversely – the opening to democracy in Peru in 1980 and the apparent improvement in horizontal political equality led to less effective *representation* despite considerable *mobilisation*, above all around land issues. The move to democracy and the conflicts over land in turn fed mobilisation to violence by Sendero, and violence and its feedback effects were part of the failure to achieve political representation.

### 2. Emergent Forms of Self-determination: contemporary Igbo nationalism and the Order of Violence in Nigeria

Godwin Onuoha (Martin Luther University)

#### *Abstract*

More than in any other period in its post-colonial history, since its return to civil rule in 1999 Nigeria has witnessed several manifestations of ethno-nationalist projects. While these movements mobilise support from their ethnic enclaves, they also impose severe strains on national security by virtue of the means they adopt in their struggle against the state. Despite concrete variations in these ethno-nationalist projects, they are similar to the extent that they incarnate salient strands of “self-determination”, which at best translates into pseudo-separatist inclinations towards decentralisation, autonomy, and devolution of power and authority as presently constituted in Nigeria. By drawing on the activities of the Movement for the Sovereign State of Biafra (MASSOB), this paper examines the emergent forms of militant Igbo nationalist aspirations in Nigeria. Unlike other militant nationalist movements in Nigeria of Ijaw and Yoruba ethnic extraction, MASSOB’s stated objective is to achieve the self-determination of the Igbos by peaceful and non-violent means. However, as a group that challenges the sovereignty of the Nigerian state over Igboland, MASSOB evokes “counter-claims of sovereignty” and seeks to create alternative spaces of “power and influence” in its Igbo homeland. Within this context, MASSOB has expanded its operations in the southeast to include the formation of the Biafran Security Agency; circulation of the Biafran currency and mobilising its use for business transactions in the region; rallying of Nigerians of Igbo extraction, mostly traders, to routinely observe sit-at-home orders; and mobilising the boycott of the last census exercise in Igbo states of the southeast on the grounds that these states

were not part of Nigeria, and harassing and intimidating those who participated. The movement has also engaged in civic and communal functions, like the enforcement of rules on residence of states considered to be Igbo states or Biafra territories and pegging of rents where they have become exorbitant; enforcement of sanitation laws in urban cities in the East with punitive measures for defaulters; enforcement of the official price of petroleum products in filling stations in Igbo states; forceful seizure of fuel tankers moving from any part of the East to the North as a sign of protest against the non-supply of adequate products to the East; taking on board security issues in some cities in the East (especially Onitsha) and the settlement of disputes between warring groups. These developments negate the “absolutist” view of the Nigerian state as the sole founder and main guarantor of law and order, the main source of social rules, norms and values guiding the day-to-day existence of the people in the region. It calls into question the state-centric approaches to governance and empirically unveils alternative forms of social regulation and governance as a form of resistance against formal state control and sovereignty. The activities of MASSOB have not only pitched it against the Nigerian state, but against its own people also. As such, this paper explores the link between non-violent contentious nationalist claims based on self-determination and the state response born of repression. This focuses on the determinants of the transition of group resistance into a “violent order” in which alternative sources of power and legitimacy are being established; and the internal structures, organisational principles and social anchorage of such groups. It scrutinises the social actions, processes and a variety of social actors engaged in these contexts, how they interact and how these interactions shape the emergence of structures and social rules, which in turn, shapes the dynamics of violence and governance.

### **3. Religion and ethnicity as sources of mobilisation: a preliminary comparison**

Frances Stewart (University of Oxford)

#### *Abstract*

The root causes of most violent conflicts lie in economic and political factors, often horizontal inequalities of various types. Yet people are organised, united and mobilised by identities, in particular ethnic or religious ones. Most conflict analyses treat religion as a subset of ethnicity. This paper explores differences between them both by reviewing literature and by analysis of some recent surveys of perceptions in a number of conflict-affected countries. It finds many similarities in mobilisation, with both identities used instrumentally by leaders, but both “essentialised” and “believed in” by those who are mobilised. Yet in both cases, leaders have to cultivate the identity and that of the other, to induce violence on any scale. Religious organisation and external support are often stronger than in the case of ethnicity, but there is no evidence that religious conflicts are more deadly than ethnic ones. Preliminary evidence suggests that in the many cases where both identities are present and overlapping, the identity along which mobilisation occurs is determined by demographics and according to the identity which is perceived as being used politically in the allocation of government jobs and contracts. The need for both religious and ethnic leaders to work at mobilisation for some time preceding a conflict gives rise to possibilities of monitoring and intervention to prevent conflict occurring.

**Yvan Guichaoua** asked **Maritza Paredes** about the left-wing political brokerage that she mentioned, and wanted to know how these two groups of people from different origins work together and produce mobilisation.

**Maritza Paredes** explained that the nature of the mobilisation (land invasions) was such that this left-wing party became the central organisation in the movement. They were officially banned but this was a way of continuing political activity, and they become brokers by bringing networks and contacts to peasants, transferring these from the cities that they used to live in to

the rural areas that they moved to. Importantly, the type of relation/brokerage was negotiated because the Left wanted to create more militant movements whereas the peasants did not; so the terms of leadership were negotiated (rather than imposed).

**Yvan Guichaoua's** question centred on the violent aspects of MASSOB; he wanted to know if their security outfit could be called vigilantism, and also how they were working with other vigilante groups in the southeast. He also asked if there was anything left of the past ties between Igbo nationalists and France.

**Godwin Onuoha** said he would not compare MASSOB to vigilantes, saying that what they really did was enforce rules and a sense of law and order; for example, by setting rent ceilings. He went on to relate an illuminating episode a few years ago when MASSOB provided security to a governor for whom the Nigerian state had withdrawn security, even though MASSOB did not agree with his policies. Thus, though they may have tendencies to radicalism, MASSOB claim to be and largely are non-violent. Regarding the latter question, he put France's 1960s support into context, saying that it was obvious then they would support Biafra because they wanted to put down the Nigerian state in a neighbourhood of French colonial states. Since those conditions no longer exist, they were not really involved now.

**Yvan Guichaoua**, with reference to **Frances Stewart's** presentation, made the comment that there were in fact plenty of stories about competition between ethnic and religious entrepreneurs, highlighting the example of many Islamic groups which, when members join, demand that they cut parochial interests.

**Ukoha Ukiwo** wanted to know the source and nature of Igbo society's support for MASSOB, and also about the response of the Nigerian state. He also asked whether **Godwin Onuoha** believed the MASSOB hierarchy was really interested in self-determination or whether it was just using the campaign to get a better deal from the Nigerian state.

**Godwin Onuoha** explained that MASSOB arose as a critique of elites; it was a reaction to the fact that while the Igbo question had remained prominent, in MASSOB's perception no one had been able to address or resolve it. Their support base was made up of traders and artisans mostly, with people who could have been little more than children during the civil war giving money to the movement. The response of the state to MASSOB had been different to that of other groups – for example, leaders in the Niger Delta were arrested but soon released – because there was a growing sense that government actions against Igbos fed into the sense of marginalisation and alienation that drove the movement.

**Ukoha Ukiwo** made the comment that when you have a coincidence between religion and ethnicity this becomes a particularly powerful tool for mobilisation, and vice-versa i.e. when identities are cross-cutting, it reduces the chance of mobilisation and of conflict. In line with this, he highlighted the example of Yorubas in Nigeria, who are almost evenly divided between Muslims and Christians, with the former tending to be poorer, but while leaders have often tried to mobilise people along religious lines, they have always failed.

**Frances Stewart** agreed that when identities are cross-cutting, it diffuses conflict, highlighting the example of Switzerland.

**Rachael Diprose** suggested that we should investigate what point in history groups are at, arguing that there are plenty of places where you could describe religious identity as an ethnic

marker, and these tend to be in advanced industrialised countries – so perhaps modernised states have less of a problem. In addition, in an effort to explain why religion did not come up as a significant variable in Poso (where religious conflict did take place), she also mentioned the CRISE survey question regarding religious self-identification, saying it was problematic because what was asked was “how do you see yourself?” i.e. it centred on private life, but maybe the religious conception was different in public life.

**Frances Stewart's** response was – yes, exactly! She felt that the important point was that at least we showed that there is indeed a difference between public and private spheres.

**Francisco Gutiérrez** picked up on **Godwin Onuoha's** point that the implementation of the Structural Adjustment Programs opened the period of competition for resources based on ethnic identity, and asked him to explain the mechanisms of this.

**Godwin Onuoha** outlined how everything quickly became privatised, and as competition for contracts and jobs intensified, ethnic associations in urban areas began to mobilise based on self-help efforts. Moreover, the divestment of shares politicised ethnic divisions because if your ethnic group was not on good terms with the government or if your ethnic group was not strong enough, you would not get a share. He also highlighted another interesting point, that we saw the emergence of religious groups at this time as people retreated to religion as a form of cover and protection.

**Francisco Gutiérrez:** on the question of the instrumentality of religious identity as a mobiliser, he made the point that there is a lack of mechanisms to see if x or y feelings of leaders are really genuine or not.

**Frances Stewart** defended her assertion that religious mobilisation seems to be less instrumental than ethnic mobilisation, saying that when you read religious leaders' biographies, you see they do not get many material rewards and actually often get death – so not good prospects! Conversely, ethnic leaders get massive amounts of money and political power, and there is thus a better payoff in terms of instrumentality. However, she added that more research was needed into when a conflict is really religious as opposed to religion just being used as a marker.

**Valeria Pizzini-Gambetta:** her questions focused on **Maritza Paredes'** description of mobilisation in north Peru as being around dispute settlements and extra-legal governance – she wanted to know more about the modalities of that, and also the ways of enforcement.

**Maritza Paredes** explained that in the case of the north, because land struggle was not a long-standing issue, the Left had less incentive to go into that. Communities were freer to make interpretations of their own reality so the principle problem came with cattle thievery. This was a specific problem related to how the state was exercising justice i.e. the perception in the north was that the police did not care about them; thus, they tried to establish a movement that created a parallel government as an alternative to the central state. This alternative was not recognised by the central state and was thus repressed. However, even though it was not allowed to exist in the 70s and 80s, these local governments, known as *rondas*, thrived and participation in them was compulsory. They are considered to have helped keep the north out of the conflict by being a bulwark against *Sendero* influence, which was growing in the highlands.

**Jennifer Sheehy-Skeffington:** coming from social psychology, she really appreciated the emphasis on the social construction of identity linking into socio-economic conditions. She felt that social psychologists are too de-contextualised and mistakenly consider identity just to be something personal.

**Philip Verwimp:** can the difference between religious and ethnic groups be framed in terms of how members of those groups react to extremists? His point was that you cannot choose your ethnic group because you cannot escape your identity, and the leaders of the movement will make you decide whether you are with them or against them; whereas with religious groups, you can always leave your religion or point to more moderate interpretations.

**Frances Stewart:** while she thought that the point about extremism within groups was a good one, she averred that it is in fact quite difficult – and some would say more difficult – to leave certain religions, particularly highly politicised and mobilised ones.

**Stathis Kalyvas** had two comments regarding how to further our understanding of the politicisation of some identities over others, Firstly, you should investigate institutions to see how and what incentives are formed. Secondly, there is the more historical approach, particularly looking at who is the first mover of things when mass politics is first introduced – this historical effect may then reproduce itself over time.

**Frances Stewart** considered both to be good points, adding that the question of electoral institutions is complementary to demographics. In support of the latter point, she suggested looking at Sri Lanka as an especially illustrative example of the importance of historical patterns.

**Patricia Justino** asked **Frances Stewart** if she agreed that populations are mobilised according to inequalities and/or demographics. If she did, were these competing or complementary?

**Frances Stewart:** In her view, you need both and they are complementary.

**Gnangadjomon Koné** asked **Godwin Onuoha** to say something about the dynamic within the movement, particularly the relationship between the leaders and how that affects the functioning of the movement.

**Godwin Onuoha:** in terms of structure, he explained that MASSOB had state chapters but recently they had started coordinating nationally. There was a rift in the movement, which led to its splitting into three different factions, as a result of tension and contested claims over the substitute/replacement for leaders who were in detention.

## Session VI: Rebels and Civilians

### 1. Time is Now: recruitment into rebel organisations

Philip Verwimp (University of Antwerp)

*Abstract*

Recent literature has pointed to the importance of (changes in) the economic environment for the understanding of conflict dynamics. Two channels, negative income shocks on the one hand and the presence of exportable commodities on the other hand, are considered as drivers of conflict. This paper studies these two channels with a new 15-year panel of community-level data on Burundi. We find that decreases in the producer price of coffee increases recruitment at the community level. The coffee economy thus affects conflict as a reservoir for potential recruits and not as an object of predation. We perform robustness tests with different specifications and with rainfall shocks as a mechanism affecting overall agricultural income, not just coffee. Results are confirmed. We also find evidence for the impact of past grievances, in particular indiscriminate violence, on current recruitment.

## **2. Civilian Involvement in Civil War**

Ana Arjona (Yale University)

### *Abstract*

There is dramatic variation in how civilians living in areas where armed groups are present respond to the presence of such groups: some stay and collaborate, some flee, some fight back forming self-defence groups, and some enlist as full-time combatants. The variation is staggering in its range yet our systematic knowledge about it is close to nil, as is our theorising about its causes and effects. In this paper I argue that in order to understand civilian choice in times of war we need to have a thorough understanding of the contexts in which civilians living in war zones make choices. These contexts vary greatly both across and within wars, and even across villages within regions. This is so because in their effort to control territories, armed groups approach civilian rule in different ways. Some try to approximate the behaviour of organised states by extracting taxes, imposing new social norms, establishing predictable and routinised systems of rule enforcement, and supplying public goods. Other armed groups, however, behave like predatory bandits, reneging from ruling civilian affairs. Communities, for their part, respond to these strategies in very different ways. In order to understand civilian choice I propose a typology of micro-orders that emerge in different war zones by looking at both armed groups' strategies and communities' characteristics. I explore how civilians make different choices in each of these micro-orders. I rely on new quantitative and qualitative evidence that I collected on the Colombian conflict, where insurgent and counterinsurgent groups have operated for several decades.

## **3. Poverty and Violent Conflict: a micro-level perspective on the causes and duration of warfare**

Patricia Justino (Yale University)

### *Abstract*

This paper discusses how endogenous mechanisms linking processes of violent conflict and the economic well being of individuals and households in combat areas provide valuable microfoundations to the ongoing debate on the causes and duration of armed conflict. Notably, the endogenous relationship between conflict processes and household economic status leads to the emergence of symbiotic associations between armed groups and households living in areas they control that affect substantially the probability of a conflict starting and its effectiveness thereafter. Households in conflict areas draw on local armed groups to protect their economic status when anticipating violence and during the conflict, while armed groups make use of different levels of (either reluctant or voluntary) participation, support and cooperation from local populations to advance their strategic objectives at the onset and throughout the conflict. The level of household participation at the start and during the conflict is a function of two interdependent variables, namely household vulnerability to poverty and

household vulnerability to violence. The poorer the household is at the start of the conflict, the higher the probability of the household participating and supporting an armed group. The higher the risk of violence, the higher the probability of the household participating and supporting armed groups. The interaction between these two variables varies with the conflict itself and is defined by the direct and indirect effects of conflict-induced violence on the economic behaviour and decisions of households in combat areas.

## Comments and questions

**Stathis Kalyvas:** *The presentations provided a nice illustration of the research agenda for the dynamics of civil war, as opposed to onset or duration, the impact on conflict and post-conflict possibilities.*

**Rachel Diprose to Philip Verwimp:** *What is the basis of the conclusion that recruitment patterns were not explained by economic factors?*

**Frances Stewart to Patricia Justino:** *Does the study account for semi-macro issues such as vulnerability to violence based on group membership? Also, richer households that will lose property have reason to protect their assets by joining in the fighting. Finally, some families make strategic decisions that involve sending only one member to join the fighting rather than the whole household. Does the study's analysis account for these issues?*

**Rosemary Thorp to Philip Verwimp:** *Did recruitment patterns respond to changes in the producer price of coffee or to differences between the producer and world price?*

To **Patricia Justino:** *Does the study account for other kinds of vulnerability such as vulnerability to specific rebel discourses? For example, populations that badly need order may respond to discourse that emphasises paternalism.*

**Thomas McKenna to Philip Verwimp:** *In some instances, particularly where there is a lot of criminal violence, victims have no clear idea of who the perpetrators of indiscriminate violence were. Victims may not know whether it was the military or the rebels or criminal extortionists and people also get caught in cross fires. Interestingly, victims sometimes try to give meaning to such violence by assigning status to certain corpses as martyrs, victims of the cause, or not. In some cases, rank and file supporters will assign status even when leaders are unwilling to do so, and vice versa.*

**Stathis Kalyvas to Philip Verwimp:** *The study's main variable for recruitment levels is whether rebel groups appear in the village to recruit. Is this variable measuring rebel willingness to recruit rather than people's willingness to join? Is the assumption that a decrease in the coffee prices represents an example of an opportunity cause appropriate?*

To **Ana Arjona** and **Patricia Justino:** *The two studies address the same phenomenon, Justino from an economic and Arjona from an institutional perspective. How can the authors account for the arguments of the other?*

**Magali Chelpi-den Hamer to Patricia Justino:** *Can the study's model explain why households with similar characteristics diverge in terms of joining or not joining the fighting?*

To **Philip Verwimp** on Burundi: In Côte d'Ivoire the price of coffee is also set by the state but it is not the price actually received by the producers. In Burundi, is the price set by the state the one that the producers see?

**Yvan Guichaoua** to **Philip Verwimp** on Burundi: The study's results may suggest contradictory interpretations. The relationship between coffee prices and recruitment levels could indicate people getting tired of exploitation by the state or deciding that they can earn a better living as a rebel. The association of community victimisation with indiscriminate violence and recruitment levels could reflect the desire for revenge or the seeking of protection.

To **Ana Arjona**: Intuitively, one expects that the social composition of the two groups will predict rebel-civilian interaction. Does the research indicate that the rebel group represents the social composition of the civilian population? Perhaps the rebel composition is actually an outcome of the rebel-civilian interaction because community members may join or not join based on the interaction and thus affect the group's social composition.

**Valeria Pizzini-Gambetta** to **Philip Verwimp** on Burundi: By using a supply and demand function to link the presence of a rebel group in a community with recruitment levels, does the study actually measure the anticipation of demand rather than actual supply?

To **Ana Arjona**: The theory emphasises community responses to risk from the rebels rather than fear of the government. The importance of both these factors will change over time. Does the study address changes in a community's response over time? There may be a learning curve that shifts community preferences about collaboration.

**Zoe Marks** to **Ana Arjona**: *Did the study reflect any patterns in the sequence of civilian-rebel interactions? Was there variation between rebel territory, the front lines, or territory that had recently changed hands?*

**Arnim Langer** to **Philip Verwimp** on Burundi: The variable used for recruitment seems to be actually measuring something else. Is it possible to relate the overall strength of the rebel army to overall shocks in the coffee price? Can the study test whether a positive shock has an impact on demobilisation?

**Gnangadjomon Koné** to **Patricia Justino**: What variable does the study use to measure state failure?

**Julia Jönsson** to **Philip Verwimp** on Burundi: How do rebel recruiters get called to a village? Do they arrive on their own initiative or does the village invite them?

### **Presenter responses**

**Philip Verwimp**: For the years following an incident of indiscriminate violence, the study concluded that economic variables did not explain recruitment levels because road construction, coffee cultivation and population density were not significant variables. However, the association with recruitment levels appears for the producer price and the difference between the producer price and the world price. However, the producer price is the one that matters in the end. Although farmers make many calculations throughout production, the comparison to the world price requires calculations of real prices, exchange rates, etc. The producer price is announced annually on the radio so everyone knows it. The tinkering comes when the state representatives weigh the coffee harvests.

The variable used for recruitment levels in the study is the presence of rebel recruiters in a village, not the actual number of people who joined. The study assumes a supply and demand function, in that a rebel organisation will not be active in a village if no people are joining. It would be extremely inefficient for rebels to recruit in locations where they were not successful. The rebel organisations know when the fate of farmers is desperate. At that point it is very easy to recruit. A total of 70 percent of farmers in Burundi live below the poverty line. The coffee price shocks have an impact across the community, not just on the coffee farmers. The farmers can spend or not spend on goods and services in the community based on the coffee price. So potential recruits after negative shocks are not limited to farmers but could be other people suffering from the bad economy. Therefore, the coffee price represents an opportunity cost for all community members, not just the farmers. It is very easy to recruit people when you have negative shocks. In other countries, during coffee price shocks farmers will switch to another crop. In Burundi, however, the state prevents farmers from leaving their coffee trees. As a result, the rebel organisation can tap that grievance. In other countries, the grievance may come out in another way, but Burundi has the unfortunate combination of poverty, a state coffee economy and conflict.

The data does not include how many people joined in each of the 15 years, but only the total number of recruits over the 15 years and the number of recruits in the first year. In theory, recruits could join the rebels without a recruiter arriving in the village, but there is no evidence of this. However, there is significant variation by community in the specific years that rebels were present. Different interpretations of the results are indeed possible. Are people joining the rebels because of exploitation or victimisation, for revenge or protection? What the study definitely does observe is annual variation in recruitment.

In the Burundi case, the population knows very well who the perpetrators of indiscriminate violence are.

**Ana Arjona:** her approach and Justino's (one emphasising institutions the other emphasising economics) are complementary. Institutions define the rules of the game: the payoffs and the rules. Within each community, collaboration will entail different things based on the social order. Collaboration is following a few rules under military occupation but under a rebelocracy it involves many more things. The acts that count as collaboration vary and so do the motivations behind them. Economic differences between communities would have an affect on interactions. Under a rebelocracy, higher-income peasants might have more bargaining capacity. In addition, the exit option is shaped by economics

Organised communities may reject rebels even if they have been organised by the left and interactions may change over time. Sometimes the rebels may begin violently and then build order. In many cases the outcome is the result of an actual negotiation. In a year, a village may shift from rebel to paramilitary control. In addition, the villages in the study are only an hour and a half from Bogota, which is under army control. But even some Bogota slums are under rebel control. There may be amazing rebelocracies in the middle of state-controlled territory.

**Patricia Justino:** The two studies are complementary. The four variables that the study identifies as impacting collaboration decisions are actually indicative of institutional arrangements. They are: level of control, provision of public goods, type of violence and access to resources.

The study accounts for group loyalty in defining vulnerability to violence. Groups that belong to the right ethnic groups are less likely to be targeted with violence, and the rich may lose assets. Both of these are taken into account by vulnerability to violence. There is also the dynamic side to conflict in that events in the course of the conflict – such as economic loss or household member death – will affect outcomes. In measuring state weakness, the study looks at whether rebel groups are the ones providing public goods such as the rule of law, protection of property rights, and social services. Households do use individual members to pursue different strategies, so the analysis will focus on the individual within the household.

## Panel VII: Why Doesn't Peace Last?

### 1. Political Culture and Tuareg Mobilisations: rebels of Niger, from Kaosen to the “Mouvement des Nigériens pour la Justice”

Frederic Deycard (Sciences-Po, Bordeaux)

#### *Abstract*

This paper will address the mobilisations of the Tuareg militants through a socio-historical approach to the Tuareg rebellions in Niger since the resistance movement of Kaosen against France in 1916. By giving particular attention to the words of the combatants, I intend to emphasise a trend among the different rebellions, to understand the mechanisms of the mobilisations “*par le bas*” [i.e. bottom-up] and in the end, to show the rise of a political culture among the rebels. The diversity of motivations among the fighters points to a collective identification with the reasons and the consequences of an armed resistance. The multiplication of the symbols of the rebellions in the everyday life in Agadez also intertwines with a feeling of pride and a strong belief in the efficiency of armed conflicts. I will base this paper on multiple interviews conducted with the rebels of the conflict of 1990-1997 in order to answer the following questions: how did identification with the myths of the rebellion become a collective reference for the Tuaregs? How did this collective reference become a political culture that determined the terms of the political action in case of a crisis with the central government of Niamey? How did it evolve? How did it influence the mobilisations of fighters and interfere with their political choices even in times of peace? We will also see that the political culture of the Tuaregs grew beyond the limits of Tuareg society and reached the international scene through a remarkable adaptation to the new modes of communication. A new rebel movement, the *Mouvement des Nigériens pour la Justice*, has appeared in Niger since February 2007, dividing the range of political discourse of the Tuaregs between an influential diaspora and the combatants; a historical comparison will emphasise the continuities and the differences in the mobilisations of the Tuaregs.

### 2. Mobilisation and Collective Violence in Central Nigeria

Adam Higazi (University of Oxford)

#### *Abstract*

This study assesses the patterns and dynamics of group mobilisation during episodes of collective violence in Nigeria. The research was undertaken in Plateau State, an area of great ethnic and linguistic diversity with mixed Christian and Muslim populations. Despite severe periodic violence elsewhere in northern Nigeria, mostly along religious lines, the study area had been peaceable for decades. But there was a series of protracted, though relatively localised, violent conflicts between 2001 and 2006. Mobilisation took place principally along ethnic and

religious lines. The paper highlights the factors underpinning the conflicts and driving mobilisation, and assesses the rationale and actions of armed groups and their links with the state and with ethnic and religious authorities.

### **3. The Endless Road to Peace: understanding the cycle of armed separatism, compromise, and betrayal in the Muslim Philippines**

Thomas McKenna (ARPC)

#### *Abstract*

In sharp contrast to other separatist conflicts, the Philippine Government and Philippine Muslim Separatists have been talking to one another steadily for over 30 years of their almost 40-year conflict, agreeing to multiple ceasefires and signing three peace accords. Yet today, the Southern Philippines is once again on the verge of a full-scale war between Muslim separatist rebels and the Philippine military after the Manila government rejected an already initialed peace plan that was years in the making. This paper addresses the puzzling problem of how so much willingness to negotiate on both sides has proved so fruitless so often. It does so by probing an interesting feature of the Muslim armed separatist struggle. That struggle has been marked by remarkably little communal violence or terror attacks against civilians. It has been fought as a traditional armed insurgency against an occupying army. The Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) contests the legitimacy of the Philippine Republic and demands a separate state (or autonomous region) covering the ancestral homeland of Philippine Muslims. It has never officially sanctioned violence against Christian settlers. In fact, it has never (despite its name) brought religious differences to the forefront. It is a notably pragmatic nationalist organisation, willing to negotiate in pursuit of self-determination for Philippine Muslims.

While the MILF and the Philippine government contend (and compromise) on a national stage, the fault lines between the two entities are always local. And it is local Christian politicians who have consistently scuttled the peace agreements between the MILF and the Philippine State. They do so because of the fear of local Christian communities that the horizontal inequalities that have defined Philippine rule in Muslim ancestral lands will be rectified at their expense. I examine these issues through the lens of individual motives for joining the MILF, for fighting, and for negotiating. I look at the tragic consequences of betrayal and at the prospects for ending, once and for all, the political dynamic that always leads back to violence.

#### **Questions and Comments**

**Yvan Guichaoua** to **Frederic Deycard** on leaders not necessarily being willing to embrace the traditional collective action issue: Tell us about one attempt from the one political party (with a federalist agenda) and why this political party failed.

**Godwin Onouha** to **Adam Higazi** and **Thomas McKenna**: he suggests that they look at the patterns of elite alliances. It would seem that under military rule, elites will ally with the dominant group in the country and so you don't see separatist movements all that much.

**Godwin Onouha** to **Thomas McKenna**: In terms of the cease-fire, what does the region contribute to the political economy of the conflict?

**Valeria Pizzini-Gambetta** to panel: It seems that the choice to rebel comes out of a variety of historical contexts. The choice to rebel is based on an incentive to engage, but there is also the issue of trust and reputation. Perhaps the choice to rebel is a way of reaffirming rebel reputation and reasserting it? There seems to be an incentive to pretend to be a rebel; is this a romantic fact or are there economic incentives to this?

**Moussa Fofana** to **Adam Higazi** on the relationships between pre-war vigilantism and post-war: was there a loss of power from different leaders? Is there a different chain of command; different numbers?

## Responses

**Frederic Deycard** to **Yvan Guichaoua**: In 1995, one of the rulers tried to use one of the traditional ways to take over the UDPS. This was a politically correct federalist attempt at autonomy. This move also attempted to merge the militant group into a normal political faction, but failed. "The result was also a rewriting of history of the Tuareg leader's own tribe, redefining the locus of power and the control of land. His party was seen as a political instrument to bring more power into the party of the president." He is now in exile in France. Not a good example. It is not that if you are Tuareg you will be a rebel, but there are other ways of you being forced into this role. Individuals are guided onto this path and shaped into this role. In order to have political clout, even NGOs are presented as rebels as well when they go to France; this identity is an important political tool.

**Adam Higazi** to **Godwin Onouha**: Military regimes have been dominated by northern elites. Jos is a centre of real political strife because it was created under a military regime and so there is still conflict there.

**Thomas McKenna** to **Godwin Onouha**: Muslims have had an opportunity to assert themselves because they constitute one-third of the country. They are militant. Muslim rebels fought the military to a standstill and have been able to do so regularly. Thus, the government has been obliged to negotiate with them. On resources – Muslims have been relegated to resource-poor areas, except for one case: the marshlands, which might hold oil deposits. The government is not concerned with this because they were working out resource-sharing in the most recent agreements.

**Frederic Deycard** to **Valeria Pizzini-Gambetta**: Belonging to a network provides, partially, certain economic resources. It also, in Niger, offers employment. The networking is crucial and the recruitment is as well. Each agency recruits, especially along its own front. There is some economic benefit to certain networking: networking to go to France with a visa; music contracts available if a rebel is a musician; helps you to meet the right people, etc. Petrol and uranium are also sources of resources, but at the moment it is tourism. There are also well-defined lines between networks. After the peace process there was an integration of the combatants that also gave an incentive to label oneself as a "rebel" for the state benefits derived from that status.

**Adam Higazi** responds to **Moussa Fofana**: A lot of it has to do with population shifts during conflicts. Vigilante organisations were often very localised and informal. This is very common. It is the same kind of social class of people who fight (vigilantes and militias). Both have communal functions: protecting properties. Militias were more for the protection of the communities from other communities. The leadership was different: during an outbreak of violence, new leaders would emerge. When you have huge insecurity, you get huge reshuffling of power structures. This also depends on how you define "vigilantes": they could just be a mob (an *ad hoc* issue). Militias are consistently more tightly organised. Militias are primarily local, but also responsible for lashing out into a wider context as well.

## Closing Session: Concluding Reflections and Further Steps

Frances Stewart, Chair

1. Frederico Varese
2. Stathis Kalyvas
3. Francisco Gutierrez
4. Yvan Guichaoua

### Comments and questions

**Magali Chelpi-den Hamer** to **Francisco Gutiérrez**: Being careful about interpretation and bias is important, but Gutiérrez's criticism of oral testimony seemed to undervalue it as a source of reliable data even though other types of data are comparably "produced".

**Jason Hart**: In studies of conflict there remains a tendency to see mobilisation as an extraordinary moment rather than the outcome of a process. This tendency affects research methodology. Understanding the context in which mobilisation occurs requires more than a single method because studies must study mobilisation as part of a societal process.

**Nana Antwi-Ansorge** to **Francisco Gutiérrez**: How should researchers triangulate data from oral history in the study of conflict?

**Ana Arjona**: One reason theory building is so important is that you can use theory to reflect on the validity of data from oral testimony. When working in a local case and based in theory, it is always possible to isolate testable hypotheses that can be checked with other data and methods to identify bias. The reliability of data is not just a question of empirics but also of theory.

**Zoe Marks**: Another important point is the tendency towards a-historicity in academia itself. Today's studies very rarely look at work done in past decades or the last century. Conflict studies seems to be a shrinking field. Even during this conference, participants referred very rarely to older revolutions.

**Maritza Paredes**: *The academic literature has not tended to address how violence is exercised as an ongoing process. Violence is exercised in different ways. In what ways do mafias control or not control the specific type of violence exercised?*

### Responses from panelists

**Francisco Gutiérrez**: Oral history was used as an example. Indeed, the reliability of quantitative data is equally open to debate. The point, however, was to stress that gathering trustworthy resources is extremely difficult. The academic community needs to craft common practices to address the problem of data reliability and interpretation. There is no magic formula. However, triangulation should be discussed systematically and formalised. The research community needs to think collectively about the treatment of information and its implications. It is a serious problem, but it can be solved.

**Stathis Kalyvas:** It is important to remember that research is a collective endeavor. The academic community makes the selection of the most robust findings to take to the next level. Through the research process, members of the scholarly community build on each other.

The emphasis on current conflicts is a main attraction and main difficulty in looking at conflict. Studying completed conflicts is less fashionable but it is also much safer and brings better access to data. For example, the cold war conflict in Nicaragua seems like a perfect research case, but people are not looking at it.

**Federico Varese:** The study of organised crime also has data problems. Each kind of data has problems even quantitative data. Theory does help you to test hypotheses, which is very important.

Social network analysis starts with the assumption that we all live in networks. Although the standard model of quantitative analysis is at the individual level, a big feature of social life is linking. Social network analysis puts actors into linked webs. The problem with social network analysis, however, is that it is very descriptive.