

Religion versus Ethnicity as a Source of Mobilisation: are there differences?

Frances Stewart

CRISE WORKING PAPER No. 70

July 2009



© Centre for Research on Inequality, Human Security and Ethnicity

DFID Department for International Development The UK Department of International Development (DFID) supports policies, programmes and projects to promote international development. DFID provided funds for this study as part of that objective, but the views and opinions expressed are those of the author(s) alone.

Religion versus ethnicity as a source of mobilisation: are there differences?

Abstract

The root causes of most violent conflicts lie in economic and political factors, often horizontal inequalities of various types. Yet people are organised, united and mobilised by identities, in particular ethnic or religious ones. Most conflict analyses treat religion as a subset of ethnicity. This paper explores differences between these two identities, both by reviewing literature and by analysis of some recent surveys of perceptions in a number of conflict-affected countries. It finds many similarities in mobilisation, with both identities used instrumentally by leaders, but both 'essentialised' and 'believed in' by those who are mobilised. Yet in both cases, leaders have to cultivate the identity of those mobilised, and that of the 'other', to induce violence on any scale. Religious organisation and external support are often stronger than in the case of ethnicity, but there is no evidence that religious conflicts are more deadly than ethnic ones. Preliminary evidence suggests that in the many cases where both identities are present and overlapping, the identity along which mobilisation occurs is determined by demographics and according to the identity which is perceived as being used politically in the allocation of government jobs and contracts. The need for both religious and ethnic leaders to work at mobilisation for some time preceding a conflict gives rise to possibilities of monitoring and intervention to prevent conflict occurring.

The author

Frances Stewart is Professor of Development Economics and Director of the Centre for Research on Inequality, Human Security and Ethnicity at the University of Oxford.

Email: frances.stewart@qeh.ox.ac.uk

Table of Contents

1. Introduction3

2. Some apparently obvious differences and some similarities6

 2.1 Group formation..... 6

 2.2. Mobilising for conflict 11

 2.2.1 Motives of leaders..... 11

 2.2.2 Motives of followers 14

 2.3 Organisation, training and support..... 16

3. Implications for the nature of conflicts..... 17

4. What can we learn from CRISE perceptions surveys on these issues?20

5. Conclusions.....29

6. References.....32

List of Tables and Figures

Table 1: Large-scale killing episodes, accounting for 200,000 deaths or more, since 195620

Table 2: % whose contacts were half or more from same group.....24

Table 3: % not comfortable working with other groups25

Table 4: Proportion who would vote for a particular group compared with their overall voting ratio27

Figure 1: Religious composition of respondents21

Figure 2: Ethnic composition of respondents22

Figure 3: Most important identities.....23

Figure 4: % objecting to cross-group marriage24

Figure 5: Net change in salience of identities25

Figure 6: Does background affect chances? % saying yes.....26

Figure 7; % agreeing that sometimes violence is the only way to be heard28

Religion versus ethnicity as a source of mobilisation: are there differences?

By Frances Stewart¹

1. Introduction

On the face of it, the answer to the question posed by the title of this paper seems rather obvious: in one case, people are fighting with divine sanction and support, in the other on the basis of rather arbitrary differences in language, history etc. This is the view of (Juergensmeyer 1993), who claims that religion fosters stronger loyalty and commitment than other identities, while Hoffman argues that for religious warriors, 'Terrorism assumes a transcendental dimension, and its perpetrators are thereby unconstrained by the political, moral, or practical constraints that seem to affect other terrorists' (Hoffman 1993). Yet others have claimed that the religious label is just a label under which people fight, and performs the same instrumental function of uniting and mobilising people as ethnic distinctions based on language or history – it is one among a number of cultural markers that together define ethnicity (Seul 1999). Economists have argued that religion develops and is used instrumentally to prosecute war in much the same way as others have analysed ethnicity's role in conflict instrumentally (Iannaccone and Berman 2006 on religion; Collier and Hoeffler 2000 on ethnicity). Indeed, many analyses classify religion either as one ethnic marker, or put 'religious or ethnic' groups in the same category. Moreover, to complicate issues, many conflicts have both ethnic and religious dimensions. This paper aims to explore this debate; to identify similarities and differences, and if there do seem to be differences, what they are and what implications they have for the nature of war and for its prevention.

It is sometimes suggested that there are two alternative and exclusive explanations of the many violent conflicts (mainly within countries) that we observe today: that either they are cultural or 'civilisational' as Huntington suggested (Huntington 2002); or they have political and/or economic motivations, which may be individual or group-based. This is a false dichotomy. Clearly, cultural differences alone are insufficient to cause violent conflict, given the large number of peaceful multicultural societies (Cohen 1974; Fearon and Laitin 1996). Hence the many socio-economic and political explanations of conflict. Among these are horizontal inequalities (inequalities among culturally defined groups), a failure of the state to provide social services or security, large numbers of unemployed youths (often semi-educated), low incomes and environmental pressures, and rent-seeking activities associated with high levels of natural resources (Auvinen and Nafziger 1999; Berdal and Malone 2000; Collier and World Bank. 2003; Gurr 1993; Homer-Dixon 1994; Horowitz 1985; Humphreys 2005; Stewart 2008b). There is empirical evidence indicating that each of these explanations has some validity.

Yet those who look to socio-economic or political motives alone also find them insufficient because, however strong the motive, collective or group organisation forms an essential element in political mobilisation for violent conflict. While the underlying predisposing condition which makes violent conflict likely may be horizontal inequality, in both political and socio-economic dimensions, and/or the

¹ I am grateful for research assistance from Sonia Andolz Rodriguez; and for very insightful comments on an earlier draft from Jennifer Todd and Arnim Langer.

presence of high-value natural resources, people have to be mobilised if conflict is actually to break out. And such collective organisation and mobilisation generally requires some unifying mission or identity which is sufficiently powerful to get people to kill and be killed on a large scale. Material motives and forced conscription can and do play a role of course, but these are frequently subordinate. 'Forced' joiners seem usually to be a minority and those who join are often paid little, sometimes nothing. In many cases, in addition to the underlying grievance, it is the unifying mission which inspires those who fight. Indeed, the grievance itself generally depends on a perceived difference in the economic and/or political position of groups and some keenly felt identity difference is thus a defining aspect of the grievance as well as being an essential aspect of mobilisation. Motives are mixed, as always, and status, security, money and politics – especially for leaders – are usually present as well as the difference in felt identity or mission. Moreover, in addition to providing a powerful motive, a common identity is also important to produce trust among the fighters, which is essential for the efficient prosecution of any conflict.

During the Cold War a predominant mission was provided by ideology: people identified themselves as pro-West and capitalist or pro-Soviet Union and socialist or Marxist, especially in the wars by proxy in central Africa (Angola and Mozambique), Southeast Asia (Vietnam, Cambodia) and Latin America (Guatemala, Nicaragua and El Salvador). Nonetheless, although presented as class and ideological wars, there were often underlying ethnic issues too (see Caumartin 2005 on Guatemala, for example).² However, as has been widely observed, cultural identities appear to have become more important as a source of mobilisation in recent decades, and ideology less so (Hechter 2004; Huntington 1996; Huntington 2002). These cultural differences encompass a wide range of phenomena: 'racial' differences; 'ethnic' differences; 'clan' differences; 'religious' differences; and differences between 'religious sects'. The inverted commas are used to indicate that each concept is problematic. In many analyses, the various differences are all encompassed in the broad term 'ethnic'. For example, Horowitz states:

'Ethnic groups are defined by ascriptive differences, whether the indicum is *color*, appearance, language, *religion*, some other indicator of common origin, or some combination thereof' (Horowitz 1985: 17; my italics).

Sambanis (2001) uses Horowitz' definition in his contrast between ethnic and non-ethnic civil wars, the former encompassing religious *and* ethnic differences and the latter ideological motives (revolutionary wars). Hechter (2004) similarly argues that the move away from class politics to culture incorporates both religion and ethnicity, without making any particular distinction between the two, as we, too, did in our book on horizontal inequalities (Stewart 2008b). Kalyvas (2008) also refers only to ethnic and non-ethnic wars.

This paper, in contrast, aims to differentiate between religion and ethnicity as identities around which people mobilise and to consider whether there are important differences between the two, as sources of mobilisation, and in the likely consequences for the nature of conflicts and for policy approaches. In doing so I shall continue to use ethnicity rather broadly to encompass differences in 'colour, appearance, language' as well as other indicators, such as common histories, which are felt as sufficiently important shared characteristics to be potential sources of mobilisation. Ethnic difference will be assumed to include what might be thought of as subdivisions of a particular ethnicity ('clans') if these become important enough to

²² Kalyvas (2008: 15) has described this as 'the blend of Marxism-Leninism and ethnic mobilization exemplified by Cold War national liberation movements'.

be a source of mobilisation. Since the differences that go to constitute an ethnic group are a matter of perceptions and felt salience as much as ‘objective’ features, the boundaries may be quite fluid, changeable, and apparently arbitrary, subject to influence by the educational system, the media and leaders – in other words, ‘constructed’. Yet, as Turton (1997) pointed out, ‘the very effectiveness [of ethnicity] as a means of advancing group interests depends upon its being seen as “primordial” by those who make claims in its name’.

As far as religion is concerned, this paper is concerned with globally ‘organised’ religions rather than more amorphous bodies of belief like animism (though some have well-structured local organisation). And, as with ethnicity, I shall include subdivisions (or sects) as well as broad religious divisions in so far as they are the salient sources of mobilisation – which of course is often the case.

There remains a difficulty about categorising conflicts into ‘religious’ and ‘ethnic’ types: first, there is the question of how far the *objectives* of a conflict have to be solely (or in large part) ethnic or religious to categorise the conflicts in this way. For example, Hoffman (2006) suggests that some conflicts are not really religious because of the pre-eminence of political rather than religious motivation. Gurr (1993) takes a similar view arguing that religion is rarely the root cause of conflict. Here I take a different approach: while all conflicts have several motives with political and/or economic ones generally central, mobilisation frequently occurs on the basis of particular identities, and conflicts can then be classified as ‘ethnic’ or ‘religious’, or class or ideological, on the basis of *how people are mobilised* rather than with respect to the political or economic motives for such mobilisation. Consequently, here conflicts will be classified as ethnic or religious according to their main organising identity, irrespective of the ‘true’ underlying motives and objectives.³ A second serious problem about classifying conflicts into religious or ethnic is that there is quite often ambiguity as to whether mobilisation is by religion or ethnicity, where religious and ethnic distinctions overlap. Whether a conflict is predominantly religious or ethnic may then be difficult or even impossible to determine. It may be helpful then to have a threefold distinction between ‘religious’, ‘ethnic’ and ‘mixed’ conflicts. For these cases, Ruane and Todd (2009) suggest a matrix allowing for varying combinations of degrees of group solidarity on the basis of ethnicity and on the basis of religion.

Although, in this paper, I am concerned with identities as sources of mobilisation, this does not mean that I have abandoned the view that the fundamental causes of conflict are usually political or socio-economic, and not a clash of cultures alone⁴; nor am I denying the obvious and well-established fact that people join fighting forces for a variety of material motives. Indeed, among the issues which need to be investigated (though not in this paper) is whether conflicts with similar socio-economic and political cause have a different impact in the presence of ethnic as against religious identity differences. Moreover, the nature of the political and economic causes, and particularly the nature and extent of horizontal inequalities, may itself be a factor in causing or accentuating the salience of particular identities.⁵ This is supported by the perceptions survey evidence presented in Section 4.

³ Here I share the view of Seul (1999) who argues that ‘religious conflicts’ need not be about religion or religious conversion, and indeed usually have non-religious causes. They are so called because this is the unifying and mobilising identity. ‘Religion is not the cause of ‘religious conflict; rather for many... it frequently supplies the fault line along which intergroup identity and resource competition occurs’ (Seul 1999: 564).

⁴ See Stewart (2008b).

⁵ Cultural status inequalities, in particular, may contribute to the rise in the salience of a group.

The next section of this paper will present a general discussion on what differences one might expect between mobilisation on the basis of religious identity and that on the basis of ethnic identity, drawing on some secondary empirical evidence. This is followed by a discussion of some implications for the nature of conflicts arising from different bases for mobilisation. Section 4 explores why people adopt one identity rather than another for political mobilisation, with evidence drawn from perceptions surveys conducted by the Centre for Research on inequality, Human Security and Ethnicity (CRISE).

The aim of this paper is to provide an initial overview and come to some preliminary conclusions on the basis of this evidence, which need to be tested by further research. The final section suggests some research questions and some possible policy implications.

2. Some apparently obvious differences and some similarities

The discussion will be organised around four elements:

1. group formation;
2. the nature of mobilisation for conflict, distinguishing between leaders or mobilisers and those who are mobilised; including treatment of the 'other';
3. organisation, training and sources of support;
4. implications for the nature of conflicts.

2.1 Group formation

There is a huge literature on what ethnic identities are, how they are formed and so on. Views range from a primordial one – that ethnic differences are somehow innate to people, rigid and unchangeable – to social constructivist approaches, whereby such identities are 'constructed' through historical social processes, influenced, and sometimes manipulated, by leaders for instrumental political objectives. According to some variants of the latter view, identities are not just (or sometimes at all) self-constructed but categories whose boundaries may largely be decided by others, generally for the purpose of protecting privileges (for example, the racial categories of apartheid South Africa, or the Hutu/Tutsi distinction in Belgian-ruled Rwanda and Burundi). Within broad ethnic categories, subdivisions may emerge or gain importance over time, or groups may coalesce, often for political purposes. Consequently, the salience of ethnicity and ethnic boundaries can vary over time. Moreover, ethnic group boundaries are not usually tight or well defined and are blurred by migration and cross-cultural marriages. Yet one can trivialise what seems to be very important felt distinctions, by placing too much emphasis on the constructed nature of the distinctions. Luos and Kikuyus, Akan and Ewe, Igbo and Hausa, to take a few examples, see strong distinctions in their identities – so strong that they can sometimes lead to conflict. But it is also important to note that the importance (and recognition) of ethnic categorisations can vary sharply *within* a group as well as over time. In terms of potential for mobilisation, this means that (a) those who wish to mobilise people may first need to increase the consciousness of group identities (and of the identities of others, see below); and (b) there are likely to be strong variations in response among those with the particular identity. An important research issue is the determinants of such responses (and here, particularly, the precise economic and psychological position of 'respondees' is relevant). For example, the majority of the population in the U.S. are white, but white supremacists are supported by only a small minority of this majority.

An important factor which may determine which identities are salient, and may accentuate particular group boundaries and divisions, is the nature and extent of horizontal inequalities: if a group is excluded from political power and marginalised economically, then group consciousness is likely to rise; and, indeed, disparate subgroups may be brought together under a common identity to protest more effectively: examples are the ‘unification of diverse ethnic identities into a broader “Bangsamoro” identity in the mainly Muslim Mindanao region of the Southern Philippines’ (Brown and Langer 2008: 7); and the case of the Orange Asli, where a single identity was forged to encompass a number of aboriginal peoples of Malaysia, who are very different in terms of appearance and culture and united to gain more rights and stop the exploitation of their environment, principally by loggers and miners.⁶

Turning to religion, while religion itself may be argued to be a social construct, it is a very formal one and categorisation of people by religion would seem to be less problematic than by ethnicity. Many people are formal members of particular religious organisations; others attend ceremonies or rituals of one particular religion periodically. Within the dominant global religions, subdivisions have emerged over time, generating new organisational structures and changed beliefs and rituals (Catholic or Protestant, Shia or Sunni, for example). The subdivisions in turn have bred other subdivisions. Of course, there is some ambiguity ‘at the edges’, especially in largely secular societies, where, e.g. in the UK ‘C. of E.’ is a label given to people in hospital if they declare no specific religion. Although cross-religious marriages also occur, it seems they are less prevalent than cross-ethnic marriages (see the evidence from the perceptions surveys below), and children normally choose (or are allocated to) one religion rather than the other, and rarely claim adherence to both religions (indeed this is not permitted by most religious organisations). There is a marked difference here with respect to non-formal traditional religions, which often do seem to be adhered to simultaneously with adherence to the more formal religions. In general, however, there is less ambiguity about group boundaries in religion than in ethnicity. But because of the huge array of sects and subsects, there are choices with respect to which group, subgroup or coalition of groups to use as a basis for mobilisation, just as with ethnic mobilisation. And, as with ethnicity, not everyone within a particular religion is potentially ‘mobilisable’, rather there is a spectrum of potential; as with ethnicity, the personal circumstances of the members will play an important role here, which may be (but is not necessarily) related to the degree of religious fervour of the person. Again whether a group faces relative deprivation is likely to be one determinant of the salience of the identity.

People have multiple identities, among which both religion and ethnicity are often important components. For example, the CRISE perceptions surveys (to be discussed more in Section 4) showed that ethnicity was perceived to be one of their three most important identities by between 16 per cent (Guatemala) and 50 per cent (Malaysia) of people in the seven countries in which we conducted surveys; if we add ethnicity and place of origin, we find the ratio varies between 41 per cent and 87 per cent (same countries). Religion was perceived as a more pervasive identity, however, being among the three most important aspects of identity for 78 per cent of people in Nigeria and 76 per cent in Malaysia and Ghana, while the lowest proportion was Bolivia at 30%. In every country, many people cited religion *and* ethnicity as important aspects of their identity, ranging from 12 per cent of respondents in Ghana to 37 per cent in Malaysia.

⁶ Marianna Volpi, CRISE DPhil student: personal communication.

There is a strong tendency, for historic reasons, for religious and ethnic affiliations to overlap in many countries – for example, in Nigeria, Northern Hausa-Fulani are also Muslims, while Southern ethnic groups are mainly Christian; in Malaysia there is a near one-to-one correspondence between being Malay and being Muslim, although some Indians are also Muslim; in the former Yugoslavia, the Serbs are predominately Eastern orthodox Christians, the Croats Catholics and the Bosnians Muslims.

Where there is such an overlap, it may not be clear whether people are mobilised primarily according to their religion or their ethnicity – this is the case, for example in the conflicts in central Maluku, Indonesia, the central belt in Nigeria and the former Yugoslavia and the long civil war in Sri Lanka.

In Maluku, the conflict started as tension between indigenous Ambonese and migrants to Ambon; the migrants were Muslim (though there were some indigenous Muslims) and the locals were Christian and the conflict soon acquired a strong religious dimension, with attacks on Mosques and Churches, and with each party fearing that the other intended to make the state Muslim/Christian (Bhakti et al. 2009; Stern 2003).

'The problem of social inequality, competition over natural resources, and disputes between political elites and bureaucrats underpinned the conflict, but some discourses distorted the causes of the violence, portraying it as a religious conflict... By May 1999, the conflict in Central Maluku had settled down, until the Indonesia Democratic Party of Struggle (PDI-P) in Maluku, dominated by Christian leaders, won the election. Dissatisfaction with this on the part of the Muslim community led to a re-escalation of the conflict in June 1999. Religion became a crucial issue during this period. Property in Maluku was destroyed and lives lost. Each side defended their own faith, regardless of whether their own relatives of different religions were targeted in attacks.

(Bhakti et al. 2009: 23).

In central Nigeria, religion has been the framing identity in recent conflicts (broadly coinciding with ethnic distinctions), with religious leadership and religious symbols attacked. While there are political and economic motives, fear of the introduction of sharia law has given Christians a powerful reinforcing motive, both sides being encouraged by ideas and finance from outside (with Pentecostals influenced (broadly) by American Baptist churches and 'salafi' ideas taken from Islamic reform movements: Higazi 2009; Last 2007).

In the former Yugoslavia, what started as nationalistic/ethnic motivation took on religious dimensions, with the use of religious symbols and targets (Dunn nd; Shenk 1993) although it has been argued that this was more a way of defining nationalism/ethnicity than important in itself (Powers 1996). In Côte d'Ivoire, the fundamental issue during the recent conflict was that of citizenship (*Ivoirité*), which hinged on immigrant status, but the division between locals and immigrants was also religious (Christian and Muslim respectively) and some people presented the conflict as a religious one (Nordäs 2007; Langer 2005).

The case of Sri Lanka illustrates how, with overlapping identities, different identities can become salient according to political circumstances:

Religion closely overlaps with ethnicity in Sri Lanka, and to some extent, religious identity forms the core of ethnic identity. Before colonialism and Christian proselytization, to be Hindu was by definition to be Tamil and vice versa. To be Buddhist was to be Sinhalese and vice versa. Since the 17th

century, about 10 per cent of the Tamil and Sinhalese populations have been converted to Christianity. However, even today, Buddhist religious identity remains a very strong element in the Sinhalese identity, and efforts to institutionalise Buddhism are strongly resented by Tamils. For example, Buddhist monks are typically very strongly Sinhala nationalist and anti-Tamil.⁷

During the colonial period, religious identity was a source of serious sectarian strife, particularly between Sinhalese Buddhists and Sinhalese Christians, and there are reports of sporadic violence between the two groups. Basically, Buddhists resented the aggressive proselytization of Christian missionaries, and the favouritism of the colonial state towards the church. Some of this was the hangover from bitter memories of forced conversion and violent suppression of Buddhists and all non-Catholics during the Portuguese period.

Having said that, by the mid-20th century, ethnicity, rather than religion became the most important marker of political identity in Sri Lanka. It wasn't really the LTTE that 'chose' ethnicity over religion. The salience of ethnicity had already been established well before they were created, and people already identified themselves in these terms. For the most part, this occurred during the colonial period. Many would say that the salience of ethnicity was a creation of the colonial administration and the way in which they understood native society and the ways they sought to categorise it for administrative purposes, reinforced for example, by the way in which data was collected for census purposes, and in the way that 'native representatives' were sought out.

As a result, when electoral politics came into being in the 1930s, the dominant axes of competition were already pre-set in ethnic rather than religious terms, although religion (and caste, region, etc) also came to play an important part of the sub-text. People in Jaffna identified themselves vis-a-vis the rest of the country as Tamils, and voted for Tamil parties that explicitly sought to represent the sectional interests of the Tamil ethnic group.⁸

In other cases, in contrast, there is little or no overlap between ethnic and religious identities: in Ghana, there are many Christians as well as Muslims among Northern ethnic groups, though Southerners are mainly Christian; in Latin America, most people, of all ethnicities, are Christian with some important subdivisions; in the Congo, Rwanda, Angola and Mozambique salient identity differences are ethnic and not religious. And at a global level, the major religions cover many ethnicities. Hence while the presumption might be that it would be easier to mobilise people for conflict where there is strong overlap in religious and ethnic identities, since there will be fewer interactions across ethnicity/religion (Blau 1977; Simmel and Simmel 1955) and both religious and ethnic identities may be called on, the effective global mobilisations (Christian historically; and Muslim today) as well as those in many contemporary civil conflicts (e.g. within the Congo) question this presumption. In the first category, people have been effectively mobilised under a single umbrella despite many ethnic differences; and in the second, people of the same religion have been mobilised into conflicting groups along ethnic lines.

⁷ A further group are Sri Lankan Muslims, who are considered a separate ethnic group and a separate religious group. They share the language of Tamils but have fought for separate classification as an ethnic group.

⁸ Rajesh Venugopal, CRISE Research Officer, personal communication, January 2009.

Yet even where the differences are not religious, religion may be used to justify mobilisation: for example, in Rwanda, Christians visionaries 'predicted' a blood bath and implicitly claimed that the Virgin Mary had approved it, while parts of the Church were actively complicit (Gourevitch 1998).

The relationship between both ethnicity and religion and politics is a complex one. In many contemporary interpretations, neither ethnicity nor religion is generally viewed as being centrally concerned with politics; ethnicity encompasses a way of life – language, customs, behaviour relating to every day living – while religion is interpreted as being primarily concerned with people's relationship with God.⁹ With this view, both may need a certain amount of conversion, or politicisation, to make them political instruments. Yet historically, there has been deep political involvement of both types of identity. In the case of ethnicity, colonial powers commonly politicised ethnicity by using ethnic difference in administrative processes, as shown above in the case of Sri Lanka; this applied in general to African colonial administrations, which have been argued to be the origin of some of the sharp contemporary ethnic distinctions (Ranger 1983); in addition, ethnic associations frequently emerged to protect a groups' resources and customs against other ethnic groups and/or against the state (Cohen 1969; Horowitz 1985; Ranger 1983). In the case of religion, the extensive influence and control of religious organisations over adherents' behaviour inevitably leads to politicisation, with religious organisations either collaborating with the state or coming into conflict with it; the deeply political role of religion is perhaps clearest where a particular religion is recognised as the state religion (in about a quarter of countries today) – in these cases it is impossible to differentiate between state and religion.¹⁰ Examples of the politicisation of religion abound: missionary activities in colonial societies and Islamic Caliphates; the Crusades; many civil wars, such as that in 16th and 19th-century Europe and 17th-century Britain. Nonetheless, since the prime purpose of religious organisation is not political, the extent of politicisation varies across organisations and situation.

In summary, both ethnicity and religion are widely shared identities, which may potentially be called on to mobilise for political purposes, including for violent conflict. Group categorisation is less formal and clear cut in the case of ethnicity and may therefore need more 'work' to become an effective source of mobilisation – but this depends on history; the activities of previous agents, and events, may have created strong group consciousness. In each case, strong horizontal inequalities and perceived favouritism or discrimination by the government is likely to enhance the salience of a particular identity, as shown in the Sri Lankan case. But it is important to reiterate that in a quite large number of cases, strong overlaps in the two types of identity may make classification of conflicts into either ethnic or religious types problematic.

Two features may help determine which identity is the salient one from the perspective of mobilisation where both form potential dividing lines: first, whether political favouritism or discrimination and socio-economic inequalities occur most strongly along ethnic or religious lines, since where there are strong inequalities and discrimination, this will tend to politicise the identity and encourage mobilisation. This issue will be investigated further in Section 4. Secondly, 'demographics' or the number and relative size of the groups, may influence how people mobilise. Where there is a large number of small groups (e.g. of different ethnicities), effective mobilisation along ethnic lines may prove difficult and some overarching identity may

⁹ Though the idea that religion is a personal matter rather than a social or political one is a recent Western conception (Deneulin and Bano 2009).

¹⁰ Of course, what it means in practice for a religion to be 'established' varies hugely.

be needed, which might be a new uniting ethnic identity, or a shared religious one. Taking this argument seriously, Iannacone and Berman (2006) have suggested that encouraging the multiplication of religious sects would help prevent religious.

2.2. Mobilising for conflict

Here I wish to differentiate those who actively mobilise and those who are mobilised. Both categories are rather loose. First, on the side of the mobilisers (or what, for shorthand, I shall call 'leaders') many people may start in a subordinate position (as 'mobilisees') but then take on leadership roles. Moreover, there are leaders at many levels: 'a leader can be defined as some semi-literate preacher or imam in a small village who might manage to win the confidence of ... a couple of dozen people, to a sheikh who commands the respect of potentially millions of people. Yet in the village where the fighting is happening the sheikh might not have much relevance, ensconced as he is in a large city mosque or headquarters'.¹¹ Secondly, on the side of the mobilisees (or 'followers'), there is a spectrum of mobilisation: at one extreme are the totally committed, the most committed being suicide fighters, followed by regular active agents of violence; but then there is a range of non-fighting supporters, including organisers, suppliers, families who provide active support for fighters and those who look on with passive approval (Justino 2008; Stern 2003). Without going into the nuances within each category, we might expect the so-called leaders and the followers to have somewhat different motivations.

2.2.1 Motives of leaders

On the side of the leaders, there are typically strong political motives (to gain power, or to avoid losing it) and there may also be immediate material motives (from illicit wartime activities), which may grow as mobilisation and violence develop. It seems clear that in most cases, declared ethnic or religious objectives are used instrumentally by leaders to gain support for these other objectives. Yet this leaves undetermined the question of whether leaders have intrinsic ethnic or religious motives and how strong they are, and whether this differs between ethnic and religious leaders. Below I try to analyse these questions briefly, but clearly more careful research is needed.

It is of course impossible to know true motives as what is said is inevitably part of the effort to mobilise followers, and consequently might be viewed purely instrumentally. Nonetheless, many rebel leaders take risks and, initially at least, suffer material losses. As a first approach, it is worth listening to what leaders say: here I draw first on some statements by ethnic leaders and then by religious ones.

First, is Frederick Fasehun, leader of the Odua People's Congress (OPC), an important Yoruba militia in Nigeria, drawing on material collected by Yvan Guichaoua (Guichaoua 2006). The OPC was founded in 1994 with explicitly ethnic motives. It was founded in reaction to the Nigerian military's annulment of the elections which had been won by a prominent Yoruba, Abiola, in 1993. Fasehun commented on the situation:

'It was then I decided to gather the youths who are quite able to flex their muscles because, if it was what is required, why not'. (Interview with Yvan Guichaoua, 02/06/05). He believed that 'The Yoruba are no longer considered disfavoured second-class citizens but have become enemies that

¹¹ Adam Higazi, CRISE DPhil student, personal communication.

must be hounded into exile, haunted into detention, humiliated, dehumanised, and marked to be wiped off the surface of Nigeria' (Fasehun 2002: 147).

The fundamental objectives of the OPC as laid out in its constitution are:

to identify with our historical and cultural origin with a view to reliving the glory of our past for the purpose of posterity; to educate and mobilise the descendants of Oduduwa for the purpose of the above; to integrate the aspirations and values of all the descendants of Oduduwa into a collective platform of an Oodua entity; to ... struggle for the protection of these interests; ... to further the progress of Oodua civilization by protection and promoting our value, mores and the intergenerational transmission of same (Human Rights Watch 2003: 4, quoted in Guichaoua 2006).

It is not possible to be sure, as Guichaoua points out, how far Fasehun genuinely believed in the ethnic-oriented ideas of the OPC, or simply thought (correctly) that they would be effective in mobilisation. However, it is clear that for him the path was a risky one with low immediate rewards in either money or security. Indeed, in 1996, he was arrested and it was in reaction to this that the movement became violent. As time went on, and the OPC's membership and its economic and criminal activities expanded, its leaders undoubtedly gained more material and status rewards, and the role of ethnicity in their motivation probably lessened (Guichaoua 2006). The origin of the OPC thus lay in attack on the Yoruba people from outside (the government), according to this account. This seems a common initial impetus, which gives the group more than purely instrumental status – if the identity is under attack then its preservation (and protection of members) becomes an important objective for group leaders as well as followers. In Rwanda, similarly, Hutu leaders feared loss of power as a result of attack particularly from the Tutsi rebels in Uganda.

Yet it is not possible to know whether the black propaganda used to mobilise people is believed by those who promulgate it, or merely a strategy to achieve power. In the case of the ethno-religious wars in the former Yugoslavia, most observers seem to believe that the leaders Milosevic and Tudjman 'cleverly ... appealed to the historical and cultural passions of their countrymen ... to further their own political and regional ambitions' (Daugherty 2004: 647).

On the religious side, one can find many statements by religious leaders of rebellious groups stating essentially that God requires them to promote his will and to eliminate evil. For example:

- 'Our way is one of radical combat against depravity'¹²; 'The Resistance is not led by commanders. It is directed by the tenets of Islam'¹³ (Spokespeople for the Hizbollah),
- 'In order to preserve our Christian heritage and race, it is our patriotic duty to overthrow the Antichrist government' (James Ellison, leader of a Christian Cult – the Covenant, the Sword and the Arm of the Lord, quoted in Stern

¹² 'Open Letter from the Party of God to the Disinherited of Lebanon and the World Revealing the Way and the Intentions which are their Own on the Occasion of the First Anniversary of Ragheb Harb, Symbol of the Islamic Resistance and Exemplary Martyr', issued by Hezbollah, Beirut, Lebanon, February 6, 1985, quoted by Hoffman 2006:91

¹³ Quoted in Jaber (2007: 23). quoted by Hoffman 2006: 91

2003: 18). Ellison told members that ‘Christians had turned away from old testament laws and were allowing enemies of Christ to rule the land’ (ibid: 17).

- ‘It is our duty to defend the land for the sake of God’ (Palestinian leader, in interview with Stern, ibid: 39).
- ‘The resistance is not led by commanders. It is directed by the tenets of Islam’ (Lebanese cleric, quoted in Hoffman 2006: 91).

The personal histories of many militant religious leaders indicate their devotion to the cause, and the limited personal rewards that some receive. Husain (2007) describes the career of Syed Qutb who became leader of the Muslim brotherhood in Egypt after Hassan al-Bann was assassinated in 1949. He developed intellectual foundations for the movement (‘Milestones’) while imprisoned (and greatly maltreated) in Egypt: he was hanged for this in 1966.

Many of the religious leaders come up from the ranks, starting as students and gradually rising to leadership positions – through their diligence and devotion. An example is Maulana Masood Azhar, a Pakistani, who started religious training when he was in his teens and spent six years in a radical seminary, graduating with distinction and becoming an imam; he joined the Harkat, a militant organisation, and was sent to a military training camp. He then opened a Harkat office and became a recruiter and fundraiser. He was imprisoned for a time by the Indian government, but was released under pressure from hijackers, after which he founded his own splinter group, recruiting volunteers for Jihads in Chechnya and Bosnia (Stern 2006: 194-5). While material rewards rose as he progressed (at least in terms of having body guards), they do not seem large, though there are undoubtedly more substantial status and psychological ones. The story seems to be fairly typical (Stern 2003).

Another example is the leadership of Temple Mount Faithful, Jewish extremists whose aim was to destroy the Muslim Noble Sanctuary in Jerusalem in order to build the Third Temple on the site of the previous two Temples. According to one of the leaders, Yoel Lerner, ‘the highest value for a Jew is not the preservation of human or even Jewish life. The highest value is doing what God wants you to do’ (ibid: 90). No material or political rewards were likely as a result of their activities. Indeed, Lerner spent some time in jail. Similar stories can be told of militant Christian leaders.

While both ethnic and religious leaders probably mostly use their respective identities instrumentally, for ethnic leaders this is possibly more often the prime motive. I say this for two reasons: first, because it appears that religious leaders typically emerge from a long personal history of religious devotion, while ethnic leaders seem sometimes to invent a belief in ethnic issues in order to assist them in power-seeking. In other words, among religious leaders, the religion seems to come first and power-seeking second, while the opposite seems to be true for ethnic leaders. And secondly, because the personal political rewards seem to be lower for religious leaders than for ethnic ones, though some religious leaders do gain status and some secure considerable economic rewards. Yet there is a spectrum in the attitudes of both religious and ethnic leaders. Some religious leaders receive considerable political and material rewards¹⁴; ‘Initially I was of the view that they are doing jihad, but now I believe that it is a business and people are earning wealth through it’ (Pakistan militant cited in Stern 2003: 216). And, on the ethnic side, Fashehum’s

¹⁴ According to one organiser of a militant Muslim group operating in Kashmir, the leaders live in mansions (Stern 2003: 213).

leadership emerged because he saw his group under threat and he did not gain great political rewards.

In sum, it seems that as far as leadership is concerned, there is often a strong element of instrumentality in both ethnicity and religion, possibly more so in the case of ethnicity than of religion, with the relative strength of motives varying according to context.

2.2.2 Motives of followers

The situation as far as the mobilisees are concerned is different. Both religious and ethnic supporters generally 'believe' in their cause. But the cause is very different in the two cases. In the religious case, the cause is given divine sanction, and the supporters believe they are doing God's will, supporting good and attacking evil, as is most evident in the case of suicide fighters.

Rapoport (1984) describes three historic examples of religious terrorism – the Hindu Thugs – prevalent in India from at least the 13th to the 19th century who killed almost randomly in order to please the God Kali and were responsible for half a million or so deaths; the Muslim assassins, operating in Syria and Persia from 1090-1275 – whose targets were religious or political leaders who had betrayed Islam; and the Jewish Zealots-Sicarii, who had a much briefer (25-year) history and who assassinated Jews and non-Jews during the 1st century AD/CE, hoping to generate a mass uprising against the Romans and to produce a cataclysm which would result in the coming of the Messiah. In each case, they had a transcendental purpose: in the case of the Thugs this was the entire purpose – to satisfy the requirements of Kali – and there seem to have been no contemporary political or economic objectives; in the case of the Assassins, while the aim was to purify Islam, there may have been some power motivation as well; in the case of the Zealots, the movement had both political and religious objectives but no material objectives, according to Rapoport.¹⁵

In each case, it appears that those who fought did so primarily because of their belief that this was God's will and they would be rewarded by God's approval, including in terms of their status in the afterlife.

There is abundant evidence of a similar nature from contemporary religious fighters:

- The head of a Christian militia group in Maluku, Indonesia, 'says that God made him a military commander. He saw Jesus Christ hovering over his head like a bird while he was in the midst of battle' (Stern 2003: 73).
- 'What is there to be afraid of. I pray for death every day...If I die in the jihad, I go to paradise. Allah will reward me' (member of Pakistani militant group, in interview with Stern, Stern 2003: 123).

¹⁵ For some reason Rapoport did not pick out a Christian group, but he clearly could have: for example, the Knights Templar, who were particularly active in the 11th and 12th centuries: '[A Templar Knight] is truly a fearless knight, and secure on every side, for his soul is protected by the armor of faith, just as his body is protected by the armor of steel. He is thus doubly-armed, and need fear neither demons nor men'. Bernard de Clairvaux, c. 1135, *De Laude Novae Militae – In Praise of the New Knighthood*, quoted in Wikipedia. In this case, there were not initially strong economic rewards. Many were killed in far-off lands in pursuit of their cause. Yet the movement as whole acquired considerable resources and also had strong political objectives.

For religious mobilisees, pleasing God and enjoying the benefits that follow from this appear to provide a major motive, and along with this goes a belief that the fight is one of good against evil. Each religion teaches the inferiority of non-adherents and conflict leaders make systematic efforts to enforce the good-versus-evil message. For example,

- The Christian supremacists in the US describe how the 'Zionist Occupied Government is killing our white babies through abortion. It is destroying white minds with its humanist teachings of evolution. In order to preserve our Christian heritage and race, it is our right to overthrow the antichrist government' (Stern 2003: 18).
- 'Our way is one of radical combat against depravity' (a communiqué from a Lebanese Shi'a militant group, cited in Hoffman 2006: 89).
- Non-adherents are referred to by derogatory terms such as *kaffir*, *goy*, *infidel*.

In addition, religious mobilisation, like ethnic, is often justified as being necessary defensively – to protect the religion against restrictions or suppression by others. For example, a leader of the Hezbollah in Lebanon stated that 'Islam is a defensive movement against those who perform violence' (cited in Hoffman 2006: 91). Again as with ethnic mobilisation, material motives also play a part; supporters are often drawn from the unemployed, or those with very low incomes; while they may not receive large wages, they usually are supplied with their basic needs and with material and psychological security (Iannaccone and Berman 2006; Stern 2003).

While religion seems to provide a ready-made justification for dividing the world into good (believers) and evil (non-believers), it would seem more difficult to find such a justification for dividing ethnic groups in this way. Drawing on social psychology, however, McCauley (2008) argues that identification with others is an intrinsic human characteristic and this forms the underlying psychological basis of adherence to ethnicity. He gives three reasons for the political power of ethnicity; people adhere to ethnic groups – those with similarities of various kinds – because they are 'easier to see', ethnic groups are then attributed an 'essence' (i.e. essentialised) which makes the divisions between the groups seem real, not constructed – this is more likely to occur the greater the 'similarity, proximity and common fate' which are seen as emanating from a common essence; finally, a person perceiving herself as a member of an ethnic group gains a sort of immortality, as the group goes on even if the individual doesn't. This last makes members feel that it is particularly important to ensure the survival (and culture) of the group. Religion can perform similar psychological functions (Seul 1999).

If ethnic mobilisation is to be justified morally, it requires not only strong identification with the particular group, but a belief that it is justifiable to attack people outside the group. Such justification can and is generated in two ways: one is by leaders convincing followers that members of other groups are inferior or evil ('rats' as Hitler termed the Jews; 'cockroaches, snakes' etc. as the Hutu described the Tutsi); the other (complementary) way is to generate the belief that the other groups are going to attack the mobilisees' own group, and survival (physical or cultural) depends on fighting them.

The Hutu leadership in Rwanda followed both strategies. There was a long-standing 'theory' of Tutsi conspiracy ('the bahima conspiracy' to kill off sufficient Hutu to ensure a Tutsi majority) (Hintjens 1999). In 1990, a journalist, Ngeze, published 'documents which purportedly "proved" that the Tutsi rebel movement was part of an

ancient Tutsi-supremacist conspiracy to subjugate Hutus in feudal bondage' (Gourevitch 1998: 86), listing Tutsi infiltration of public institutions. The article was financed by the government and distributed free to all mayors. In 1990 he published an article on 'The Hutu Ten Commandments': these included the proposition that all Tutsi women were agents and anyone who married one was a traitor; that every Tutsi was dishonest, and 'his only aim is the supremacy of the ethnic group'; Hutus should control all positions of power and unite against the common Tutsi enemy, spread Hutu ideology and avoid showing mercy to Tutsis (Gourevitch 1998; Hintjens 1999). Rumours were spread of RPF¹⁶ bombings of Kigali and plans to invade and kill all the Hutu elite (Hintjens 1999). In a famous speech in 1992, Leon Mugesera, a doctor and close friend of President Habyarimana and vice president of the MRND¹⁷, stated that 'we the people are obliged to take responsibility ourselves to wipe out this scum'. He stated that 'The law... mandated death to the "accomplices" of the "Cockroaches"' (Gourevitch 1998: 96). 'Massacres were invariably preceded by political "consciousness-raising" meetings at which local leaders, usually with a higher officer of the provincial or national government at their side, described Tutsis as devils – horns, hoofs and tails and all – and gave the order to kill them' (ibid: 94).

Leaders have to work at dehumanising the other, often preaching hate over many years, sometimes decades. Yet the audience frequently seems ready to receive the message – to believe that others are so inferior that their destruction is justified, often because of a long history of acculturation, and sometimes of conflict. There is also plentiful evidence of material and psychological rewards for ethnic fighters, including wages, security and a variety of services (Guichaoua 2007; Iannaccone and Berman 2006; Keen 1998; Keen and International Peace Academy 2005). But such rewards are not always present – for example, in the Rwandan slaughter.

2.3 Organisation, training and support

Effective mobilisation for conflict requires organisation, training and support, and these are generated by both religious and ethnic organisations.

In formal religions, existing organisations centred on churches, mosques, synagogues or temples can be drawn on, though they may need to be taken over and their course changed from purely religious to more political functions. Husain (2007) provides a vivid case study of the way some mosques in London have been used in this way¹⁸. New organisations may also emerge.

In general, ethnic associations are less prevalent and may be formed for specific mobilisations. For example, in the case of Côte d'Ivoire, the rebellion of 19 September 2002 led to the emergence of militant pro-government youth organisations, known as the Alliance des Jeunes Patriotes pour le Sursaut National or simply the Jeunes Patriotes (Young Patriots). While the Young Patriots initially were able to mobilise a wide cross-section of the population in Abidjan they soon developed into urban militia forces under the control of the regime, consisting almost exclusively of people from the southwestern part of the country (i.e. the home region

¹⁶ Rwandan Patriotic Front, Tutsi rebels based in Uganda.

¹⁷ Mouvement Républicain National pour la Démocratie et le Développement, the Hutu-dominated party of President Habyarimana.

¹⁸ Though it has been claimed that he is pursuing a political agenda and is not always accurate. Noman Hanif 2007. 'Ex-Islamist Inc: Fabricating a Link Between Hizb-ut-Tahrir and Terrorism'. <http://liberationparty.blogspot.com/2007/07/manufacturing-terrorism-case-against.html>

of President Laurent Gbagbo) (Marshall-Fratani 2006).¹⁹ The formation of specialised ethnic associations may, indeed, be one of the early signs of impending mobilisation. In Rwanda, the militias developed out of local football clubs for children and associations of the unemployed (Reyntjens 1995, cited in Hintjens 1999). Among the most active of the killers, the *interhammwe* apparently started as rural self-help associations, 'much praised by donors' (Hintjens 1999: 286).

Training is one of the functions of such organisations. Where the state sponsors one side, this is provided officially or semi-officially (as in Sudan; Cote d'Ivoire; Rwanda – Hintjens 1999). Rebels may be trained with overseas support; in the Cold War this was supplied by one side or other. For example, as is well known, the Taliban initially received training and supplies from the U.S., while rebels in Central America received support from the USSR and Cuba. Post-Cold war, it seems that religious organisations are in a stronger position than ethnic ones to secure external support. Islamic organisations receive financial support from Middle Eastern countries and some from European countries, and there is also international support for training. (Stern 2003; Hoffman 2006). In central Nigeria, Christians received supported from the US and Muslims from the Middle East (Last 2007). Within a country, support also comes from co-religionists (Diprose forthcoming). Ethnic groups generally have a narrower basis for support; however, where there is a big diaspora this can produce significant support, such as from the Tamils to the Sri Lankan LTTE. Moreover, some ethnic groups have ties to particular Western governments (e.g. the Hutus to France), which can lead to financial and technical assistance and arms.

Contrasting three minority separatist movements in Southeast Asia, May (1992) found that Islamic identity provided a source of both financial and political support in Thailand, among the Patani, and for the Moro in the Philippines. In contrast, however, although the struggle was one of Christians versus others, Christianity did not provide a unifying identity in West Papua, Indonesia, as the struggles were presented in cultural not religious terms and only limited Christian support was provided. They received only 'sympathy and occasional moral support' from Irianese emigrants and from a variety of human rights groups. (May 1992: 409).

Preliminary conclusions, then, are that religious groups have more ready-made organisational structures, while ethnic groups have to work harder at creating them. And, for the most part, religious groups are likely to find it easier to get outside support than ethnic groups.

3. Implications for the nature of conflicts

Here I shall consider two questions:

1. Are there reasons to expect more religious than ethnic conflicts, for a given socio-economic situation?
2. Are there reasons to expect the conflicts to be 'worse' – i.e. to last longer and involve more deaths and destruction?

1. Are there reasons to expect more religious than ethnic conflicts, for a given socio-economic situation?

There are many more ethnicities than religions in the world, even allowing for religious sects, so there would seem to be more potential for ethnic than religious conflict. But only a very small proportion of potential ethnic conflicts (taking all

¹⁹ Also Arnim Langer, CRISE Research Officer, personal communication.

situations where ethnicities live side-by-side as potential) turn into actual conflicts (Fearon and Laitin 1996), so a higher conversion rate for religious conflicts (from potential to actual) could compensate for this. There are reasons for expecting a higher conversion rate – the ready-made organisational apparatus religions have, the impact of divine sanction on mobilisation, and the external support available – all of which might generate more religious than ethnic conflict. On the other hand, the political and material gains for participants may be less, and there are many situations where there are no significant religious differences so any conflict is bound to be ethnic or geographic.

External events and the global habitus play a role too, so one might expect a change in the balance of religious as against ethnic conflicts over time in the light of such global changes. To summarise very large changes very briefly, there have been many major changes in the global context which affect the nature of salient identities and their use for mobilisation. Among the relevant changes are the nationalist movements of 19th-century Europe and colonial societies in both 19th and 20th centuries; the emergence and then the collapse of socialism as an ideal; a general move in the intellectual ethos from the enlightenment and modernism to post-modernism, and along with this a reaction against prevailing secularism towards religious and ethnic revival. Increased global and national communications associated with modern technology have been argued to increase ethnic awareness (Connor 1972). It has also been widely argued, as noted earlier, that the end of the Cold War brought less emphasis on ideology and class and more on ethnicity and religion (especially by Huntington 1996, 2002). The nationalist ideology had mixed implications for the role of ethnicity. On the one hand, nationalist movements typically struggled to develop national identities, subsuming or eliminating local identities. On the other, the same philosophy that justified nationalism could also justify sub-national 'nationalisms' (Connor 1972)²⁰. Moreover, the suppression of subnational identities left an undergrowth of ethnicities, ready to be revived when conditions became ripe, as we see clearly in the case of the former Yugoslavia. Finally, the worldwide religious revival, itself partly a reaction to the secular material culture embodied in Western capitalism, as well as to the sharp horizontal inequalities between and within countries in which Muslims are systematically relatively deprived (Stewart 2008a), was a cause (as well as a consequence) of religious mobilisation, providing a global network of support for those who led religious groups.

Reynal-Querol has argued that, *ceteris paribus*, there are likely to be more religious than ethnic conflicts: 'religiously divided societies are more prone to intense conflict than countries where people have conflicting claims to resources based on interest groups or language divisions... because religious identity is fixed and non-negotiable. Disputes among identity groups based on their religion are particularly difficult to negotiate, raising the odds of violence' (Reynal-Querol 2002: 29). She states that religious differences are sharper, firstly because the identity is exclusive: a person can be half-French and half-Saudi but not half-Muslim, half-Christian; a person can have two languages but only one religion. And secondly, because religious differences imply different ways of understanding the world. But counter-arguments are possible: religious conversion is possible, whereas ethnic conversion is usually not; and ethnic differences, too, may imply different ways of seeing the world. In fact, there is a large amount of common perceptions and beliefs in the great religions.

²⁰ '...in its pristine form, the doctrine [self-determination of nations] makes ethnicity the ultimate measure of political legitimacy, by holding that any self-differentiating people, simply because it *is* a people, has the right, should it so desire, to rule itself' (Connor 1972: 331).

Reynal-Querol (2002) provides empirical results supporting her view that religious differences (measured as religious polarisation) tend to be associated with a higher incidence of conflict than ethnic differences (measured by linguistic differences), while fractionalisation of either kind has no effect. However, the findings of Montalvo and Reynal-Querol (2005) differ: they find ethnic polarisation consistently raises the risk of conflict, but religious polarisation only does so (positively) when religious fractionalisation (which has a negative sign) is also included. They cite the contrast between Korea and Sri Lanka as examples. They argue that this is because higher religious fractionalisation increases coordination problems. While both studies take into account many of the usual factors associated with conflict (per capita income, level of education, population size, the share of primary exports), they do not include socio-economic horizontal inequality. However, Reynal-Querol (2002) does have a measure for political inclusiveness (assessed by the type of political system), and she finds that more inclusive democracies (which presumably are ones with lower political horizontal inequalities) reduce the propensity for religiously polarised societies to have civil war.

In summary, then, it is not possible to answer the question *a priori* and the limited empirical evidence is ambiguous. It seems that conflicts are organised along ethnic or religious lines broadly according to the effectiveness of so doing from the point of view of mobilising support of both people and finance. It was argued earlier that this is likely to vary according to the nature of horizontal inequalities among groups (or potential grievances) and to the demographics of the situation. For example, in the cases cited earlier in Southeast Asia, Islam provided a unifying identity in both Thailand and the Philippines, whereas multiple ethnicities meant this would have been less effective (May 1992a).

2. Are there reasons to expect religious or ethnic conflicts to be 'worse' – i.e. to involve more deaths and destruction and to last longer?

Reynal-Querol claims that religious conflicts are likely to be fiercer and on a larger scale than ethnic ones. Grew also argues that 'religious beliefs have always been those that people were most willing to sacrifice, fight, and die – and live – for' (Grew 1997: 20, cited in Nordås 2007). Equally, Hoffman argues that religious conflicts result in many more deaths than other types – although he is writing about 'terrorist incidents' rather than all conflicts. His reasons are, first, the transcendental nature of such conflicts – as noted earlier he claims that 'its perpetrators ... often disregard the political moral, or practical constraints that may affect other terrorists' (Hoffman 2006: 88). He argues that religious terrorists 'often seek the elimination of broadly defined categories of enemies' whereas secular terrorists 'rarely attempt indiscriminate killing on a truly massive scale because such tactics are not consonant with their political aims' (ibid). Finally, he argues that secular terrorists aim to correct a 'flaw' in a basically good system or 'as a means to foment the creation of a new system' but religious terrorists 'seek fundamental changes... This sense of alienation also enables the religious terrorist to contemplate far more destructive and deadly types of terrorism' (ibid: 89).

Hoffman presents two types of evidence for his view that religious conflicts are more deadly: first, a list of terrorist incidents between 1992 and 1998 which he claims show that 'terrorism motivated in whole or in part by religious imperatives has often led to more intense acts of violence that have produced considerably higher levels of fatalities than the relatively more discriminating and less lethal incidents of terrorist violence perpetrated by secular terrorist organisations' (ibid: 88). And secondly, he notes that the proportion of total terrorist deaths accounted for by Shi'a terrorists in the 1980s and al Qaeda from 1998-2004 far exceed the proportion of incidents. Yet

Lacina (2006) finds no evidence that the total battle deaths in civil wars, 1946-2002, were significantly more, the greater either religious or ethnic polarisation.

Moving from what Hoffman defines as terrorism, to the worst incidents of mass killings, an overview of cases with very high death rates (with 200,000 or more deaths) since 1956 shows ethnic incidents of these mass lethal events being far the most pervasive; there is no single case of religion alone, but religion combined with ethnicity/nationality played a role in four cases out of the 16 (Table 1). The very worst cases – over 1 million deaths – include four with no religious element (Pakistan, Cambodia, Rwanda, the Congo) and three with some religious motivation (Bosnia, Sudan and Iraq/Iran). These facts make nonsense of Hoffman's claims about the 'moral or practical constraints' of non-religious fighters.

Table 1: Large-scale killing episodes, accounting for 200,000 deaths or more, since 1956

Country	Date	Est. killed	Nature of killing
Sudan	1956-72	400-600,000	Ethnic and religious
South Vietnam	1965-75	400-500,000	Ideology
Indonesia	1965-66	500-1,000,000	Ideology and ethnic
China	1965-75	400-850,000	Ideology
Guatemala	1978-96	60-200,000	Ethnic and ideology
Pakistan	1971	1,000-3,000,000	Political
Uganda	1972-79	50-400,000	Ethnic and political
Angola	1975-2001	500,000	Ethnic and ideology
Cambodia	1975-79	1,900 -3,500,000	Ethnic and class
Afghanistan	1978-92	1,800,000	Ideology
Uganda	1980-1986	200-500,000	Ethnic and political
Sudan	1983+	2,000,000+	Ethnic and religious
Iraq/Iran war	1980-88	438-1,300,000	Religion and nationalism
Bosnia	1992-95	225,000	Ethnic and religious
Rwanda	1994	500-1,000,000	Ethnic
Congo	1998-2004	5,400,000	Ethnic and political


Source: Harff (2003), apart from Congo: IRC ([http://www.theirc.org/special-report/congo-forgotten-
crisis.html?gclid=CIT44_Gs4ZcCFUoa3godghl2CQ](http://www.theirc.org/special-report/congo-forgotten-
crisis.html?gclid=CIT44_Gs4ZcCFUoa3godghl2CQ)); and Iraq/Iran War: Wikipedia.

On this evidence, it would seem that of large-scale events over these years, ethnic conflicts were the deadlier.

4. What can we learn from CRISE perceptions surveys on these issues?

CRISE perceptions surveys allow further investigation of one important issue considered above: what determines the nature of mobilisation – whether it is according to religion or ethnicity, where both present possibilities. In four countries surveyed – Ghana, Nigeria, Indonesia and Malaysia – there are both religious and ethnic divisions, and political mobilisation might potentially be rooted in either identity. There are also quite severe socio-economic and political horizontal inequalities in each country, whether assessed by ethnic group or by religion (evidence is provided by Langer et al. 2007; Mustapha 2005; Sundaram 2001; Khoo 2001). Around 600 questionnaires were administered in two or three sites in each country.

The religious composition of the sample in each country is shown in Figure 1.




As can be seen from Figure 1, there is considerable variation in religious composition across countries and among areas within each country²¹. Ghana is predominantly Christian in all areas, but with significant Muslim minorities, except in Ho; the other three countries are more mixed. Two of the sites in Nigeria were mainly Christian but with substantial Muslim minorities, while one was almost entirely Muslim (Lagos-Ajegunle); in Malaysia all three areas were mixed, between Muslims and (mainly) Buddhists, but with significant Hindu minorities and some Christians. The Indonesian sites were fairly evenly divided between Hindus and Muslims. Ho in Ghana and Kukawa in Nigeria are virtually homogeneous religiously, one Christian the other Muslim.

Turning to ethnic composition (Figures 2a-2e), in the two West African countries there were four major groups – Akan, Ewe, Ga-Adangme and Mole-Dagbani in Ghana, with Akan dominating the sample as a whole (at over 50 per cent); and Yoruba, Igbo, Hausa/Fulani and Kanuri in Nigeria, with Yoruba dominating at 41 per cent; and three in Malaysia – Chinese, Malay and Indian – with Malays the largest group (at 45 per cent). The Indonesian sites stood out in this respect: each had four largish groups and then numerous small ones (32 different identities were identified altogether). Two of Ghana's three survey sites were dominated by one group – Akan in Kumasi who formed 78 per cent of respondents and Ewe in Ho, who formed 80 per cent – while the other site was much more mixed. In Nigeria, just one site was dominated by a single group – Lagos-island with 87 per cent Yoruba – and the other two sites were mixed. In Malaysia and Indonesia each of the sites had a fair balance of different identities.

²¹ The data are derived from respondents' own answers to the question of what their religious affiliation and ethnic group was.


Figure 2: Ethnic composition of respondents



The sample was not intended to be nationally representative, and the data on both religion and ethnicity indicates that indeed it is not: Muslims form a much higher proportion of the national population in Malaysia, Indonesia and Ghana than in the sample. In terms of ethnicity, Malays form a much larger proportion of the total Malaysian population than the 45 per cent of our sample (about two-thirds, including all 'sons of the soil'); in Ghana, the Akan, Ewe and Ga-Adangme are overrepresented and the Mole-Dagbani underrepresented compared with national estimate; in Nigeria, likewise, some are overrepresented (Yoruba, Ewe and Kanuri) and some underrepresented (Hausa-Fulani); and in Indonesia, the Javanese are seriously underrepresented and the Bugis overrepresented. None of this is surprising given the choice of sites and the fact that different ethnicities are regionally concentrated.

A series of questions provided indications of the relative salience of religion and ethnicity as identities. Respondents reported that religion was a very important aspect of their identity everywhere (Figure 3). Over 70 per cent of the sample put this as one of their three most important identities in Ghana, Nigeria and Malaysia. Only in Indonesia, did it fall to just under 50 per cent. Ethnicity was mentioned by

substantially fewer people than religion in West Africa; and by fewer in Southeast Asia, except for Poso in Indonesia, where it was mentioned by slightly more people than religion. Since people may have felt that saying that their language or region of origin was important was equivalent to saying ethnicity was important we devised a measure of 'broad ethnicity' which included all respondents who mentioned either ethnicity or language or region of origin.²² With this broad definition, ethnicity was mentioned by more people than religion in Lagos-Ajengunle, Penang and both sites in Indonesia – but still by fewer people in all the Ghana sites, two of the Nigeria sites and one of the Malaysian ones. For the purpose of analysing mobilisation, the narrow definition seems more relevant, however, as it indicates that it was ethnicity as such that people immediately thought of as significant.




Religion was a more important identity for those who were Muslim than those who were Christian, Hindu or Buddhist. It was one of the three most important identities for 89 per cent of Nigerian Muslims, 92 per cent of Ghanaian Muslims, 63 per cent of Indonesian Muslims and 94 per cent of Malaysian Muslims, whereas for Christians the proportion saying religion was among the three most important aspects of their identity was 60 per cent, 65 per cent and 35 per cent for Nigeria, Ghana and Indonesia respectively.

A further indication of the personal importance of religion was that the rate of marriages across religions was less than the rate of marriages across ethnicity in all countries except Malaysia, where both were very low (2.1 per cent across ethnicity; 2.5 per cent across religion). In Ghana there were 25 per cent cross-ethnic marriages, but just 10 per cent across religion (which may well have included marriages across different types of Christianity as well as between Christians and Muslims), and in Nigeria, 10 per cent and 5 per cent respectively. Consistent with

²² If they mentioned more than one of these, they were counted just once as mentioning broad ethnicity.

this finding, objections to cross-religious marriages substantially outweighed objections to cross-ethnic marriages in almost all places (Figure 4). The one exception was Malaysia, where objections to interethnic marriage were almost as great as objections to interreligious marriages.

From this data, one might expect religious mobilisation rather than ethnic in these countries. Yet other data tell a different story.



In many respects there was little difference between religious and ethnic identity. For example, in three countries (Ghana, Nigeria and Indonesia) there were more social contacts within the religious group than within the ethnic group but the opposite was true in Malaysia (Table 2). The striking fact is the very high proportion of ‘in-group’ contacts, whether religious or ethnic. However, this was clearly a function of where people lived; in Ho for example which is almost entirely Christian it is unavoidable that most social contact would be among Christians. In addition, in all countries the great majority had no problems about working with others from different ethnic or religious groups and there was little difference between cross-ethnic and cross-religious work situations (Table 3). The highest proportions of people who were *not* comfortable working with others were in Kukawa in Nigeria (which is a totally Muslim area), with respect to religion.

Table 2: % whose contacts were half or more from same group


	Ghana*	Nigeria	Indonesia	Malaysia
Ethnic group	87.7	63.3	61.8	83.7
Religious group	95.5	70.9	76.0	78.7

*This question was asked rather differently in Ghana, so comparison across countries may not be legitimate.

Table 3: % not comfortable working with other groups

	Ghana			Nigeria			Malaysia		Indonesia	
	Accra	Ho	Kumasi	Lagos-A	Lagos-I	Kukawa	Penang	Kuantan	Donggala	Posso
Ethnic group	2.6	0	1.2	2.5	1.0	4.5	6.7	11.8	1.0	1.3
Religious group	3.3	3.3	1.7	4.6	2.5	19	5.5	12.2	1.3	5.0

When asked whether their views of other religions/ethnic groups had improved or worsened, the vast majority said they had either improved or remained unchanged, with similar proportions in relation to religion and ethnicity. Again, Malaysian respondents stood out with significantly higher proportions saying that their view of other religious or ethnic groups had worsened, but with little difference as between the ethnic or religious classification.




However, when asked whether the *salience* of ethnicity/religion had changed in recent years, there were marked differences across locations (Figure 5). In both Nigeria and Malaysia, many more people thought the salience of both religion and ethnicity had increased, with more pointing to ethnicity in Nigeria and more to religion in Malaysia. In the other two countries, different results obtained according to location. In each case, a high proportion of respondents in one location (Ho in Ghana; Posso in Indonesia) felt that the salience of identities had increased, with respect to religion but not ethnicity in the case of Posso, and predominantly ethnicity in the case of Ho.

However, a more systematic difference emerged in relation to whether people perceived that ethnicity and religion affected their chances of getting job, contracts, education etc. (Figure 6). In general, people perceived ethnicity as more important than religion in the allocation of government and private sector jobs, contracts and services, with the most marked differences between the two in Nigeria and Malaysia – the two countries where policies do indeed allocate government jobs and contracts to some extent according to ethnicity. But even in Ghana and Indonesia, where there is no explicit policy in this respect, more people think government jobs and contracts are allocated according to ethnicity than by religion. In Ghana 35 per cent and in Indonesia 28 per cent overall believe government jobs are allocated according to ethnicity. Housing is another area where there is a strong perception that background affects chances,

especially in Ghana and Malaysia. People across the board think that getting access to education and public services is less affected by background, but again ethnic background is regarded as more relevant than religious. Once again Posso stands out: it is the one area where religion is regarded as a more important factor influencing chances than ethnicity.

If one differentiates among respondents according to their own ethnic or religious background, one finds (not unexpectedly) that it is 'opposition' groups that are more negative about other groups, and are more likely to state that their chances are affected by their background. For example, 49 per cent of Ewe in Ghana (then broadly the opposition group) believed that the salience of ethnicity had increased, but only 19 per cent of Akan (the group which dominated the government) thought this; and 49% of Ewe thought ethnic background affected the chance of getting government jobs, compared with 29% of Akan. Similarly, substantially more Yoruba and Igbo in Nigeria thought ethnicity affected chances than the more politically dominant Hausa-Fulani. In Malaysia, a very high proportion of those of Chinese or Indian origin (over 70 per cent) thought the government favoured certain groups compared with 31 per cent of Malays.



Where ethnicity is perceived to count more than religion in governmental allocation of economic and social benefits, one might expect ethnicity to play a more *political* role, including in terms of conflict mobilisation, despite the fact that religion seems more important in people's own view of themselves.

Responses on voting patterns allow further investigation of this issue. Asked whether they would vote for candidates from different groups, every group showed a preference for their own group as against others and prejudice against particular groups. In West Africa, the ethnic voting preferences and prejudices seemed to be stronger than religious ones, but in Southeast Asia, religious prejudice – particularly by Christians against voting for Muslims – were somewhat stronger than the ethnic prejudices. This is consistent with the differences in views about allocation of jobs etc. In more detail:

- In Ghana, ethnic voting showed up in the tendency for the Akan and the Mole-Dagbani not to vote for the Ewe; there was no apparent religious discrimination, but Muslims were more likely to favour other Muslims.
- In Nigeria, ethnic voting preferences seemed to be stronger, particularly with the Yoruba and Igbo against the Northern Hausa-Fulani, and the Hausa-Fulani against the Yoruba, plus a strong preference for their own group among the Yoruba, Igbo and Fulani. Religious discrimination or favouritism was mild among Muslims, but strong (against Muslims) among Christians, although no stronger than the ethnic prejudice of the Yoruba.
- In Indonesia, there was some ethnic preference and prejudice, but the strongest prejudice was shown by Christians against Muslims.
- Malaysia showed the strongest racial and religious preferences and prejudices: while the Malays (and Muslims) showed only mild racial or religious voting preferences, there was a strong anti-Malay and anti-Islam preference expressed by both the Chinese and Indians. The data indicates that religious prejudices were larger than racial ones.

Table 4: Proportion who would vote for a particular group compared with their overall voting ratio

4a: Ghana	Akan	Ewe	Mole-Dagbani	Christian	Islam
Akan	1.046	0.843	1.002		
Ewe	0.977	1.060	0.992		
Mole-Dagbani	1.001	0.930	1.062		
Christian				0.994	0.999
Muslim				0.987	1.147

4b. Nigeria	Yoruba	Igbo	Hausa-Fulani	Christian	Islam
Yoruba	1.322	1.137	0.657		
Igbo	1.061	1.789	0.640		
Hausa	0.899	1.048	1.156		
Fulani	0.801	1.003	1.296		
Christian				1.379	0.747
Muslim				0.923	1.123


4c. Indonesia	Pamona	Lowland Kaili	Javanese	Islam	Christian
Pamona	1.097	0.814	0.910		
Kaili	0.852	1.026	1.009		
Gorontalo	0.881	0.954	1.044		
Minahasa	1.011	0.837	1.010		
Bugis	0.843				
Javanese	0.878	0.921	1.069		
Balinese	0.984	0.838	0.936		
Islam				1.029	0.964
Christian				0.740	1.095

4d. Malaysia	Malay	Chinese	Indian	Islam	Buddhist	Hindu
Malay	1.080	0.903	1.029			
Chinese	0.603	1.307	1.281			
Indian	0.625	1.257	1.419			
Muslim				1.078	0.892	1.055
Christian				0.517	1.385	1.363
Buddhist				0.547	1.382	1.292
Hindu				0.573	1.284	1.499

Voting intentions tell us about one aspect of (non-violent) mobilisation. In order to try and assess propensity to violent mobilisation, respondents were asked a series of questions about their attitudes to violence. Almost all agreed that 'violence should

never be used'. However, as shown below (Figure 7) a substantial proportion also agreed that 'sometimes violence is the only way to be heard'.

It is of interest that 'peaceful' Ghana shows among the highest agreement with this statement, and Nigeria, which has suffered periodically from violence, the least agreement – which could be a consequence of having seen the results of violence or part of a 'politically correct' response. We find no systematic differences between the attitudes of those who mention religion as one of their three most important identities and those who mention ethnicity, though we do find the highest approval among those mentioning religion in Posso where there has been religious violence.



From this evidence one would expect more ethnic mobilisation in West Africa, but that in Southeast Asia religious mobilisation, especially by Christians against Muslims, might be more prevalent. This is broadly supported by events. In Ghana, there has been no serious violent mobilisation at a national level²³, but political parties and voting patterns broadly follow ethnic lines (Langer 2009). In Nigeria, at a national level, there is broad ethnic voting, although the strong overlap between ethnicity and religion makes it difficult to differentiate the two (Afro-barometer surveys; Oyediran 1979; Aborisade and Mundt 2001). Moreover, as noted earlier, the militia organisations are organised on ethnic lines. In terms of violent events, the Biafran war had an ethnic and regional, not a religious, basis, while violence in the Niger Delta is led by local ethnic groups, protesting about the way the oil resources are used – it has no religious basis. In Kano and the Middle Belt, however, violent

²³ With the exception of the 'guinea fowl war' in Northern Ghana, 1994-5 (see Jönsson 2007).

conflicts have been organised along three tightly overlapping dimensions (settlers and indigenes, and ethnic and religious differences, with religion dominating as the organising element). These areas were not covered by the surveys cited above. But a similar survey was conducted in Kano, where there was serious violent conflict in 2004 (Ehrhardt 2007 and personal communication from David Ehrhardt); it showed, first, that (as with the other surveys), religion was by far the most salient identity, declared by over 90 per cent of respondents to be one of their most important identities, while language (taken as a proxy for ethnicity) was included by just over 40 per cent. But in contrast to the Nigerian surveys cited above (Figure 6), religion was viewed as a more important factor absolutely and relative to ethnicity in political allocations. For example, in Kano City, in 2006, 51 per cent thought religion affected the chances of getting a government job, compared with 59 per cent who thought ethnicity did. By 2008, there was a much less marked view that there was government favouritism in either dimension, but religious favouritism outpaced ethnic, at 31 per cent compared with 23 per cent.

Turning to Southeast Asia, in Posso, the violent conflict did have strong religious dimensions (Brown 1994; Brown et al. 2005). This is consistent with the exceptional results for Posso in our survey, which indicated that people felt religious background was more important than ethnic in determining jobs, contracts etc, in contrast to all other areas surveyed. Since our survey, however, followed the violence (as did the Kano survey), the results, in each case, could be the outcome of this violence, not its cause. In Malaysia, where respondents gave ethnicity as most important, but religion as almost as important as ethnicity in one area, and also important for over 30 per cent of respondents in the other, in the allocation of government jobs and contracts (Figure 6), political mobilisation has followed strongly overlapping religious and ethnic dimensions (Brown 1994; Sundaram 2001; Khoo 2001).

Earlier, it was hypothesised that the demographic situation might also affect the way people mobilise. This too receives some support from these surveys, since the Indonesian sites show many more ethnic identities than elsewhere, whereas religious identities are virtually bimodal (Figures 1, 2d and 2e).

In conclusion, the evidence from these surveys suggests that it is not the identity that is most important to people from a *personal* perspective that necessarily forms the basis of mobilisation. Rather it is the one that it is perceived as being important from the point of view of the allocation of government resources. This supports the view that the identity that is adopted is determined largely instrumentally, and is a matter of resources and politics, rather than a matter of deep primordial beliefs. But the existence of strong identities provides the context in which such identities can be used for mobilisation.

5. Conclusions

The paper has explored differences and similarities between the use of religion and ethnicity as mobilising identities, both by drawing on existing literature and by analysing some results of surveys of perceptions in four multiethnic and multireligious countries. The review in the first three sections of this paper suggested both similarities and differences in how ethnicity and religion ‘work’ in terms of mobilising people for conflict. The paper takes the view that while the underlying causes of conflict generally arise from a combination of conflicts over control of resources and resentments about state failures and horizontal inequalities, in most conflicts shared identities among those who fight or support the fighting are important as a way of unifying and motivating people and of creating trust among participants. Both religious and ethnic identities play this role. In many conflicts, indeed, where there

are overlapping religious and ethnic identities, each may reinforce the other, and it is not always clear which is the dominant one, and this can change over time. But in other conflicts, one or the other identity is clearly dominant. Both identities work instrumentally, with leaders using the identity to differentiate their supporters from others, and to identify the others as evil and inferior.

There do seem to be some differences, however. First, while both identities are clearly used instrumentally by leaders to mobilise people, historical analysis and interviews suggest that religious leaders have a stronger belief in their cause than ethnic leaders, and that the latter primarily *use* rather than *believe in* the identities. Secondly, both types of leader need to convince followers of the importance of the cause and the righteousness of killing for it. In both cases, this needs considerable work, which may be carried out over a long historical period preceding violence. This work consists in preaching the inferiority of the other and, importantly, that the other threatens the group, convincing people, often by invented incidents, that preservation of the group requires an attack on the other. In the case of religion, texts can be interpreted or reinterpreted to achieve this objective. In the case of ethnicity, there is generally no such text to be called on, and here specific works have to be produced, and promulgated by speeches and the media. Religion generally has an organisational advantage, with existing religious organisations ready made, but they need conversion towards a mobilising objective; ethnic associations also often exist historically, but may be less formal or may need to be formed. Religious movements may also find it easier to call on outside resources, from others sharing the religion. However, outside support comes for some ethnic wars, from the same or similar groups (as in the Congo) or from external powers seeking to improve their own position.

Participants (called 'followers' here) often have material and political motives, but in both cases, they also appear to have strong primordial beliefs in their *essential* differences. In particular cases, this seems to be the result of a history of competition, conflict and propaganda, with education (parental, informal and formal) playing a major role. Yet it seems people are surprisingly easy to convince about their 'essential' differences, possibly because of a deep human need to belong.

Although some authors have predicted that religion is likely to lead to more, and more deadly, conflicts than ethnicity, this is not supported by the (limited) evidence. Indeed, there have been more very large-scale episodes associated with ethnicity than with religion over the past 60 years.

In many situations where groups differ in both religion and in ethnicity, there is some 'choice' as to which is used for mobilisation. The paper has suggested that two factors influence which is chosen: first, which identity is used (or believed to be used) politically in the allocation of resources; and secondly, what the demographic situation is, with the mobilising identity being one that unites a large and effective group. The survey material supported the first view, showing that mobilisation occurred behind the identity which was thought to affect people's material chances of securing government jobs, contracts etc., rather than behind the identity that appeared to mean most to the people. It also lent some support to the second hypothesis since religious identity was used for conflict in Posso, where there were multiple ethnic identities. However, the Posso story is also consistent with the first explanation.

Some policy implications for conflict prevention follow from the analysis and conclusions of this paper. The first priority remains the need to correct the root causes – i.e. the inequalities, unemployment, poverty and mismanagement of natural

resources that so often underlie conflicts. It is the existence of these that lead to the politicisation of identities. But beyond that, the paper suggests that there could be a role for policy in breaking the links between underlying root causes and actual mobilisation. These links include the creation and accentuation of identities of a group itself and of others; and the organisation, training and financing of those who fight. These are real events which take place over a long time; the first occur via education, writing, the media etc, in a process which Akindès calls 'the marketing of identities'(Akindès 2007). The second generally take place in a shorter time period, but are more palpable and easier to detect.

Preventative policy, both by outsiders and by local decision-makers, including central and local governments and civil society, includes in-depth monitoring of developments and then developing offsetting action. In most conflicts, both religious and ethnic, there are many warning signs, often recorded by independent observers, frequently ignored by decision-makers for a variety of reasons. One is that the government itself is often deeply implicated. The processes are similar for religious and ethnic conflicts, but the location and precise nature of conflict-creating activities differ. One major difference in transmission mechanisms between religious and ethnic conflicts is the role of external agents in all aspects of conflict creation – that of formation of salient identities, and the provision of a variety of types of support. As noted above, both may have external support, but religious groups tend to have more extensive ones. The external link gives a potential role for outsiders in breaking some parts of the transmission process – as occurred for example, in relation to US Irish connections with the Northern Ireland Catholics (Dudley and Lloyd 2006).

This paper is based on incomplete evidence. It thus presents a research agenda, rather than definitive conclusions. Research questions that need further work, include:

1. What is the statistical evidence on the prevalence of religious, ethnic or ideological conflicts, and conflicts which 'combine' more than one element over time?
2. Is there evidence that for the same socio-economic and political causes, there are more or fewer religious or ethnic conflicts?
3. Is there statistical evidence for the conflicts differing in terms of intensity (length; number of deaths)?
4. Is there evidence of differences in external support according to the nature of the conflict?
5. Can one discern leaders' 'true' motivations: the balance of identity/ideology, and instrumental reasons and material reasons?
6. Can one discern the balance of reasons (notably identity/ideology and material) for followers?
7. How does the rhetoric and 'selling' of the mobilisation identity differ between religious and ethnic mobilisation, with respect to own identity and that of the other?
8. How do successful and unsuccessful peacemaking efforts differ?
9. Policy implications for prevention and peacemaking.

6. References

- Aborisade, O., and Mundt, R.** 2001 *Politics in Nigeria*, London: Longman.
- Akindès, F.** 2007 'Mobilisation identitaire, inégalités horizontales et sociohistoire de la violence politique en Côte d'Ivoire', *CRISE Internal Paper*, Oxford: Centre for Research on Inequality, Human Security and Ethnicity, University of Oxford.
- Auvinen, J., and Nafziger, E. W.** 1999 'The sources of humanitarian emergencies', *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 43: 267-90.
- Berdal, M., and Malone, D.** 2000 *Greed & grievance: economic agendas in civil wars*, Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner.
- Bhakti, I. N., Yanuarti, S., and Nurhasim, M.** 2009 'Military Politics, Ethnicity and Conflict in Indonesia', *CRISE Working Paper No. 62*, Oxford: Centre for Research on Inequality, Human Security and Ethnicity, University of Oxford.
- Blau, P.** 1977 *Inequality and heterogeneity: a primitive theory of social structure*, New York: Free Press.
- Brown, D.** 1994 *The state and ethnic politics in Southeast Asia*, London, New York: Routledge.
- Brown, G., and Langer, A.** 2008 'Horizontal inequalities and conflict', Geneva: UNRISD.
- Brown, G., Tajima, Y., and Hadi, S.** 2005 *Overcoming violent conflict: peace and development analysis in Central Sulawesi*, Jakarta: Jakarta Conflict and Recovery Unit, UNDP.
- Caumartin, C.** 2005 'Racism, violence and inequality. An overview of the Guatemalan case', *CRISE Working Paper No. 11*. Oxford: Centre for Research on Inequality, Human Security and Ethnicity, University of Oxford.
- Cohen, A.** 1969 *Custom and politics in urban Africa*, Berkeley: University of California Press.
- 1974 *Two-dimensional man: an essay on the anthropology of power and symbolism in complex society*, Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Collier, P., and Hoeffler, A.** 2000 'Greed and grievance in civil war', *World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No. 2355*, Washington DC: World Bank.
- Collier, P., and World Bank.** 2003 *Breaking the conflict trap: civil war and development policy*, Washington, DC; New York: World Bank; Oxford University Press.
- Connor, W.** 1972 'Nation-building or nation-destroying?' *World Politics* 24(3): 319-355.
- Daugherty, L. J.** 2004 'The ethnicization of war and politics in the Balkans: a review essay', *The Journal of Slavic and Military Studies* 17(4): 643-672.
- Deneulin, S., and Bano, M.** 2009 *Religion in development*, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Diprose, R.** forthcoming 'A comparison of communal conflict dynamics and sub-national variations in violence: the case of Indonesia (province of Central Sulawesi) and Nigeria (Kaduna State)', DPhil thesis, Oxford Department of International Development, Oxford.
- Dudley, S. and Lloyd, C.** 2006 'Global-Local Cultural Links: Diaspora, Transnationalism, Solidarities and the Media', in V. Fitzgerald, F. Stewart and R. Venugopal (eds) *Globalization, self-determination and violent conflict*, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Dunn, L. A.** 'The role of religion in conflicts in the former Yugoslavia', unpublished paper, Department of Social Science, Program on the Analysis and Resolution of Conflicts, Syracuse University.
- Ehrhardt, D.** 2007 'Authoritative voices: informal authorities and conflict resolution in Kano, Nigeria', MPhil thesis, Oxford Department of International Development, Oxford.

- Fasehun, F. I.** 2002. *Frederick Fasehun, the son of Oodua*, Lagos: Inspired Communication.
- Fearon, J., and Laitin, D.** 1996 'Explaining interethnic cooperation', *The American Political Science Review* 90(4): 715-735.
- Gourevitch, P.** 1998 *We wish to inform you that tomorrow we will be killed with our families: stories from Rwanda*, New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux.
- Guichaoua, Y.** 2006 'The making of an ethnic militia: the Oodua People's Congress in Nigeria', *CRISE Working Paper No. 26*, Oxford: Centre for Research on Inequality, Human Security and Ethnicity, University of Oxford.
- 2007 'Who joins ethnic militias? A survey of the Oodua People's Congress in Southwestern Nigeria' *CRISE Working Paper No. 44*, Oxford: Centre for Research on Inequality, Human Security and Ethnicity, University of Oxford.
- Grew, R.** 1997 'On seeking the cultural context of fundamentalism', in Martin E. Marty and R. Scott Appleby (eds.), *Religion, Ethnicity and Self-Identity. Nations in Turmoil*, London: University Press of New England, pp. 19-34.
- Gurr, T. R.** 1993 *Minorities at risk: a global view of ethnopolitical conflicts*, Washington DC: Institute of Peace Press.
- Harff, B.** 2003 'No lessons learned from the Holocaust? Assessing risks of genocide and political mass murder since 1955', *American Political Science Review* 97 (1): 57-73.
- Hechter, M.** 2004 'From class to culture', *American Journal of Sociology* 110(2): 400-45.
- Higazi, A.** 2009 'Interpreting religious conflict in Nigeria', CRISE Internal Paper, Oxford: Centre for Research on Inequality, Human Security and Ethnicity, University of Oxford.
- Hintjens, H. M.** 1999 'Explaining the 1994 genocide in Rwanda', *The Journal of Modern African Studies* 37(2): 241-286.
- Hoffman, B.** 1993 "'Holy terror": the implications of terrorism motivated by a religious imperative' *Worldwide Department of Defense Combating Terrorism Conference*, Virginia Beach, VA.
- 2006 *Inside terrorism*, revised and expanded edition, New York: Columbia University Press.
- Homer-Dixon, T.** 1994 'Environmental scarcities and violent conflict: evidence from cases', *International Security* 19(1): 5-40.
- Horowitz, D.** 1985 *Ethnic groups in conflict*, Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Human Rights Watch** 2003 *The Oodua People's Congress: fighting violence with violence*, Washington: Human Rights Watch.
- Humphreys, M.** 2005 'Natural resources, conflict, and conflict resolution: uncovering the mechanisms', *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 49 (4): 508-537.
- Huntington, S. P.** 1996 *The clash of civilizations and the remaking of world order*, New York: Simon & Schuster.
- 2002 *The clash of civilizations and the remaking of world order*, New York: Free Press.
- Husain, E.** 2007 *The Islamist: why I joined radical Islam in Britain, what I saw inside and why I left*, London: Penguin.
- Iannaccone, L. R., and Berman, E.** 2006 'Religious extremism: the good, the bad, and the deadly', *Public Choice* 128(1/2): 109-29.
- Jaber, H.** 2007 *Hezbollah: Born with a vengeance* New York Columbia University Press.
- Jönsson, J.** 2007 'The overwhelming minority: traditional leadership and ethnic conflict in Ghana's Northern Region', *CRISE Working Paper No. 30*, Oxford: Centre for Research on Inequality, Human Security and Ethnicity, University of Oxford.
- Juergensmeyer, M.** 1993 *The new Cold War? Religious nationalism confronts the secular state*, Berkeley: University of California Press.

- Justino, P.** 2008 'Poverty and violent conflict: a micro level perspective on the causes and duration of warfare' *MICROCON: Research Working Paper 6*. Brighton: MICROCON.
- Kalyvas, S. N.** 2008 'Ethnicity and the dynamics of civil war', paper prepared for the *Rethinking Ethnicity and Ethnic Strife: multidisciplinary perspectives* conference, Budapest, September 25-27..
- Keen, D.** 1998 *The economic functions of violence in civil wars*, Oxford: Oxford University Press for the International Institute for Strategic Studies.
- Keen, D. and International Peace Academy.** 2005 *Conflict & collusion in Sierra Leone*, Oxford; New York: James Currey; Palgrave.
- Khoo, B. T.** 2001 'Managing ethnic relations in post-crisis Malaysia', Paper presented at the *Racism and Public Policy* conference, Durban, South Africa, September 3-5.
- Lacina, B.** 2006 'Explaining the severity of civil wars', *The Journal of Conflict Resolution* 50(2): 276-289.
- Langer, A.** 2005 'Horizontal inequalities and violent group mobilisation in Côte d'Ivoire', *Oxford Development Studies* 33(1). 25-45.
- 2009 'Living with diversity: the peaceful management of horizontal inequalities in Ghana', *Journal of International Development* 21(4). 534-546.
- Langer, A., Mustapha, A. R., and Stewart, F.** 2007 'Horizontal Inequalities in Nigeria, Ghana and Côte d'Ivoire: Issues and Policies ' *CRISE Working Paper No. 45*, Oxford: Centre for Research on Inequality, Human Security and Ethnicity, University of Oxford.
- Last, M.** 2007 'Muslims and Christians in Nigeria: an economy of political panic', *The Round Table* 96(392): 605-616.
- Marshall-Fratani, R.** 2006 'The war of "who is who": autochthony, nationalism, and citizenship in the Ivoirian crisis', *African Studies Review* 49(2): 29-43.
- May, R. J.** 1992 'The religious factor in three minority movement: the Moro of the Philippines, the Malays of Thailand, and Indonesia's West Papuans', *Contemporary Southeast Asia* 13(4): 396-414.
- McCauley, C.** 2008 'The political power of ethnicity: a psychological approach' paper prepared for the *Rethinking Ethnicity and Ethnic Strife: multidisciplinary perspectives* conference, Budapest, September 25-27.
- Montalvo, J., and Reynal-Querol, M.** 2005 'Ethnic polarisation, potential conflict, and civil wars', *American Economic Review* 95(3): 796-816.
- Mustapha, R.** 2005 'Ethnic structure, inequality and governance of the public sector in Nigeria', *CRISE Working Paper No. 18*, Oxford: *Centre for Research on Inequality, Human Security and Ethnicity*, University of Oxford.
- Nordås, R.** 2007 'Identity polarization and conflict: state building in Cote d'Ivoire and Ghana' Paper prepared for the *Polarization and Conflict* meeting, Gaillac, France, June 7-9.
- Oyediran, O.** (ed.) 1979 *The Nigerian 1979 elections*, London: Macmillan.
- Powers, G. F.** 1996 'Religion, conflict and prospects for reconciliation in Bosnia, Croatia and Yugoslavia ', *Journal of International Affairs* 50(1): 221-53.
- Ranger, T.** 1983 'The invention of tradition in Colonial Africa', in E. Hobsbawm and T. Ranger (eds) *The Invention of Tradition*, Cambridge: Canto.
- Reynal-Querol, M.** 2002 'Ethnicity, political systems, and civil wars', *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 46(1): 29-54.
- Rapoport, D. C.** 1984 'Fear and trembling: terrorism in three religious traditions', *The American Political Science Review* 78(3): 658-677.
- Reyntjens, F.** 1995 *Rwanda: trois jours qui ont fait basculer l'histoire*, Paris: l'Harmattan.
- Ruane, J., and Todd, J.** 2009 'Ethnicity and religion: redefining the research agenda', Dublin: University College, Dublin.

- Sambanis, N.** 2001 'Do ethnic and nonethnic civil wars have the same causes? A theoretical and empirical enquiry', *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 45(3): 259-282.
- Seul, J. R.** 1999 'Ours is the way of God': religion, identity and intergroup conflict', *Journal of Peace Research* 36(5): 553-569.
- Shenk, G. E.** 1993 *God with us? the roles of religion in conflicts in the former Yugoslavia*, Uppsala, Sweden: Life & Peace Institute.
- Simmel, G., and Simmel, G.** 1955 *Conflict*, Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press.
- Stern, J.** 2003 *Terror in the name of God: why religious militants kill*, 1st ed., New York: Ecco.
- Stewart, F.** 2008a 'Global aspects and implications of horizontal inequalities: inequalities experienced by Muslims worldwide ' *CRISE Working Paper No. 60*, Oxford: Centre for Research on Inequality, Human Security and Ethnicity, University of Oxford.
- 2008b *Horizontal inequalities and conflict: understanding group violence in multiethnic societies*, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Sundaram, J. K.** 2001 'Malaysia's New Economic Policy and "National Unity"', Paper presented at the *Racism and Public Policy* conference, Durban, September 3-5.
- Turton, D.** 1997 'War and ethnicity: global connections and local violence in North East Africa and Former Yugoslavia', *Oxford Development Studies* 25: 77-94.